© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

METAPHILOSOPHY
Vol. 50, No. 5, October 2019
0026-1068

WHAT IS A THING?

M. ORESTE FIOCCO

Abstract: “Thing” in the titular question of this paper should be construed as hav-
ing the utmost generality. In the relevant sense, a thing just is an entity, an existent,
a being. The present task is to say what a thing of any category is. This task is the
primary one of any comprehensive and systematic metaphysics. Indeed, an answer
provides the means for resolving perennial disputes concerning the integrity of the
structure in reality—whether some of the relations among things are necessary
merely given those relata themselves—and the intricacy of this structure—whether
some things are more or less fundamental than others. After considering some rea-
sons for thinking the generality of the titular question makes it unanswerable, the
paper propounds the methodology, original inquiry, required to answer it. The key
to this methodology is adopting a singular perspective; confronting the world as
merely the impetus to inquiry, one can attain an account of what a thing must be.
Radical ontology is a systematic metaphysics—broadly Aristotelian, essentialist,
and nonhierarchical—that develops the consequences of this account. With it, it
is possible to move past stalemate in metaphysics by revealing the grounds of a
principled choice between seemingly incommensurable worldviews.

Keywords: essentialism, fundamentality, methodology, necessity, neo-Aristo­telianism,

ontology.

1. Introduction
“Thing” in the titular question should be construed as having the utmost
generality. In the relevant sense, a thing just is an entity, an existent, a
being (I make no distinction among these). The titular question is, then,
one about the members of the summum genus, the all-inclusive category.
Language can mislead, suggesting the presence of some thing when, in
fact, none is there, but anything in the world is a thing. If there be material
objects, mental entities, essences, forms, kinds, properties, relations, modes,
tropes, events, processes, forces, laws, states of affairs, facts, propositions,
moments, points, collections, sets, numbers, holes, privations—what have
you—each example of any of these varieties is a thing. The present task is
to say what a thing of any variety is.
One might think little hangs on such an indiscriminate question. This,
however, would be a mistake. Indeed, I believe this question is the primary
one of any systematic metaphysics. A systematic metaphysics provides

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

650 M. ORESTE FIOCCO

insight into what the world is and, more specifically, how things in the
world are related—what a thing is determines the extent of these relations
and their force and complexity. Since much of the contention in meta-
physics, from the beginning of the discipline to today, ultimately turns
on disagreement regarding just these issues, an explicit account of what a
thing is would be invaluable.
I develop these claims, thereby defending the significance of the titu-
lar question, in section 2. Regardless of this putative significance, some
will be dubious of the question, for it has long been maintained that
there can be no summum genus, no class that includes each thing just in
virtue of its existing. If this were so, the question of what a thing is would
be misguided, unanswerable. In section 3, I defend the legitimacy of the
question by considering—and dismissing—the reasons adduced for main-
taining there can be no summum genus, as well as an additional concern
that a satisfactory answer to the question cannot be given. Addressing
these reasons and this concern, however, brings to light the singular diffi-
culties in answering the titular question. In order to avoid these, one needs
to employ a unique methodology. I introduce this methodology, origi-
nal inquiry, in this section, then articulate, in section 4, the answer to the
titular question that it provides. I conclude, in section 5, by presenting the
principles of the systematic metaphysics, radical ontology, that follow from
this account of what a thing is and by briefly considering this broadly
Aristotelian position vis-à-vis more familiar ones.

2. What Hangs on the Question of What a Thing Is?

An answer to the question of what an existent is provides the basis of
a principled account of the scope of reality—what exists and what does
not—and, hence, what must be included in a comprehensive metaphysics.
Each thing within this scope stands in many relations. This complex of
relations and relata, each relation and each relatum likewise a thing, is the
structure in reality. There are two salient axes of disagreement regarding
this structure that are the mainsprings of much, if not most, of the dispute
in the history of Western metaphysics. One axis turns primarily on an issue
concerning the relations in this structure, the other on one concerning its
relata. I maintain that an answer to the question of what a thing is also
resolves, in a unifying way, disagreement along both axes. Hence, given
its role in both circumscribing reality and resolving pivotal disagreement
about the structure therein, this answer is the key to a comprehensive and
systematic metaphysics.
So consider these two axes of disagreement regarding the structure
in reality. The first concerns its integrity, the force—and origins—of the
relations that yield the structure. Some philosophers maintain that there
are necessary connections among things themselves, that some things,

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

 WHAT IS A THING? 651

independently of how they are thought of or described, must be related

as they are. Thus, certain things—substances, for example—are supposed
to be necessarily related, given how or what they are, to other things—the
kinds they instantiate or some of the properties they exemplify or other
substances. Or, for another example, certain things—states of affairs,
facts, or events—are supposed to be necessarily related to others—distinct
states of affairs, facts, or events. Other philosophers deny all such neces-
sary connections among things themselves, maintaining that any one thing
can be related anyhow to any other (and, hence, any relation that in fact
obtains could fail to). Those in this latter camp hold that any necessity
among things arises not from those things per se but from some other
source, such as the capacities of minds or the activities of conscious beings
engaging what is real.
Such disagreement about the provenance of necessity raises the grand
question of what role minds play in constructing mundane reality, as well
as associated questions regarding the appropriate accounts of contin-
gency, causation, the laws of nature, and explanation and its limits. These
issues are at the heart of the early modern rejection of Scholasticism, and
from that juncture they have largely directed the narrative of Western phi-
losophy (though disagreement surrounding them goes back much further,
to at least Protagoras). Contentious assumptions regarding them underlie
empiricism (and positivism) and so inspired Kant and the legion of ide-
alists, of various stripes, that followed him and all the realists, of various
stripes, that have objected to their views. Basic disagreement about the
integrity of structure remains central in contemporary debates between
the heirs of Hume and Kant and neo-Aristotelians.
What is crucial, for present purposes, is recognizing that this disagree-
ment about the necessity of the structure in reality turns on whether
there are necessary connections among things. The disagreement can be
resolved, therefore, with an account of what a thing is. If anything, just by
being, must be connected to some other thing(s), then the very existence
of a thing would require there be necessary structure in reality. Existence
and necessity would be concomitant. Given such necessary connections,
to some extent the world would be ready-made; there would be, prior to
the engagement of any mind, joints to carve. On the other hand, if a thing
could exist with no necessary connection to anything, then there would be
no necessity in the world itself, that is, reality consisting only of each thing
as it is in itself. Insofar as there appear to be necessary connections, these
must arise from a source other than those connected things (presumably
via some mind or being with a mind). Hence, this long-standing disagree-
ment about the integrity of structure depends on what a thing is.
The other axis of perennial disagreement regarding the structure in
reality concerns its intricacy, the complexity and bases of the relata that
are supposed to yield it. Consider some relatum that in relation to other,
ostensibly independent things contributes to the structure in reality. Some

