1983-85 famine in Ethiopia
A widespread famine affected the inhabitants of today's Eritrea and Ethiopia from 1983 to
1985.The worst famine to hit the country in a century, in northern Ethiopia it led to more than
400,000 deaths, but more than half this mortality can be attributed to human rights abuses that
caused the famine to come earlier, strike harder, and extend further than would otherwise
have been the case.Other areas of Ethiopia experienced famine for similar reasons, resulting in
tens of thousands of additional deaths. The tragedy as a whole took place within the context of
more than two decades of insurgency and civil war.
The great famine of 1983–5 is often ascribed to drought, and while climatic causes and
consequences certainly played a part in the tragedy, it has been shown that widespread
drought occurred only some months after the famine was under way. The famines that struck
Ethiopia between 1961 and 1985, and in particular the one of 1983–5, were in large part
created by government policies, specifically the set of counter-insurgency strategies employed
and so-called 'social transformation' in non-insurgent areas.
Background
Prior to the 1983–5 famine, two decades of wars of national liberation and other anti-
government conflict had raged throughout Ethiopia and Eritrea. The most prominent feature of
the fighting was the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by the Ethiopian army and
air force. Excluding those killed by famine and resettlement, more than 150,000 people were
killed.
The economy of Ethiopia is based on agriculture: almost half of GDP, 60% of exports, and 80%
of total employment come from agriculture.
In 1973, a famine in Wollo killed an estimated 40,000 to 80,000, mostly of the marginalized
Afar herders and Oromo tenant farmers, who suffered from the widespread confiscation of
land by the wealthy classes and government of Emperor Haile Selassie. Despite attempts to
suppress news of this famine, leaked reports contributed to the undermining of the
government's legitimacy and served as a rallying point for dissidents. In 1974, a group of
Marxist soldiers known as the Derg overthrew Haile Selassie. The Derg addressed the Wollo
famine by creating the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) to examine the causes of the
famine and prevent its recurrence, and then abolishing feudal tenure on March 1975. The RRC
initially enjoyed more independence from the Derg than any other ministry, largely due to its
close ties to foreign donors and the quality of some its senior staff. As a result, insurgencies
began to spread into the countries administrative regions.
By late 1976 insurgencies existed in all of the country's fourteen administrative regions. The
Red Terror (1977–1978) marked the beginning of a steady deterioration in the economic state
of the nation, coupled with extractive policies targeting rural areas. The reforms of 1975 were
revoked and the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) was tasked with extracting food
from rural peasantry at low rates to placate the urban populations. The very low fixed price of
grain served as a disincentive to production, and some peasants had to buy grain on the open
market in order to meet their AMC quota. Citizens in Wollo, which continued to be stricken
with drought, were required to provide a "famine relief tax" to the AMC until 1984. The Derg
also imposed a system of travel permits to restrict peasants from engaging in non-agricultural
activities, such as petty trading and migrant labor, a major form of income supplementation.
However, the collapse of the system of State Farms, a large employer of seasonal laborers,
resulted in an estimated 500,000 farmers in northern Ethiopia losing a component of their
income. Grain wholesaling was declared illegal in much of the country, resulting in the number
of grain dealers falling from between 20,000 to 30,000 to 4,942 in the decade after the
revolution.
The nature of the RRC changed as the government became increasingly authoritarian.
Immediately after its creation its experienced core of technocrats produced highly regarded
analyses of Ethiopian famine and ably carried out famine relief efforts. However, by the 1980s
the Derg had compromised its mission. The RRC began with the innocuous scheme of creating
village workforces from the unemployed in state farms and government agricultural schemes
but, as the counter-insurgency intensified, the RRC was given responsibility for a program of
forced resettlement and villagization. As the go-between for international aid organizations and
foreign donor governments, the RRC redirected food to government militias, in particular in
Eritrea and Tigray. It also encouraged international agencies to set up relief programs in regions
with surplus grain production, which allowed the AMC to collect the excess food. Finally, the
RRC carried out a disinformation campaign during the 1980s famine, in which it portrayed the
famine as being solely the result of drought and overpopulation and tried to deny the existence
of the armed conflict that was occurring precisely in the famine-affected regions. The RRC also
claimed that the aid being given by it and its international agency partners were reaching all of
the famine victims.
