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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 63
Volume 63, Number 1, May 2008
- Klaus Abbink

, Jordi Brandts
:
24. Pricing in Bertrand competition with increasing marginal costs. 1-31 - Christopher P. Chambers:

Proper scoring rules for general decision models. 32-40 - Tarek Coury, Vladimir P. Petkov:

Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies. 41-55 - David Dickinson, Marie-Claire Villeval

:
Does monitoring decrease work effort?: The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories. 56-76 - Michael A. Fishman:

Asymmetric evolutionary games with non-linear pure strategy payoffs. 77-90 - Thomas Giebe

, Elmar Wolfstetter
:
License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers. 91-106 - Ani Guerdjikova:

Case-based learning with different similarity functions. 107-132 - Chih Chang, Cheng-Cheng Hu:

A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of bankruptcy problems. 133-144 - René Kirkegaard, Per Baltzer Overgaard

:
Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions. 145-165 - Eliot Maenner:

Adaptation and complexity in repeated games. 166-187 - Alan D. Miller

:
Group identification. 188-202 - Christina Pawlowitsch

:
Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system. 203-226 - Shie Mannor

, Nahum Shimkin:
Regret minimization in repeated matrix games with variable stage duration. 227-258 - Colin Sparrow, Sebastian van Strien

, Christopher J. Harris
:
Fictitious play in 3×3 games: The transition between periodic and chaotic behaviour. 259-291 - Dale O. Stahl, Ernan Haruvy:

Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees. 292-307 - Jakub Steiner

:
Coordination cycles. 308-327 - Satoru Takahashi:

The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses. 328-340 - Annick Laruelle

, Federico Valenciano
:
Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index. 341-353 - Jens Josephson

, Karl Wärneryd
:
Long-run selection and the work ethic. 354-365 - Philipp C. Wichardt

:
Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample. 366-369 - Eldad Yechiam, Jerome R. Busemeyer

:
Evaluating generalizability and parameter consistency in learning models. 370-394 - Eduardo Zambrano

:
Epistemic conditions for rationalizability. 395-405
- Bingyong Zheng:

Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals. 406-416
- William H. Sandholm:

H. Peyton Young, , Strategic Learning and Its Limits (2004) Oxford Univ. Press 165 pages. 417-420
Volume 63, Number 2, July 2008
- Ehud Kalai:

Presidential address. 421-430 - Philip J. Reny:

2004 World Congress Special Issue. 431-434 - Mark Satterthwaite, Artyom Shneyerov:

Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate. 435-467 - Kris De Jaegher:

Efficient communication in the electronic mail game. 468-497 - Jeffrey C. Ely, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine:

When is reputation bad? 498-526 - Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris:

Ex post implementation. 527-566 - Hervé Moulin:

Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness. 567-587 - Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen:

Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles. 588-620 - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:

New complexity results about Nash equilibria. 621-641 - Ryan Porter, Eugene Nudelman, Yoav Shoham:

Simple search methods for finding a Nash equilibrium. 642-662 - David Gill, Daniel Sgroi

:
Sequential decisions with tests. 663-678 - Yaron Azrieli, Ehud Lehrer:

The value of a stochastic information structure. 679-693

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