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

652 M. ORESTE FIOCCO

philosophers maintain that such a thing can be dependent upon—made up

of or based on—other things, in the sense that the very being of the thing
is derived from other things.1 Certain things—a wooden table or a statue
or a mental property, for example—are supposed to be derived from
others—cellulose molecules, a lump of clay, a physical property, respec-
tively. Thus, the existence of one thing (or that thing being what it is or its
having its distinguishing features) is explicable in terms of some other
thing(s). There is a variety of putative relations here—composition, con-
stitution, grounding, realization, emergence, and so on—so there is a good
deal of contention.2 This contention lacks any obvious unity. Some deny
that composition ever occurs, some maintain constitution is identity, some
repudiate grounding altogether, and so forth, with one’s position regard-
ing a certain relation not clearly determinative of one’s position regarding
another. It is, however, widely taken for granted that there are at least
some such constitutive dependence relations. Whether indeed there are is a
point worth examining.
Such disagreement about whether (or under what conditions) one thing
can make another be raises the profound question of ontological status,
whether there are levels in being. If the structure in reality were hierarchi-
cal, there would be something distinctive about those things that make
others yet are themselves not made to be, for these would be the ultimate
grounds of an explanation for how the world is. Whereas necessity is cru-
cial to the integrity of structure, it is fundamentality that is key to its intri-
cacy. Fundamentality is often construed—mistakenly, as I argue—as the
correlate of ontological dependence, whereby what is fundamental is not
ontologically dependent. The fundamental is supposed to be what builds
but is not built; what is simple or not constituted or ungrounded. Such
issues have been contentious from the beginning of Western philosophy, at
least since Aristotle’s critique of the atomism of Democritus. This critique
motivated Epicurus and his followers, leading to modern corpusculari-
anism and contemporary physicalist materialism. Controversy has been
compounded in recent decades by various reductive and non-reductive
hierarchical views, involving a host of putative constitutive dependence
relations, and remains central to much contemporary metaphysical
discussion.
What is crucial, for present purposes, is recognizing that this disagree-
ment concerning fundamentality turns on whether one thing can be made

1
“Made up of ” and “based on” are metaphors. In this connection, see Karen Bennett:
“One theme that cuts a surprisingly large swath through philosophy is that of building up or
generating or constructing or giving rise to or getting out of . . . and there are many other
metaphors that could continue that list.” (Bennett 2011b, 79–80) Bennett calls all these
“building relations.”
2
Other putative examples of such relations include micro-based determination,
truth-making, singleton formation, bundling. See Bennett 2011b, § 2.

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

 WHAT IS A THING? 653

to be by another. Like the foregoing disagreement, regarding necessary

connections, disagreement here can be resolved with an account of what
a thing is. If a thing, by its very existence, precludes being made to be by
some other, then there would be no constitutive dependence relations, no
relations in which existence is derived or transferred. Consequently, there
would be no hierarchical structure in reality—no levels of being—and it
would be misguided to characterize the fundamental in terms of what
builds but is not built. No thing would be (ontologically) built. On the
other hand, if the very existence of one thing can be derived from another,
then there could be building relations, that is, relations of constitutive
dependence, perhaps even the variety widely presumed to be. An account
of what a thing is might, however, nonetheless provide some insight into
which building relations actually hold and the connections among them.
Thus, disagreement about both the integrity and the intricacy of the
structure in reality—whether its connections are necessary and what is to
be regarded as fundamental in it—turns on the question of what a thing
is. Determining its answer should be the primary goal of any systematic
metaphysics.

3. Can This Question Be Answered?

If indeed much in metaphysics hangs on answering the question of what
a thing is, some might conclude from this alone that metaphysics is futile.
From near the outset of the discipline, this question has been regarded
as fruitless. Aristotle argues in Book B of Metaphysics (998b21–27) that
being is not a genus, that there is no class that includes all things as things.
Of course, each thing is, but there is no basis here on which to expound
what it is to be. Were this so, there would be nothing informative to be said
about a being considered simply as a being and, thus, no answer to the
question of what a thing is.

3.1. Aristotle’s Argument That Being Is Not a Genus

The argument by Aristotle that being is not a genus occurs in the context
of his efforts to provide an account of what makes a familiar concrete
object be what it is (and do the things characteristic of that object). The
argument rests on several assumptions regarding how such objects are in-
dividuated. In particular, Aristotle assumes that an object is first individ-
uated as being of a certain kind and that a kind is characterized by means
of a real definition. A real definition is a set of conditions determining
what that kind is in terms of a general class (that subsumes that kind) and
a specific difference that distinguishes that kind of thing, that is, that spe-
cies, from others in the general class. Thus, a given man is individuated as a
man, a certain kind of animal, by exhibiting general features characteristic

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

654 M. ORESTE FIOCCO

of animals and by exhibiting rationality, a specific capacity that distin-

guishes men from all other animals.
This account of the individuation of objects requires certain con-
straints. Thus, it is supposed to be impossible for a genus itself to apply to
the specific difference that distinguishes a species of that genus. To illus-
trate: Being an animal cannot apply to rationality, for, first of all, rational-
ity is itself not an animal. Furthermore, if being an animal were to apply
to rationality, any rational thing would be an animal, and so “rational
animal” would be redundant and would not characterize a specific kind of
animal. Being, however, were it a genus, would apply to any specific differ-
ence, because every specific difference has being, that is, exists. (For exam-
ple, rationality must exist if it is being rational that distinguishes humans
from other animals.) Therefore, being violates the supposed constraint and
so cannot be a genus.
This argument is not convincing. Even if one accepts that objects
are individuated by real definitions, the putative constraints on such an
account are not well justified. In particular, the constraint on which the
above argument rests, namely, that it is impossible for a genus itself to
apply to a specific difference (of that genus), is merely presumed. This
constraint is plausible enough when considered in light of certain exam-
ples (like being an animal and rationality), but there is no reason to think
that it generalizes to most or all cases, including the pertinent one of being.
Of course, as just observed, being, as a genus, would apply to any specific
difference, but whether the resulting definition is redundant or otherwise
unacceptable cannot be evaluated in the absence of any particular pro-
posal. (A related concern about circularity is addressed in the next section.)
Although some support is offered for the relevant constraint in the
Topics, this support is also based on example rather than general princi-
ple.3 It seems to me misguided, then, to think that a sweeping and all-
important question regarding existence—what each thing is—is settled by
a brief argument resting on an unjustified constraint concerning, in par-
ticular, the individuation of familiar concrete objects.4 Relatedly, and
more significantly, this argument from individuation via real definition
includes a number of quite precise presuppositions about things (such as
that a genus cannot apply to a specific difference of that very genus) that
are unacceptable in the context of trying to explicate what a thing—
anything whatsoever—is in the first place.
Therefore, I conclude that it is by no means obvious that being cannot
be a genus and that there is no summum genus of all things. This is corrob-
orated in contemporary discussion of this issue: some take it for granted