Famine
Five Ethiopian provinces—Gojjam, Eritrea, Hararghe, Tigray, and Wollo—all received record low
rainfalls in the mid-1980s. In the south, a separate and simultaneous cause was the
government's response to Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) insurgency. In 1984, President
Mengistu Haile Mariam announced that 46% of the Ethiopian Gross National Product would be
allocated to military spending, creating the largest standing army in sub-Saharan Africa; the
allocation for health in the government budget fell from 6% in 1973–4 to 3% by 1990–1.
Although a UN estimate of one million deaths is often quoted for the 1983–5 famine, this
figure has been challenged by famine scholar Alex de Waal. In a major study, de Waal criticized
the United Nations for being "remarkably cavalier" about the numbers of people who died, with
the UN's one-million figure having "absolutely no scientific basis whatsoever," a fact which
represents "a trivialization and dehumanization of human misery."
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the disaster has been well documented: in addition to
hundreds of thousands of deaths, millions were made destitute. Media activity in the West,
along with the size of the crisis, led to the Do They Know It's Christmas? charity single and the
July 1985 concert Live Aid, which elevated the international profile of the famine and helped
secure international aid. In the early to mid-1980s there were famines in two distinct regions of
the country, resulting in several studies of one famine that try to extrapolate to the other or
less cautious writers referring to a single widespread famine. The famine in the southeast of the
country was brought about by the Derg's counterinsurgency efforts against the OLF. However,
most media referring to "the Ethiopian famine" of the 1980s refers to the severe famine in
1983-5 centered on Tigray and northern Wollo, which further affected Eritrea, Begemder and
northern Shewa. Living standards had been declining in these government-held regions since
1977, a "direct consequence" of Derg agricultural policies. A further major contributing factor
to the famine were the Ethiopian government's enforced resettlement programs, utilized as
part of its counter-insurgency campaign.
Despite RRC claims to have predicted the famine, there was little data as late as early 1984
indicating an unusually severe food shortage. Following two major droughts in the late 1970s,
1980 and 1981 were rated by the RRC as "normal" and "above normal". The 1982 harvest was
the largest ever, with the exception of central and eastern Tigray. RRC estimates for people "at
risk" of famine rose to 3.9 million in 1983 from 2.8 million in 1982, which was less than the
1981 estimate of 4.5 million. In February and March 1983, the first signs of famine were
recognized as poverty-stricken farmers began to appear at feeding centers, prompting
international aid agencies to appeal for aid and the RRC to revise its famine assessment. The
harvest after the main (meher) harvest in 1983 was the third largest on record, with the only
serious shortfall again being recorded in Tigray. In response, grain prices in the two northern
regions of Begemder and Gojjam fell. However, famine recurred in Tigray. The RRC claimed in
May 1984 that the failure of the short rains (belg) constituted a catastrophic drought, while
neglecting to state that the belg crops form a fourth of crop yields where the belg falls, but
none at all in the majority of Tigray. A quantitative measure of the famine are grain prices,
which show high prices in eastern and central Tigray, spreading outward after the 1984 crop
failure.
A major drain on Ethiopia's economy was the ongoing civil war, which pitched rebel
movements against the Soviet and Cuban backed Derg government. This crippled the country's
economy further and contributed to the governments lack of ability to handle the crisis to
come.
By mid-1984 it was evident that another drought and resulting famine of major proportions had
begun to affect large parts of northern Ethiopia. Just as evident was the government's inability
to provide relief. The almost total failure of crops in the north was compounded by fighting in
and around Eritrea, which hindered the passage of relief supplies. Although international relief
organizations made a major effort to provide food to the affected areas, the persistence of
drought and poor security conditions in the north resulted in continuing need as well as hazards
for famine relief workers. In late 1985, another year of drought was forecast, and by early 1986
the famine had spread to parts of the southern highlands, with an estimated 5.8 million people
dependent on relief food. In 1986, locust plagues exacerbated the problem.