3
See Top. VI.6, 144a31–b3, and Madigan’s commentary, page 74, on Metaphysics, Book
B and Book K, 1–2 (Aristotle 2000).
4
Alexander of Aphrodisias seems to have criticized Aristotle on similar grounds; see
Madigan’s commentary, page 74.

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

 WHAT IS A THING? 655

that there is a summum genus (see, e.g., Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1994,
17–18, and Lowe 2006, 7–8, 39); others take pains to leave open the ques-
tion of whether there is (see, e.g., van Inwagen 2013, 15–16, esp. n. 8); yet
others, for reasons that seem problematic, deny that there is.5

3.2. The Circularity of a Real Definition of Thing

If one rejects doctrinal Aristotelian (and other supposed) reasons for
maintaining there is no summum genus, and takes it to be an open question
whether thing is a kind, one might nevertheless be pessimistic regarding an
insightful answer to the titular question given its utter generality. With
some reflection, it is clear there can be no real definition of thing along the
lines offered for other kinds. These definitions are provided by citing some
general class and then distinguishing the definiendum from among that
class by its peculiar properties; in this case, however, one is seeking illumi-
nation of the general class, the all-inclusive summum genus. Moreover, if
a real definition requires a genus and a specific difference, and any specific
difference exists, then being will be differentiated by itself, and so the re-
sulting definition, if not redundant (see the preceding section), would be
objectionably circular. (Indeed, it is this sort of consideration that, in part,
leads some to deny that being is a genus; see Oderberg 2007, 107).
These concerns about the form of a real definition and its circularity
are misplaced. A real definition is meant to illuminate what some kind is
essentially; it makes perspicuous what it is to be something (of that kind).
A traditional sort of real definition—an analytic definition, a definition
ad genus per differentiam—might provide the means of doing this for
some kinds, while incapable of doing so in the case of thing (that is, being).
Failure in the latter case does not show that there can be no real definition,
for there is no reason to think that every such definition must have the
same form. There surely can be other manners of providing an explicatory
account of what something is. The success of a proposed explication or
real definition needs to be assessed on the basis of the insight it provides,
not whether it has any particular form. Still, what a thing is cannot be
given in terms of anything but some thing—there can be no other means
to articulate the account. Furthermore, every definition is of one thing in
terms of another (or others). The definition of thing can be no different.
If one is trying to illuminate what a thing—anything at all—is via a real

5
Thus, Amie Thomasson (2007, 113–14), following David Wiggins (2001, 69), argues that
being is not a kind because “being” is not a sortal. The argument conflates linguistic or con-
ceptual issues with ontological ones and also presumes that all things must conform to per-
sistence conditions and so exist in time. David Oderberg (2007, 37, § 5.3) denies that being is
a genus because he accepts the Scholastic doctrine of the Analogy of Being. This doctrine,
however, has its roots in the work of Aristotle considered above, where the claims on which
it is based were found to lack appropriate justification.

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

656 M. ORESTE FIOCCO

definition, and that definition must be in terms of a thing (or things), such
a definition is bound to be, in some way, circular.
Fortunately, not every circular, that is, impredicative, definition is inap-
propriate or unilluminating. An impredicative definition is one that defines
some particular thing or kind by means of a totality that includes that
thing (or instances of that kind).6 Consideration of such definitions has
been undertaken in several contexts, for example, in attempts to address
the semantic paradoxes and to provide criteria of identity for various
kinds. There seems to be consensus among those who have considered
impredicative definitions—contra Russell (1956 [1908], 63)—that there is
nothing about impredicativity per se that makes it problematic.7 To para-
phrase Lowe: impredicativity is problematic only in the absence of an
appropriate supporting framework concerning the entities that one is try-
ing to define.8 Thus, each definition—impredicative or not—should be
evaluated on its own terms given one’s theoretical objectives.

3.3. The World as Impetus to Inquiry

So the question then arises of what supporting framework would be fruit-
ful for illuminating what something—anything—is. In order to appreci-
ate an explicatory account of thing, a real definition, which must be in
terms of something or other, one must have some wider perspective on
the definiendum. Here the prevalence of things seems to present an obsta-
cle. What is required is some feasible origin that is not explicitly or obvi-
ously about things yet nevertheless has purchase on them. Such a principle
needs to be entirely general, so that it may bear on all things, otherwise its
limited scope would render it unsuitable to provide the means of illumi-
nating what each and every thing is. Despite its generality, the principle
needs to be telling enough to provide a context in which to understand
what a thing is, yet not so telling as to preclude implausibly any particular
metaphysics. The purpose here, after all, is to provide a real definition of
thing that anyone would have to accept and then show how consequences
of this definition constrain, even settle, more controversial metaphysical
issues. Finally, the key principle needs to be plausible; if it were implau-
sible it would undermine, rather than augment, a real definition of thing
that accorded with it.
Thus, what is needed to appreciate a real definition of thing, a defi-
nition that cannot but be circular, is a contextualizing principle that has

6
Such an account of impredicativity, which comes from the work of Russell and
Whitehead, can be found in Gödel 1990 [1944]; Quine 1985, 166; and Lowe 1989.
7
See, for example, the papers by Gödel, Quine, and Lowe cited in note 6. Indeed, Gödel
argues that impredicative definitions are acceptable whenever the objects being defined exist
independently of one’s definitions.
8
See the concluding paragraph of Lowe 1989.

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

 WHAT IS A THING? 657

unlimited scope, is substantive without being tendentious, and is plausible.

The stringency of these criteria is daunting. Yet there is a source that meets
them, one that is so obvious that it goes unremarked in any but the most
rarefied investigations. The source is this—this encompassing array, the
world at large. Accepting this is not to assume that there is a material world
or an external world. Plausible as these assumptions might be, for present
purposes, they are far too controversial, presupposing too much about
what exists and what can be known. Rather, the principle I am demon-
strating is not in the least controversial, it merely displays an impetus to
inquiry. Such a datum is surely unquestionable. Any investigation, in any
circumstance, from the humblest—a child examining a flower, a person
looking to the sky—to the grandest metaphysical inquiry must accept it.
All inquiry begins with this, or some aspect of it.
Not even the most rabid skeptic could deny that there is a prompt to
ontological (and epistemological) investigation. Regard this prompt, this
impetus to inquiry, as the world. One can recognize the world in this sense
and yet assume nothing about its nature, not even that “it” is a thing.
From the perspective at this origin, the singular one of original inquiry,
all is given. There can be no distinction here between what is and what
can be known, between ontology and epistemology, because nothing—no
thing—is being presumed; no defined subject, no object, nothing internal,
nothing external. Hence, this perspective does not even permit a distinc-
tion between appearance and reality.
This is, admittedly, an extraordinary gambit—recognizing the world,
this encompassing array, yet not ipso facto supposing that any thing
exists—but such a move does not seem out of place in a rudimentary
investigation of everything. Indeed, such an unsettling opening should not
be entirely unfamiliar. It is redolent of the preliminary stances of others
(consider Descartes’s dans le poêle and Husserlian epoché). The attempt
to answer the titular question begins, therefore, with an incontrovertible
principle, the impetus to inquiry, yet eschews any supposition about the
nature and, at this point, explanatory basis of what is accepted, even that
what is being confronted is a thing. My suggestion is that the elusive and
unfamiliar—an explicatory account of a thing—can be apprehended in
the context of the overwhelmingly familiar—the world at large—and that
the aptness of the former can be evaluated by how well it can elucidate
what cannot be questioned. Once one has an answer to the question of
what a thing is, one can expect some insight into the world and how to
regard “it” (whether or not “it” is a thing).

3.4. Original Inquiry as a Methodology

The purpose of this entire section 3 is to argue that there is no obvious
reason to think there can be no informative account of what a thing of
any variety is. Indeed, I believe that there can be one and, hence, that the

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

658 M. ORESTE FIOCCO

titular question can be answered. Given the generality of this question,

though, answering it requires a unique methodology. This methodology,
call it original inquiry, begins with a certain perspective on the world, the
one articulated in the preceding subsection, and proceeds by illuminat-
ing prescriptions on being. Taking this perspective is necessary in order
to provide the appropriate context in which to appreciate the explicatory
account, the real definition, of a thing (with its unavoidable circularity).
So consider the world. Consider it anew, as simply the impetus to
inquiry. Regarding it in this way inspires a sense of the world as the “great
blooming, buzzing confusion” that William James supposed confronts an
infant before a mind discriminates a tractable array.9 Such consideration
refines the original datum to the extent that it is clear that the world is not
homogenous. It is, on the contrary, heterogeneous (motley, piebald, varie-
gated, multifarious, and so on.). Therefore, in accepting an impetus to
inquiry that is heterogeneous, what is accepted is a world that is thus—here
“thus” demonstrates the more or less determinate panoply immediately
present. (Some such panoply is available to anyone in any circumstance.)
There needs to be some explanation for how the world is thus, how
it is as it is. To deny this would be to deny the very possibility of suc-
cessful inquiry. All inquiry is directed either at the very phenomenon that
prompts it—its impetus—or at some derived phenomenon that arises only
in light of an originary impetus. If this derived phenomenon is to be intel-
ligible, there must be some account of the originary impetus, an account
that informs what is derivative and provides a basis for interpreting it.
Therefore, since the world just is the originary impetus for any inquiry, in
either case, successful inquiry requires some explanation for how the world
is as it is. Moreover, all inquiry not only begins with the world, it ends
with it. It begins with this impetus, insofar as inquiry is directed either at
the impetus or at what is derived from it; inquiry ends with this impetus,
insofar as every explanation of any phenomenon must be evaluated with
respect to an account of the impetus and comport with that account. So
the present point can be made baldly: if there is no explanation for how
the world is as it is, when the world is regarded simply as the impetus to
inquiry, no sense can be made of anything.
There might be compelling reasons to deny or, at least, be skeptical of
the possibility of successful inquiry given certain assumptions about the
nature of the world or of the capacities of mind or inquirers. There can
be no such reasons here, however. There are no assumptions being made
about the nature of the world and none regarding the mind (or inquirers).
All that is being accepted is an (unquestionable) impetus to inquiry; to
9
See chapter 13 of James’s Principles of Psychology. The reference here to James is not
merely casual. The ontological project in the present paper is closely related to James’s in
empirical psychology. In fact, this project seems to me to be a necessary precursor to James’s,
insofar as ontology has a certain primacy in inquiry concerning the mind, and intentionality
more specifically. In this connection, see Fiocco 2015 and 2019b.