Response to the famine
Despite the fact that the government had access to only a minority of the famine-stricken
population in the north, the great majority of relief was channelled through the government
side, prolonging the war.
The Ethiopian government's inability or unwillingness to deal with the 1984-85 famine
provoked universal condemnation by the international community. Even many supporters of
the Ethiopian regime opposed its policy of withholding food shipments to rebel areas. The
combined effects of famine and internal war had by then put the nation's economy into a state
of collapse.
The primary government response to the drought and famine was the decision to uproot large
numbers of peasants who lived in the affected areas in the north and to resettle them in the
southern part of the country. In 1985 and 1986, about 600,000 people were moved, many
forcibly, from their home villages and farms by the military and transported to various regions
in the south. Many peasants fled rather than allow themselves to be resettled; many of those
who were resettled sought later to return to their native regions. Several human rights
organizations claimed that tens of thousands of peasants died as a result of forced
resettlement.
Another government plan involved villagization, which was a response not only to the famine
but also to the poor security situation. Beginning in 1985, peasants were forced to move their
homesteads into planned villages, which were clustered around water, schools, medical
services, and utility supply points to facilitate distribution of those services. Many peasants fled
rather than acquiesce in relocation, which in general proved highly unpopular. Additionally, the
government in most cases failed to provide the promised services. Far from benefiting
agricultural productivity, the program caused a decline in food production. Although
temporarily suspended in 1986, villagization was subsequently resumed.
International view
Close to 8 million people became famine victims during the drought of 1984, and over 1 million
died. In the same year (October 23, a BBC news crew was the first to document the famine,
with Michael Buerk describing "a biblical famine in the 20th Century" and "the closest thing to
hell on Earth". The report shocked Britain, motivating its citizens to bring world attention to the
crisis in Ethiopia.
In January 1985 the RAF carried out the first airdrops from Hercules C-130s delivering food to
the starving people. Other countries including Sweden,East and West Germany, Poland,
Canada, USA and the Soviet Union were also involved in the international response.
Live Aid
Live Aid, a 1985 fund-raising effort headed by Bob Geldof (who had also organized the charity
group Band Aid the previous year), induced millions of people in the West to donate money and
to urge their governments to participate in the relief effort in Ethiopia. Some of the proceeds
also went to the famine hit areas of Eritrea. The event was one of the most widely-viewed
television broadcasts in history.
Effect on aid policy
The manner in which international aid was routed through the RRC gave rise to criticism that
forever changed the way in which governments and NGOs respond to international
emergencies taking place within conflict situations. International aid supplied to the
government and to relief agencies working alongside the government became part of the
counter-insurgency strategy of the government. It therefore met real and immediate need, but
also prolonged the life of Mengistu's government. The response to the emergency raised
disturbing questions about the relationship between humanitarian agencies and host
governments.
Aid money and rebel groups
On 3 March 2010, Martin Plaut of the BBC published evidence that millions of dollars worth of
aids to the Ethiopian famine were spent in buying weapons by the Tigrayan People's Liberation
Front, a communist group trying to overthrow the Ethiopian government at the time. Rebel
soldiers said they posed as merchants as "a trick for the NGOs". The report also cited a CIA
document saying aid was "almost certainly being diverted for military purposes". One rebel
leader estimated $95 million (£63 million). Plaut also said that other NGOs were under the
influence or control of the Derg military junta. Some journalists suggested that the Derg was
able to use Live Aid and Oxfam money to fund its enforced resettlement and "villagification"
programmes, under which at least 3 million people are said to have been displaced and
between 50,000 and 100,000 killed. These reports were later refuted by the Band Aid Trust and
after a seven-month investigation, the BBC found its reporting had been misleading regarding
Band Aid's money and had also contained numerous errors of fact and misstatements of
evidence:
“Following a complaint from the Band Aid Trust the BBC has investigated these statements and
concluded that there was no evidence for them, and they should not have been broadcast. The
BBC wishes to apologise unreservedly to the Band Aid Trust for the misleading and unfair
impression which was created.