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

 WHAT IS A THING? 659

maintain already that successful inquiry is impossible is not merely defeat-

ist but wholly unjustified. At the point of original inquiry, where there
cannot yet be a distinction between ontology and epistemology, skepti-
cism is not a legitimate option. Therefore, if successful inquiry is to be at
all possible—and, again, there can be no reason at this point for thinking
it is not—there must be some explanation for how the world is thus.
It is important to be clear about what is in need of explanation. What
needs to be explained is how the impetus to inquiry is as it is rather than
some other way. Such an explanation cannot be causal. Causal explana-
tions are supposed to account for how events occur in space over time
in terms of the laws of nature or the powers of the constituents of those
events. In the present context, a causal explanation would presuppose much
too much about what things exist and how they interact. Furthermore,
not only does it seem that the explanandum, an impetus to inquiry that is
thus, is not even susceptible to a causal explanation—it is all encompass-
ing and no mere event—but even if it were, such an explanation would not
explain the target. What requires explanation is not how the impetus to
inquiry arose or how it came to be thus; what is needed in the first instance
is, again, some explanation for how the impetus to inquiry is (now) as
it is. Such an explanation cannot be causal, it would be more generally
ontological, even transcendental (to use a provocative notion) in that it
would rely on certain background conditions having to be met in order
that more obvious ones be accounted for.
Regardless of the sort of explanation needed, if there is some explana-
tion for how the world is as it is, then the explanation must have a basis in
reality, in what exists. An explanation works by indicating some relation
between the explanandum and something or some things, elucidating the
former in terms of the latter. Explanation is, then, crucially relational and
is not merely between linguistic or representational entities.10 It is because
the explanans is as it is, and, hence, exists in the first place, that any insight
into the explanandum is available. Although one might assume nothing
about the explanandum—not even that it is itself a thing, an existent—one
cannot be similarly noncommittal about the explanans. One cannot
account for an explanandum, whatever it might or might not be, by no
means at all, and if the explanans were nothing it would be no means.
Therefore, if there is explanation, the explanans is something, some thing.
In this way, every explanation is based on what exists, and so explanation
is ontologically committing.
The world as the impetus to inquiry is not presumed to be a thing. Yet,
for the reasons given above, there is some explanation for how the world is
thus. Every explanation has a basis in what exists, and so if there is some
explanation for how the world is as it is, there is something. It is certainly
not implausible to suppose that something or other exists. On the contrary,
10
For this sort of realist view of explanation, see Ruben 1990 (in particular, chapter 7).

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

660 M. ORESTE FIOCCO

it seems incoherent to presume that nothing whatsoever exists. Whatever

a thing is, then, it must be able to provide the basis of an explanation, at
least in part, for how the world is as it is. So, by applying the methodology
of original inquiry as initiated above one obtains a preliminary answer to
the question of what a thing is: it is something that provides the basis
of an explanation for how the world is as it is. Note that though this is
circular—thing is characterized in terms of some thing—it is not vacu-
ous; the world, this unquestionable encompassing heterogeneous array,
provides context and gives it heft. But this is not a real definition or not
a satisfying one, for it says what a thing does, not what it is. What is still
needed is an account of what it is to be something capable of providing the
basis of an explanation for how the world is thus.

4. What a Thing Must Be: A Natured Entity

Original inquiry reveals that a thing provides the basis of explaining how
the world is thus, how it is as it is. It is a truism that explanation must
end at some point; a thing is whereby an explanation can end. The ques-
tion of what a thing is, therefore, becomes the question of what an entity
must be in order to play this determinative role. A thing, at least in part,
makes the world as it is; so that the world is thus is in virtue of some thing
(again, at least in part). Since it is a thing that provides the basis of at
least a partial explanation for how the world is as it is, there can be nothing
further that determines how a thing in its entirety is. If how a thing (in its
entirety) were explicable in terms of some other thing, the former would
be ontologically idle, making no contribution itself to how the world is;
such a “thing” would merely be a manifestation of the latter, that genuine
existent. Hence, if there were something that made a thing how “it” is,
“its” contribution to how the world is thus would be made by whatever
determines or makes “it” how “it” is. Yet if “it” itself were not capable of
contributing to a partial explanation for how the world is as it is—if “it”
itself were insufficient to do at least this—“it” would be no thing at all.
“It” could in principle make no contribution to the impetus to inquiry
and, therefore, is, literally, nothing.
Not only can a thing not be made how it is, it cannot be made to be by
something else. Suppose that x makes to be y, in the sense that y is “latent”
in x and so y derives its very existence from x.11 Makes to be is, if anything,
a relation (and if it is not anything at all, it cannot contribute to the struc-
ture in the world); as such, it relates things. If makes to be relates distinct
things, if x ≠ y, then both x and y must exist in order to stand in this rela-
tion; in which case, the existence of y is a precondition of its standing in the
relation. Consequently, it cannot be by standing in this relation that y exists.
11
This is how many, including Jonathan Schaffer, understand the relation of grounding.
See Schaffer 2009, 378, 379.

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

 WHAT IS A THING? 661

The very existence of y is, therefore, not attributable to or determined by x:

it is not the case that x makes to be y. If x = y, then “x” and “y” are merely
co-referential terms, and so y is merely a guise of x (and vice versa): it is not
the case that x makes to be some other thing. Furthermore, if one thing
cannot be made to be by something else, it follows that one thing cannot
make another thing be what it is. This is because no thing can exist without
being what it is. (Though some things might change how they are in certain
respects, this does not change, in the relevant sense, what they are.) That one
thing cannot make another be what it is stands to reason in light of the
foregoing conclusion, to wit, one thing cannot make another how it is (in its
entirety), for, presumably, how a thing is is not independent of what it is.
Therefore, each thing is an ontological locus in the sense that (i) its being
is not determined (by anything beyond itself), (ii) its being how it is (in its
entirety) is not explicable in terms of any other thing, (iii) its being what it
is is not explicable in terms of any other thing—it just is what it is—and
(iv) the existence of that thing is the basis of at least a partial explanation
for how the world is as it is. As the basis of an (at least partial) explanation
for how the world is thus, a thing is some ways or others. Given that at least
some of the ways a thing is are not explicable in terms of anything else and
so are attendant upon its being (and, thus, being what it is), as an ontolog-
ical locus, a thing is these ways simply because it is. Such a thing is natured
insofar as it must be certain ways just in existing; the explanation for its
being as it is (with respect to these ways) is simply its being what it is. One
might say that such a thing has a nature or has an essence, namely, those
ways it must be merely in existing. Such locutions should be avoided, how-
ever, for they are misleading. They suggest that a nature (or essence) is
itself some variety of thing—some thing to be had by another—and this
might suggest further that a thing is what it is because of its nature (or
essence). But, again, there is nothing that makes a thing what it is or as it
is essentially.12 So a thing is not an entity with a nature or with an essence,
although it is nonetheless natured and essentially certain ways.13

12
Hence, what is being espoused here is a sort of real essentialism, not the contemporary
essentialism made familiar by Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke, according to which an essence
is a set of properties a thing must have because it is these properties that make that thing what
it is. See Oderberg 2007, chapter 1, for this distinction and a convincing critique of contem-
porary essentialism. The real essentialism that I am propounding in this paper is quite differ-
ent from Oderberg’s, for my account of a thing leads me to reject Aristotelian forms and
hylomorphism in general.
13
It is important to not reify essences. Lowe also stresses this point (2013; 2008). The real
essentialism propounded here is more similar to Lowe’s than to Oderberg’s (see note 12). My
overall project is quite different from Lowe’s, however. I am attempting to justify and thereby
provide adequate foundation for a systematic metaphysics by asking the primary ontological
question, viz., What is a thing? Lowe simply adopts an Aristotelian framework and takes for
granted a notion of an entity in the most general sense, never articulating this notion. See
Lowe 1998, 180–81; Lowe 2006, 7.

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

662 M. ORESTE FIOCCO

In light of these considerations, I can now answer the titular

question, What is a thing? A thing is a natured entity. This real defini-
tion is, as was to be expected, circular—a thing is a natured thing—
nevertheless, it is not vacuous. This definition in terms of being natured
captures an important insight: with a thing there is nothing to explain
how it is as it is.14 This does not mean that each thing is an explanan-
dum lacking an explanans; rather, each thing is inexplicable, not even
amenable to explanation. Things are the bases of explanations, they are
themselves not to be explained. Each thing—of any variety whatso-
ever—is ontological bedrock, as it were.15 A natured entity just is, just
is what it is. It is being so that makes a thing a suitable basis of an (at
least partial) explanation for how the world is as it is, and of any other
explicable phenomenon. With this insight and the irrefragable need of
some explanation for how the world is thus, one has a robust account of
what it is to be.
What follows from this explicatory account of a thing is that what a
thing is is not determined by the ways it is; rather the ways it is—
specifically, how it is essentially—are determined simply by its being (and,
thus, being what it is).16 Better purchase on this claim can be obtained by
considering a different and perhaps more familiar one. Suppose, contrary
to this account of a thing, that a thing is what it is because of how it is.
That is, suppose a thing is made to be what it is because of the ways it is.
This is not farfetched; in fact, I suspect such an account is presumed by
most philosophers. On this alternative account, a thing is an apple because
it is round, red, organic, grows on certain trees, and so forth or is a sample
of water because it is liquid (at room temperature), potable, odorless, is of
the same stuff that fills rivers and lakes, is composed mostly of H2O mol-
ecules, and so on. Under scrutiny, however, this alternative account of
what makes a thing what it is is problematic. First of all, such an account
must apply to all things, not merely familiar concrete objects. But then one
must give an account of the ways that make, say, a red trope be what it is
or the ways that make the property of being potable what it is (and so exist
at all). These consequences indicate that the alternative account is mis-
guided. Worse, though, this account of what makes a thing what it is seems
incoherent, for an explanation of a thing’s being what it is cannot be based

14
One should not be misled by language here: being natured is not a property, that is, a
thing.
15
In Fiocco 2019a, I argue that each thing is fundamental.
16
This qualification is needed because some things can be, in addition to the ways they
are essentially, ways that they need not be. Call these ways how a thing is accidentally. How a
thing is accidentally—some way it does not have to be merely in existing (and, hence, being
what it is)—might be amenable to an explanation. But set such considerations aside for the
present. In this paper, I am addressing all things, and all things are some ways essentially,
even if they are not, in addition, certain ways merely accidentally.

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

 WHAT IS A THING? 663

on its being as it is, for it must first be in order to be as it is, and it cannot
be without being what it is.17
Therefore, by being as it is, a natured entity contributes to the world
by being the basis of an (at least partial) explanation for how the world
is thus. A thing is as it is, the ways it is (essentially), because of what it is,
and it is what it is simply in existing. So if there is a (general, instantiable)
property, say redness, there is no thing that makes redness redness or makes
redness a property. If there is a red mode (a particular instance of redness),
there is no thing that makes that red mode a red mode or a mode. This is
so even if there is some other thing—to wit, this apple—that must exist in
order for that very red mode to be identified as the mode it is (that is, the
particular redness of this apple) or something else—to wit, the property
redness—that the red mode could not exist in the absence of. If there is a
(general, instantiable) kind, say, apple, there is no thing that makes apple
apple or makes apple a kind. If there is a particular apple, there is no thing
that makes that apple an apple. If there is a state of affairs of this apple’s
being red, there is nothing that makes this a state of affairs or makes it the
state of affairs it is—and to the extent that there is reason to think that the
apple and its redness make this state of affairs be the state of affairs it is,
there is reason to think there is no state of affairs (rather than just an apple
and its redness). Similar claims can be made about a putative natured
entity of any other variety whatsoever. (I say more about the relations of
ontological dependence adverted to in this paragraph in the next section.)

5. Radical Ontology and Its Principles

The methodology of original inquiry provides the answer—a natured
entity—to the titular question. It also provides the context needed to
appreciate this answer. Radical ontology is a systematic metaphysics that
develops the consequences of this account of a thing. The system is radical
in that it arises from the roots of inquiry and ontological in that it begins,
not with impressions or ideas or concepts or phenomena, but with things,
that is, natured entities, themselves.
This account of what a thing is has some clear implications for the two
axes of perennial disagreement regarding the structure in reality presented
above. A first thing to note, however, is that, according to this account,
structure is not itself a thing. Structure, unlike a natured entity, is what “it”
is—a complex of relations and relata—because of these other things, these
relations and relata. The structure in reality is straightforwardly as “it” is
because they are as they are; a difference in being with respect to any rela-
tion or relatum is ipso facto a difference in structure. Accordingly, struc-
ture is no thing. Structure is indeed a multiplicity of things, but a bunch
17
Though, presumably, in many cases a thing can persist as what it is without being pre-
cisely as it is.

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

664 M. ORESTE FIOCCO

of things is itself no thing. (This is so despite the general term “structure”

and the singular term “the structure in reality.” As noted at the outset, the
grammar of natural language is no guide to what exists.)
So consider again disagreement regarding the integrity of the structure
in reality. The controversy here turns on whether some things, inde-
pendently of how they are thought of or referred to or otherwise inter-
acted with, must be related as they are. The upshot for the integrity of
structure given that each thing is a natured entity is obvious. As the basis
of an (at least partial) explanation for how the world is thus, each thing is,
in itself, some ways or other. Each way of being, that is, each quality, par-
ticular or general, is a thing.18 Since at least some of the ways a thing is are
attendant upon its very being—and, thus, its being what it is—as an onto-
logical locus, a thing is these ways simply because it is it. A thing must be
these certain ways just in existing. Therefore, there are necessary connec-
tions among things. That there are follows simply from the existence of
any natured entity. One of the principles of radical ontology, then, is that
some of the structure in reality must be as it is merely given the things this
structure comprises.
This result is perhaps not surprising, and is certainly not unwelcome,
in light of examining the disagreement regarding the integrity of struc-
ture. If there is to be any real controversy here, it must be plausible—or
at least coherent—that there could be absolutely no necessary connec-
tions among things as they are in themselves. Hence, there would have
to be some account of a thing, of what serves as the basis of an (at least
partial) explanation for how the world is thus, according to which things
could be any way whatsoever, interacting with any other thing anyhow.
But such a “thing,” one of pure potentiality, so indeterminate in its own
being, is incoherent. (A “thing” of pure potentiality need not be any par-
ticular way—not even of pure potentiality!—so such a thing might be con-
strained and, consequently, incapable of being some way or other.) Such
a thing is not feasible as the basis of a systematic metaphysics that would
provide insight into the world. It is precisely this sort of an account of a
thing, with its corresponding position regarding the integrity of structure,
that is precluded by a thing’s being a natured entity.
Now consider again disagreement regarding the intricacy of the struc-
ture in reality. The controversy here turns on whether one thing can be
made to be by or derived from another or, conversely, whether one thing
(or things) can make another be in the sense of providing the being through
which the other exists. There are also obvious upshots for the intricacy of
structure given that each thing is a natured entity. First of all, since a thing
provides the basis of at least a partial explanation for how the world is
thus, each thing must make its own distinctive contribution to the world.
18
I assume this here, though in other work—in deducing distinct categories of thing—I
argue for the claim.

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

 WHAT IS A THING? 665

How it is with respect to this contribution, then, cannot be explicable in

terms of some other thing—but, as argued above, neither can what it is
nor its very being. There are, then, no building relations, that is, no rela-
tions of constitutive dependence, whereby one thing is made to be by
another.19 In particular, there is no grounding of one thing in another, in
the sense characterized above. Moreover, there is no such thing as an
“ontological free lunch,” in David Armstrong’s sense (where, if one thing
supervenes on another, it need not be accorded the same ontological status
as the latter) (Armstrong 1989, 55–56), and, pace David Wiggins, each
thing is indeed something “over and above” any other (Wiggins 1968,
91–92). Regardless of its complexity, each and every thing is fundamental,
in that it must be included in an inventory of the world. To use a familiar
locution: if God were to make the world just as it is, he would have to
make every thing—not merely some of the things (the putative subvenient
basis, or “building blocks”) but all of them. Therefore, a second principle
of radical ontology is that there is no hierarchical structure in reality—no
levels of being—and it is misguided to characterize the fundamental in
terms of what builds but is not built (see Fiocco 2019a). Everything is
existentially on par; the world is ontologically “flat.”20
Although no thing is built from another, not everything is simple. A
thing can have parts. The parts of a whole, a complex thing, however, do
not make up that whole in the sense of making it be. In other words, a
whole does not constitutively depend on its parts; the whole and (each of)
its parts are equally fundamental. Nevertheless, a whole might be ontolog-
ically dependent on its parts or on some other thing(s) entirely. The notion
of ontological dependence is multifarious; there are different ways one
thing can ontologically depend on another.21 The egalitarian notion of
fundamentality on radical ontology, however, provides constraints on any
tenable account of ontological dependence. Whereas there are (and must
be) relations of ontological dependence in the jointly existing sense—
whereby the existence of one natured entity, given what it is, requires the

19
Of course, in other senses, one thing can be made (to be) by other things: a carpenter
can make (or build) a table, a tree can make fruit, parents can make a child. But this causal
and diachronic sense of making differs from the ontological and synchronic one pertinent
here. In none of these cases does one thing provide the very being—rather than merely the
materials, the nutrients, the genetic material—that determines and, hence, explains the com-
ing to be of another thing (at a particular moment).
20
This notion of a “flat” world comes from Karen Bennett. (See Bennett 2011a, 27, 28,
and Bennett 2011b, 88.) She is somewhat dismissive of such a view, assuming it to be false
(2011b) and calling it “crazypants” (2011a). I believe this unfavorable assessment is a result
of failing to begin with the primary ontological question of what a thing is and subsequent
oversight of the ontological difficulties attendant on the claim, crucial to positions like
Bennett’s, that one thing’s very being can come from another.
21
For instructive discussion of the varieties of ontological dependence see Koslicki 2012
and Tahko and Lowe 2015.

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

666 M. ORESTE FIOCCO

existence of another—there is no relation of ontological dependence in

the constitutive sense—whereby one thing makes another be. Such consid-
erations are among the more subtle upshots of radical ontology for the
intricacy of the structure in reality. Hence, being fundamental is not only
consistent with being complex, it is consistent with being ontologically
dependent.
Even in those cases where it seems natural to maintain that one thing
exists because of another—for example, singleton Socrates exists because
of Socrates; this red mode exists because of this (red) apple—this merely
indicates an asymmetric relation between distinct, equally fundamental,
entities. A singleton, given what it is, requires the existence of its sole mem-
ber (and not vice versa); a mode, as a mode, requires the existence of the
unique substance it characterizes (and not vice versa). What is illuminated
here—though not explained—is what one natured entity is, not that it is.
(Or perhaps something epistemic is being explained: how one is able to cog-
nize, identify or (epistemically) individuate one thing in light of another.)
Again, what it is for x to be ontologically dependent on y is not for the
very being of x to originate in y but rather for x, given what it is, to require
the existence of y. Therefore, ontological dependence in a nonhierarchical
world is merely a reflection of the necessary connections that arise from
the existence of things. Here is where the two axes of disagreement inter-
sect and are resolved together by the account of a thing as a natured entity.
Thus, the principles of radical ontology, emerging from original inquiry,
indicate structure in reality that is necessary and in which each and every
thing is fundamental. This structure arises merely from the existence of
things and so is there independently of the workings of any mind (but not
independently of minds, per se, for the structure includes many minds).
The view of the world revealed by original inquiry is, therefore, quite differ-
ent from those commonly taken for granted in modern and contemporary
metaphysics. Much more familiar are views on which the structure in real-
ity arises from features of the mind or the linguistic activities of conscious
beings, and a host of reductionist or constructivist views on which there
is hierarchical structure in reality with the very existence and natures of
most things explicable in terms of the existence and natures of a select
class of things. (Most commonly, this select class of privileged, “funda-
mental” things are tiny and material.)
These more familiar views are the heritage of a too-strict empiricism—a
reliance on the senses that overlooks more basic questions of intentionality,
of how mind and the world engage (see Fiocco 2019b)—and an associated
(and laudable) maxim to be properly scientific—that nonetheless has a paro-
chial conception of science. The views were developed by the giants of mod-
ern philosophy and were refined and perpetuated by the giants of
twentieth-century analytic philosophy, until the point when now their famil-
iarity has become dogmatic and hegemonic. Their progenitors were reacting
to the dogma and hegemony of Aristotelian Scholasticism. In recent years,

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

 WHAT IS A THING? 667

though, some have recognized the need, in order to address seemingly intrac-
table problems, to reexamine Aristotelian views that were long ago dis-
carded.22 There has, however, been very little direct engagement between
proponents of the familiar, standard, “modern scientific” metaphysical
views and those working in a neo-Aristotelian vein. This is understandable
given the deep differences in the principles with which they begin. Yet meta-
physicians on neither side present real reason (other than, perhaps, prag-
matic reasons) for adopting the principles they do. One might wonder, then,
given these two seemingly incommensurable approaches, yielding incompat-
ible pictures of the underlying structure in reality, which is the correct one.
Some of the consequences of radical ontology are deeply antithetical
to familiar Aristotelian doctrines; still, the system clearly shares more
in common with the older tradition than with the newer, “modern” one.
Therefore, one of the purposes of this paper is to show—by asking the
primary ontological question, What is a thing?—that the essentialism and
the rejection of a certain ontological hierarchy that are part of a broadly
Aristotelian view of the world are crucial features of any systematic meta-
physics that can provide an explanation for how the world is thus. By start-
ing at the beginning—with original inquiry—at a point prior to perennial
disagreement regarding necessity and fundamentality, I hope to have gone
some way toward resolving such controversy in a broadly Aristotelian way,
and to have presented new motivation for reconsidering old yet hardly
obsolete views of science and of the world.

Department of Philosophy
University of California
92 Humanities Instructional Building
Irvine, CA 92697-4555
USA
[email protected]

Acknowledgments
This paper was written with the support of the FWF (Austrian Science
Fund), project number: M 1881-G24. I would like to thank David
Woodruff Smith for many insightful—and encouraging—conversations on
the topics discussed in the present paper and Yuval Avnur, Michael Della
Rocca, John Heil, Daniel Korman, Kathrin Koslicki, David Oderberg,
and Tuomas Tahko for extremely helpful written comments on previous
versions. I would also like to express my gratitude to audiences at Stanford
University, the University of Salzburg, the University of Modena and

22
See, for example, the work of the late E. J. Lowe, Kit Fine, Kathrin Koslicki, David
Oderberg, Tuomas Tahko, and the work of those authors collected in Tahko 2012, Novák
and Novotný 2014, and Novák et al. 2013.

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

668 M. ORESTE FIOCCO

Reggio Emilia, and the University of Ljubljana for helpful discussion,

especially Johannes Brandl and Christopher Gauker.

References
Aristotle. 2000. Metaphysics, Books B and K 1–2. Translated and with
commentary by Arthur Madigan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Armstrong, David. 1989. Universals: An Opinionated Introduction.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Bennett, Karen. 2011a. “By Our Bootstraps.” Philosophical Perspectives
25:27–41.
   . 2011b. “Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required).” Philo­
sophical Studies 154:79–104.
Fiocco, M. Oreste. 2015. “Intentionality and Realism.” Acta Analytica
30:219–37.
   . 2019a. “Each Thing Is Fundamental: Against Hylomorphism and
Hierarchical Structure.” American Philosophical Quarterly 56:289–301.
   . 2019b. “Structure, Intentionality and the Given.” In The
Philosophy of Perception and Observation: Proceedings of the 40th
International Wittgenstein Symposium, edited by Christoph Limbeck-
Lilienau and Friedrich Stadler, 95–118. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Gödel, Kurt. 1990 [1944]. “Russell’s Mathematical Logic.” In Collected
Works, Volume II: Publications, 1938–1974, 119–41. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Hoffman, Joshua, and Gary Rosenkrantz. 1994. Substance Among Other
Categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Koslicki, Kathrin. 2012. “Varieties of Ontological Dependence.” In
Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, ed-
ited by Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder, 186–213. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Lowe, E. J. 1989. “Impredicative Identity Criteria and Davidson’s Criterion
of Event Identity.” Analysis 49:178–81.
   . 1998. The Possibility of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
   . 2006. The Four-Category Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
   . 2008. “Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence.” Royal Institute
of Philosophy Supplement 83:23–48.
   . 2013. “Essence and Ontology.” In Metaphysics: Aristotelian,
Scholastic, Analytic, edited by Lukáš Novák, Daniel D. Novotný,
Prokop Sousedík, and David Svoboda, 93–122. Frankfurt: Ontos.
Novák, Lukáš, and Daniel D. Novotný, eds. 2014. Neo-Aristotelian
Perspectives in Metaphysics. New York: Routledge.

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

 WHAT IS A THING? 669

Novák, Lukáš, Daniel D. Novotný, Prokop Sousedík, and David Svoboda,

eds. 2013. Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic. Frankfurt:
Ontos.
Oderberg, David. 2007. Real Essentialism. New York: Routledge.
Quine, W. V. 1985. “Events and Reification.” In Actions and Events:
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald, edited by Ernest LePore
Davidson, and Brian McLaughlin, 162–71. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Ruben, David-Hillel. 1990. Explaining Explanation. New York: Routledge.
Russell, Bertrand. 1956 [1908]. “Mathematical Logic as Based on the
Theory of Types.” Logic and Knowledge: Essays, 1901–1950, 59–102.
London: George Allen and Unwin.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2009. “On What Grounds What.” InMetametaphysics,
edited by David Chalmers, Ryan Wasserman, and David Manley, 347–
83. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tahko, Tuomas, ed. 2012. Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics. Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tahko, Tuomas and E. J. Lowe. 2015. “Ontological Dependence.” In The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), edited by
Edward N. Zalta, at http://plato.stanf​ord.edu/archi​ves/spr20​15/entri​es/
depen​dence-ontol​ogica​l/ (last accessed on August 29, 2019).
Thomasson, Amie. 2007. Ordinary Objects. New York: Oxford University
Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2013. “What Is an Ontological Category?” In
Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic, edited by Lukáš Novák,
Daniel D. Novotný, Prokop Sousedík, and David Svoboda, 11–24.
Frankfurt: Ontos.
Wiggins, David. 1968. “On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time.”
Philosophical Review 77:90–95.
   . 2001. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd