A Culturalist Theory of Political Change

Author(s): Harry Eckstein

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 3 (Sep., 1988), pp. 789-804
Published by: American Political Science Association
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 A CULTURALIST
THEORYOF
POLITICALCHANGE
HARRY ECKSTEIN
Universityof California
Irvine

1rhe most tellingcriticismof political culturetheory is that

it has coped very inadequately with politicalchange. Thereis a good reasonfor this: the
assumptionsof the political culture approach in fact lead to the expectationof con-
tinuity. But continuity can be reconciledwith changes, though only changes of par-
ticularkinds. Thenatureof politicalchangesconsistentwith culturalistassumptionsand
with the culturalistexpectationof continuityare herespecifiedby hypothesesabout (1)
the effects of changes in social context, whether "normal"or involving abrupt dis-
continuity, and (2) the effects of attemptedrevolutionarytransformation.

The political legalism of the field-the other being

culture approach to building positive political rational choice theory. Indeed,
political theoriesand to political explana- determiningwhich of the two modes of
tion has been with us since about 1960, theorizingand explaining-the "cultural-
and has been much describedabstractly ist" or the "rationalist"-is likely to give
and much applied to concretecases. The the better results may be the single most
seminal works are Almond and important item now on the agenda of
Coleman's (1960) and Almond and political science (Eckstein1979a).
Verba's (1963). Applications of the ap- Whetheror not it is advisable to take
proach are covered comprehensivelyin a the culturalist road to theory depends
retrospective on the influence of their above all on the ability to produce a co-
work by Almond and Verba (1979). Ex- gent culturalisttheory of politicalchange:
plicationsof it as a contenderfor paradig- a theory consistentwith the assumptions
matic status in political science, so to (postulates) of the approach and con-
speak, occurin numerousworks (e.g., Bill firmed by experience. Criticisms of
and Hardgrave1973;Dawson and Prewitt culturalistpoliticaltheoriescertainlyhave
1969; MerkI1970; Putnam1973; and Pye emphasized the occurrence of certain
and Verba1965). My own use of the con- changes in political structures,attitudes,
cept of culture, which I consider more and behavior and culturalistaccounts of
precisethan that of others, is discussedin their occurrencein order to impugn the
the Appendix. [Link] (1974),for example,
Political culture theory may plausibly has arguedthat political culturalistshave
be considered one of two still viable been very offhand in dealing with
generalapproachesto politicaltheoryand change-that they have tended to impro-
explanationproposed since the early fif- vise far too much in order to accom-
ties to replacethe long-dominantformal- modatepoliticalchangesinto theirframe-

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

VOL. 82 NO. 3 SEPTEMBER1988

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 82

work. They have done so, he writes, to sary to make them explicit if one is com-
the point that they no longer have a con- pellingly to specify what experiencesare
vincing way to treat political change at "normal"in a culturalistworld and what
all. His argumentis directedat culturalist conditionsculturalisttheory can and can-
theory in general, but he singles out Al- not accommodate.
mond's work with Powell (1966) as The touchstone of culturalisttheory is
especially indicative of the sins that the postulateof orientedaction: actorsdo
culturalistscommit. not respond directly to "situations"but
This argument-and others to similar respond to them through mediating
effect-strikes me as cogent criticism of "orientations."All else either elaborates
how culturalistshave in fact dealt with or follows from that postulate. What ex-
political changes. Furthermore, dif- actly, then, does the postulate assert?
ficulties accountingfor change in general "Orientationsto action"aregeneraldis-
and for certainkinds of changeespecially positions of actors to act in certainways
seem to me inherentin the assumptionson in sets of situations. Suchgeneraldisposi-
which the political culture approach is tions pattern actions. If actors do not
based. have them, or if orientations are ill
Difficult, however, does not mean im- formedor inconsistent,actions will be er-
possible, nor [Link] is quitepossi- ratic: patternless, anomic. The idea of
ble to deduce from these assumptionsa "orientationsto action"follows a particu-
logically cogent account of how political lar psychological stimulus-response
change, and every kind of such change, model: not the simple "single-stage"be-
occurs. My purpose here is to provide havioristmodel in which nothing "subjec-
such an account, as remedy for the "ad tive"intervenesbetweenthe experienceof
hocery"Rogowski rightly criticizes. situationsand responsesto it (actions)but
"mediational"models in which responses
to stimuli (actions in situations)are con-
sidered results both of the experienceof
The Postulates of Culturalist objectivesituationsand actors'subjective
Theories and The Expectation of processing of experience. "Orientations"
do the [Link] may call them, as
Continuity did Bentley, soul-stuff, or mind-stuff.
The basic reason why a culturalistac- The criticalmethodologicaltask of studies
count of changeis intrinsicallydifficultto based on such models is, of course, to
construct(hence,why culturalistshave in penetratereliably and with validity into
fact tended to waffle in explaining the subjective.
political change)is simple: the postulates Orientations are not "attitudes":the
of the approachall lead to the expectation latter are specific, the formergeneral, dis-
of politicalcontinuity;they makepolitical positions. Attitudes themselves derive
continuity the "normal"state. from and expressorientations;though at-
titudes may, through their patterning,
The Postulatesof Culturalism help us to find orientations. If orienta-
tions frequently occur in collectivities
To see why this is so we mustfirstmake they may be called "culturethemes,"as
explicit the fundamental assumptions by Mead and Metraux (1954). Pye (Pye
from which culturalisttheory proceeds and Verba 1965) has distinguishedfour
its "axiomatic"basis, so to speak. These sets of such "themes"that he considers
assumptionsunfortunatelyhave been left useful for making cultural comparisons
implicitin culturalistwritings. It is neces- on the societal level: trust-distrust,hier-

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 PoliticalChange

archy-equality, liberty-coercion, paro- but variable, then somethingthat is vari-

chial-national identifications. Putnam able must form them. And if orientations
(1973) considersthe theme of conflict or are not simply subjective reflections of
its counterpart, harmony, critical for varying objective situations, then the
cross-cultural analysis. These "themes" variable conditions through which they
exemplifyhow "orientations"are general are formed must themselvesbe cultural.
dispositions that pattern sets of actions Orientations are not acquired in some
and sets of [Link] is conven- automatic way; they must be learned.
tional to regard orientations as having Thus, a postulateof culturalsocialization
three components: cognitive elements must hold if the first and second assump-
that, so to speak, decode experience(give tions hold: orientations are learned
it meaning);affectiveelementsthat invest through the agency of external "social-
cognitionwith feelingsthat "move"actors izers."The repertoireof cognitions, feel-
to act; and evaluative elementsthat pro- ings, and schemesof evaluationthat proc-
vide goals towardwhich actorsaremoved ess experience into action must be im-
to act (Pye and Verba 1965). parted by the socialized carriers of
The assumption of oriented actions culture. The process can be direct, by
would be vacuous without the additionof "teachers"who are culturallyvariableac-
a second postulate, which we might call tors; or it can occur indirectly simply
the postulate of orientationalvariability: through the experience of variable
orientationsvary and are not meresubjec- cultures.
tive reflections of objective conditions. "Rationalist" theorists do not, of
The significanceof this postulatelies par- course, reject the notion of political
ticularly in this: if the processing of ex- socialization. That would be silly. What
periencesinto actions were uniform-if it dividesculturalistand rationalisttheorists
were fixed at the biological level or if it here involves the issue of late-in-life
always involved "rationalist"cost-benefit learning,or resocialization.
calculation-then mediating mind-stuff In regard to that matter, culturalists
could simply be left out of theory. In proceedfrom a postulateof "cumulative"
Hempel'sterms, we would only need to socialization. This means two things.
know "initial conditions" (situations, First, although learning is regarded as
structures)to explain actions, since we continuous throughoutlife (which is not
already know the universalcovering law likely to be questioned)early learning
needed to complete an [Link] all priorlearning-is regardedas a sort of
doubt ingenuity is required in relating filterfor laterlearning:earlylearningcon-
conditionsto actions via uniformorienta- ditions later learningand is harderto un-
tions: the rationalchoice theorieswe have do. Second, a tendency is assumed
providemore than enough cases in point. toward making the bits and pieces of
But this does not alter the logic of the cognitive, affective, and evaluativelearn-
argument that without orientational ing form a coherent (consistent, conso-
variability we remain in a strictly be- nant) whole.
haviorist world. Similarly, if actions are The postulate of cumulative learning
merely "superstructural," we manifestly provides the culturalist account of how
need only to know situations to explain two fundamental needs of actors in
actions. In that case, only the explanation societies are satisfied:the need for econ-
of deviantcases (likefalse class conscious- omy of action and the need for predict-
ness) would requirethe use of mediating ability in interaction. Life would hardly
variables. be bearable, even possible, if one had to
If orientationsare not inherentin actors think out every action, taking into ac-

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 82

count all pertinentinformationand lack dispositions;the patternsof such predis-

of [Link] positions vary from society to society,
thus save virtually all decision costs. from social segment to social segment;
Social life, similarly,would hardly be they do not vary because objectivesocial
possiblewithoutreliablepreknowledge of situations or structuresvary but because
others'actionsand of the effectof one's of culturally determinedlearning; early
own actionson thoseof [Link] learning conditions later learning and
suchpreknowledge sociallife wouldtend learninginvolves a process of seekingco-
to be [Link] Crozier(1964)has co- herencein dispositions. And this is so in
gently argued, "uncertainty" of action order to "economize"in decisions to act
also begetspower-arbitrarypower. and to achieve predictabilityin social in-
Both economyof action and predict- teractions.
abilityin interactionarediminished to the
extentthatindividualorientations arein- The Expectationof Continuity
consistentand that early learningmay
readilybe [Link] Whenthe postulatesof the politicalcul-
effectssimilarto a lackof orientations to ture approachare made explicit,it should
actionsandof sociallysharedorientations be evident why political culturetheorists
[Link] to erratic,incoher- should have difficultiesin accountingfor
ent behaviorby individualsandin social political change. The assumptionsof cul-
aggregates:anomie in the former;the turalist theory manifestly lead to an ex-
absenceof anythinglike a stable con- pectation of continuity, even in cases of
sciencecollectifin the latter. changesin the objectivecontextsof politi-
It should be pointed out that the cal actions.
culturalistsolution of the problemsof The expectationof continuityin aggre-
economy of action and social predict- gate (and individual)orientationsfollows
abilityis not a uniquesolution,however most plainly from the assumption that
plausibleit may [Link],in theratio- orientationsarenot superstructural reflec-
nalistperspective,economyof actionis tions of objective structures,but them-
providedby "ideologies" or by the sen- selves invest structuresand behaviorwith
sible delegation of decision-making cognitive and normativemeaning.
powers(Downs1957).Thefixityrequired Cultural continuity also manifestly
for predictabilityin social life follows follows from the assumptionthat orienta-
fromthe very fact thatrationalchoiceis tions are formed through processes of
considered a [Link] so, [Link] the extentthat socializa-
one can anticipatethe actionsof others tion is direct (by precept), generational
andadjustone'sown behaviorto the an- continuitymust occur, the socializersbe-
[Link] may also ing formed, "culturalmen."To the extent
be achievedthroughrationallyformu- that socialization is indirect (by experi-
lated and enforcedcontractualarrange- ence), generational continuity still
mentsor generallegalrules.(Itshouldbe follows; experiencewith authorityoccurs
apparentthat the two accountsof econ- first in the family, then in schools, where
omy of action and social predictability unformed children encounter formed
providea good basis for evaluatingthe adults. In either case, what is true of one
relativepower of culturalistand ratio- generation should continue substantially
nalistperspectives.) to be true in the next. This applies as
To summarize,"cultural" peopleproc- much to culturaldivisions in a society as
essexperience intoactionthroughgeneral to more general culture types and
cognitive,affective,and evaluativepre- themes-if any exist in the first place.

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 Political Change

This, incidentally,makesthe politicalcul- "special"conditions, or adjustmentsin

tureperspectivequitecompatiblewith the concepts or theory to handle occurrences
findingthat politicalregimestypically are of change-especially major change. If,
short-lived (Gurr1974). say, theoreticaldifficultiesarisefrom em-
The expectation of continuity in phasizing early socialization, then why
politicalculturesfollows, most obviously, not just relax that emphasis and assign
from the assumption of orientational more scope for late socializationor adult
cumulativeness, namely, that earlier resocialization?If the assumption of a
learningconditionslaterlearningand that tendency toward orientational conso-
actors tend to seek orientationalconso- nance makes it awkward to explain cer-
nance. The first allows some room for tain observations, then why not simply
adult socialization and resocializa- posit more tolerationfor dissonance?Or
tion-but not much. The second makes why not redefine consonance? In that
unlikely the internalizationof piecemeal way, however, one is likely to end with
orientationalchange that might increase the term continuity meaning nothing
dissonance. more than "not completely (or instanta-
But if change in culture patterns and neously) changeable"-which drains the
themes were categorically excluded, termof all [Link] is ex-
political culturetheory must immediately actly the point of Rogowski'scriticismof
be thrown out as obvious nonsense: how culturalistshave in fact accounted
changes happen, including cultural for political change.
changes. The saving grace of culturalist The remedy is to develop an explicit
theory here is that continuity is, so to generalculturalisttheory of change, con-
speak, an ideal-typical expectation-one sistent with culturalist assumptions, in
that holds in an abstract, parsimonious order to prevent ad hoc tinkering with
culturalworld. It is an expectationakin to culturalistpostulates and their implica-
that of inertiain the Galileanconception tions. Such a theory should state, priorto
of motion. Physical inertia does not rule explanations of specific changes, the
out changesof directionor rest, accelera- characteristicsof changethat the political
tion, and [Link] does make such culture approach can logically accom-
phenomenadependon contingentfactors modate and those that do not fit its con-
that may or may not impinge on objects straints.
in motion. Continuity is the inherent To formulatesuch a theory, I will con-
(lawful) expectationand so, therefore,is sidertwo broad types of culturalchanges:
resistance to change of motion: excep- those arising"naturally"from changesin
tionally great forces are needed to induce situations and structuralconditions and
greatchangesin directionor velocity. The those that result from "artifice"-deliber-
notion of continuity as inertiain motiva- ate attemptsto transformpolitical struc-
tions (the psychological counterpart of tures and behavior.
physical motion) thus opens the door to
culturalistaccounts of change.
Throughthat door, however, the tend- Situational Change
ency toward improvised, post hoc ac-
counts of political change may enter Pattern-MaintainingChange
may be bound to enter. If one's preferred
theoreticalapproachimpliesa strongbias Actors must often face novel situations
towardthe continuityof cultureor resist- with which their dispositionalequipment
ance to culturalchange, then it is always is ill suited to deal. The world changesor
tempting to extemporize theory-saving presentsus with experiencesthat are un-

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 82

familiar for other reasons (say, the Britishworking class voters and interests
penetrationof peasantsocietiesby market are the usual case in point. Their func-
forces). The unfamiliar is encountered tion-sometimes latent" but in the case
routinely in maturation,as one proceeds of Disraeli's Tory democracy quite ex-
from family to school, from lower schools plicit-was to maintain Tory hegemony
to higher ones, and from schools to par- in the face of considerablesociopolitical
ticipation in adult institutions. At the change through the maintenance of as
level of society and polity, novel situa- much as possible of what the Young
tions arise from internal "development," EnglandCircle consideredthe feudalistic
however developmentmay be conceived. virtues: the disposition to defer to one's
Novel situations also arise from socially bettersand action by the betterson behalf
internal discontinuities (economic crises of the lower orders. The point applies to
or political disruptions,like those caused reformsof the suffrageand also to the less
by governmentalinstability or collapse, well known role of the Tories in the
or from changesbroughtabout by protest evolution of the British welfare state,
movements), or from externallyimposed which Tory governmentsnot only have
changes. Immigrationbrings actors into kept virtually intact but much of which
unfamiliar situations. So does internal they pioneered.
migration and social mobility. The en- An alternative to pattem-maintaining
counterof novel situationswill, no doubt, changeis to subjectunfamiliarexperience
occur much more frequentlyamong indi- to procrusteaninterpretationin order to
viduals than on the macro level, but it obviate cognitive or normative change.
also occurs in groups and societies. "Perceptualdistortion"has turnedup fre-
Novel situations may be short-lived quentlyin experimentson how individual
results of ephemeral upheavals. In that cognitive dissonance is handled (see
case no culturaladjustmentsare needed, Brehm and Cohen 1962). We know at
nor are they likely to occur. What, how- least a little about the sameway of dealing
ever, should one expect if such situations with the unfamiliaron the politicalmacro
persist? level. To give just one example: party
If culturesexhibit inertiathen it should political elections in Northern Nigeria
be expected that changes in culture pat- were initially regarded as a version of
ternsand themeswill occurso as to main- long-familiar elections to chieftaincy, in
tain optimally such patternsand themes; which the "candidates"were a small
that is to say, changes in culture are number of ascriptively defined eligibles
perfectlyconsistentwith culturalistpostu- (Whitaker1970). The extentto which per-
lates if they occur as adaptations to ceptual distortioncan be adaptive to un-
alteredstructuresand situationsand if the familiar experience no doubt is highly
function of change is to keep culturepat- limited. However, where institutionslike
ternsin existenceand consonant. "Pattern electionsto chieftaincyexist in traditional
maintenance"(Parsons'concept) can take cultures,the adaptationof dispositionsto
that form just as well as strict cultural other kinds of elections should be easier
continuity. than in other cases.
The Frenchhave a half-facetiousadage
for this sort of patternmaintenance:The
more thingschange,the more they remain ChangeToward Flexibility
the same. The saying no doubt fits (used
to fit?) [Link] pragmaticmastersat Highlymodem societieshave traitsthat
pattern maintaining change, however, make it especially likely that actors and
have been the [Link] concessionsto aggregatesof actors will frequentlycon-

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 Political Change

front novel situations. Social mobility, I want to make threeotherpoints perti-

vertical and horizontal, is the most ob- nent to the expectation that cultural
vious cause. Because any changes in abstractnessand flexibilitywill grow with
dispositionsare costly (dysfunctional)in social [Link], the disposition
the culturalistperspective,one should ex- to act "rationally"introducesjustthe kind
pect as a correlate to the expectationof of generaland flexibleculturetraitthatin-
pattern-maintainingculturalchange, that herentsocial fluidity requires.(Durkheim
the more modern societies are, the more [1960] already associated rational at-
the elements of their cultures will be titudesand behaviorwith the abstractness
general, thus flexible. No doubt there are of thought necessaryin highly developed
considerablelimits upon how generaland societies.) The rationalizationof modem
flexible orientationscan be and still per- life-which Weber considered to be its
form theirfunctionsof makingexperience governing trait-thus may be an accom-
meaningful, actions economical, and in- modation to structuralconditions rather
teractions predictable. In more modern than, contra Weber, their underlying
societies one should not expect cultureto cause.
changeas readily as situationsand struc- Second, the obviously difficultproblem
tures. Situational and structuralchange of findinga propertrade-offbetweentwo
tend to occur with great frequency and warringimperativesin modem societies,
rapidity in modern societies, and the that of cultural flexibility and that of
assumptionof orientationalinertiapostu- culturalfixity, is bound to be a practical
lates resistanceto frequent,swift reorien- difficulty, not just a theoretical one.
tation. Ratherone should expect that the Reconciling fixity with flexibility,
rigidityof culturalprescriptionwill relax, abstractness, and formality may be a
so that culture can accommodatemuch crucial element in what has widely been
social fluidity. perceived as growing malaise in highly
The tendencytowardculturalflexibility modem societies. Anomie will follow not
can be regardeditself as a way to main- only from lack of internalguidesto action
tain cultural patterns and themes. As but from guidelinestoo generaland loose
societies become more changeable, the to serve in the relentlessparticularityof
elements of culture increasinglybecome experience. Highly modem society thus
"forms"that can subsume a variety of may be intrinsically acultural and, for
"contents."It is probablyno coincidence that reason, transitory or susceptibleto
that some sociologistsearly in the twenti- surrogates for culture-including cults
eth century (especially Simmel [1950]) and dogmas.
adapted the Kantiandistinctionbetween The expectation of cultural flexibility,
form and contentto social [Link]- finally, should apply to all highly modem
heim arguedmuch the same point direct- [Link] thuspertainsto politiesinitial-
ly. In early societies, he wrote, "the col- ly based on rigid dogma (like communist
lectiveenvironmentis essentiallyconcrete societies) that have successfullypursued
[and] the states of conscience then [Link] such societies, the first
have the same character."("Culture"is expectation, that of cultural inertia,
not a bad translationof his notion of a should hold. Old culture should resist
consciencecollectif.)As societiesdevelop, new dogma. The expectationof pattern-
the "common conscience"is obliged to maintainingchange (or perceptualdistor-
rise above diversityand "consequentlyto tion) should hold as well. So one should
becomemore abstract.... Generalideas expectalso that as culturechangesin such
necessarilyappearand becomedominant" societies, it will change toward greater
(Durkheim1960, 287-91). flexibility-and thereforeto reinterpreta-

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tions of dogma that make it increasingly expect, for instance, a democraticpoliti-

pliable. cal culture to form, in a few short years,
in a society like Germany after World
War II, or "national"orientationsto form
CulturalDiscontinuity rapidlyin postcolonialtribalsocieties. In-
Contextualchangescan be so consider- stead, changes in political cultures that
able or rapidor both that neitherpattern- occur in response to social discontinuity
maintaining changes nor changes that should initiallyexhibitconsiderableform-
gradually relax cultural rigidity to deal lessness. For formlessness one may
with social fluidity are possible. Rapidin- substitute other terms, like Durkheim's
dustrializationis the case in point usually anomie or Merton'sdeinstitutionaliza-
cited. Changesresultingfromwar or from tion. The essence of the matter is that
the formationof new politiesalso general- culture loses coherent structure. It
ly involve upheavals in social contexts. becomes highly entropic.
Such upheavals may result as well from The idea that rapid, large-scalecontex-
economic traumaslike the great inflation tual changes are personally disorienting
of 1923 in Germany (which led to far and culturally disruptive is hardly new.
greater social disruption than the Great Lipset(1960)argueda generationago that
Depression-or possibly even the Black rapideconomicdevelopmentis associated
Death). And traumaticchangesometimes with political "extremism"("anomicpro-
strikes special segments of society rather test movements"like anarchismand syn-
than the whole. dicalism),despite the fact that high levels
We must deal, therefore, with social of such developmentare relatedto politi-
discontinuity,as well as "normal"change. cal stability. Huntington (1968) later
Culturalistshave tended either to avoid made much the same point, and Olson
the matter or, worse, to treat cases of (1963)has probablydevelopedit most co-
social traumasimply as "deviantcases"in gently.
which the theoreticalconstraintsof their To say that formlessnessunder condi-
perspectiveare off-not least, the expec- tions of socioeconomic discontinuity
tation of culturalinertia. should be "considerable"is not mere
Obviously, traumatic social discon- hedging. Cultural entropy can never be
tinuity will have cultural consequences complete. If it were, no patternedaction
differentfrom contextualstability or less or interactionswould be possibleat all. In
rapid, less [Link] such any case, social discontinuity never is
cases, however, we may not simply im- total-intimate social units, like the fami-
provise. If the assumptionsof culturalists ly, survive the greatest upheavals (may,
are correct, then traumaticsocial discon- indeed, be strengthened by them, as
tinuity should have logically expectable refuges of predictableorder); so too do
consequences,no less than other change. structuresthat are supposedlymerely in-
The one consequenceof social trauma strumental-for example, bureaucracies.
absolutely precluded by culturalist As well, if learning is cumulative, older
assumptionsis [Link] people should exhibit a good deal of
upheaval may overcome culturalinertia, orientationalinertiaeven when traumatic
but if so, actors should be plungedinto a socioeconomic change occurs. We may
collectiveinfancyin which cognitionsthat surely suppose that the more ingrained
make experienceintelligible and norma- orientations are and the more they are
tive dispositions (affect, evaluative consonant systems, the less susceptible
schemes) must be learned again, and they are to "disorientation"-the more
[Link] culturalistmay mechanismslike perceptivedistortionwill

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 Political Change

be used to invest experience with ac- can Notes. Thus, in regardto a very suc-
customedmeaning. cessfulbusinessman," 'He is a publicnui-
Governmental authority will, of sance, is he not?' 'Yessir,' . . . 'And he is
course, survive [Link] utterly dishonest, debased, and profli-
fact, it is likely to become more powerful gate?' 'Yes, sir.' 'In the name of wonder,
to the extentthat internalizeddispositions then, what is his merit?''Well, sir, he is a
cannot govern actions and interactions. smart man' " (1957, 246). I mention
How then do people act politically if Dickensbecauseone should especiallyex-
political cultureis highly formless? pect "smart" conformity in immigrant
We can get usefulclues to answersfrom societies or immigrantsegmentsof socie-
the growingliteratureon an analogousex- ty, where (as in schools) discontinuityoc-
perience: how children adapt to novel curs through movement into an un-
situations that they enter in highly dis- familiar but intact culture. Perhaps one
continuousways: going to school, for in- should expect it even more in cultures
stance, or going from one to anothertype greatly unsettled by upheaval. Thus,
or level of schooling. Much of the liter- Burkeprescientlyremarked(in 1790) that
ature on this subject(like Wakeford1969 when cultural constraints are off, "the
and Woods 1979) has been informedby worst rise to the top" (1923, 45).
Merton's (1949) path-breaking study of More commonly than conformity, one
the bases of deviantbehavior,which dealt should expectwhat Mertoncalledretreat-
in general terms with behavior under ism underconditionsof culturaldisconti-
more or less "anomic"conditions. nuity. Retreatisminvolves withdrawing
Under conditions of cultural discon- from the "alien"larger society into the
tinuity, conformitywith authorityis still smaller, more familiarworlds of family,
likely to occur, but it will tend to have neighborhood, village, and the like. In
certain [Link] Merton's tech- Almond and Verba'sschemeof concepts,
nology, it will tend to be ritualistic or it shouldshow up as increased"parochial-
else self-serving (opportunistic and of ism." In the small worlds of schools, re-
dubious morality, as general culture treatism tends to involve self-imposed
defines morality). Ritual conformity is isolation-for instance, into remote
compliance without commitment. One places and daydreams or what Woods
does what the rules or rulers prescribe, calls removal activities-"unserious pur-
not for any discerniblereason but (quot- suits which are sufficientlyengrossing...
ing from a lower-class Britishpupil inter- [to make participants]oblivious for the
viewed by Woods) "because I behave time being of [their]actual situation"-or
meself ... I just do what I'm told ... [I] both.
ain't got much choice." Conformity of Rebellion against, and intransigent
this sort may be supposed to occur fre- resistance to, authority are also likely
quently in cases in which the former responses to the experience of cultural
-political cultures and subcultures pre- decay. A voluminous literature links
scribed high compliance ("subject cul- social, economic, and political disconti-
tures," as Almond and Verba called nuities to political violence-from Marx
them). Self-serving, opportunistic con- to Moore and Skocpol. Rebellionand in-
formitybendsnormsand rulesfor private transigence,however, are always likely to
advantage-including that of getting be costly and call for much energy; re-
ahead in the competition for political treatistbehaviorinto parochialworlds or
power. CharlesDickens observeda lot of ritualisticconformity are thus more like-
that sort of behavior in his travels in ly, especiallywhere governingpower-if
Americaas he reportsthem in his Amen- not authority-is strong.

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 82

What should follow over time from "conducivetraits" I mean structuralor

contextual and cultural discontinuity?If dispositionaltraitsreadilyaccommodated
economy of action and predictabilityin- to new culturepatternsor, indeed, antici-
deed are imperatives in individual and pations of them. In Western traditional
collective life, one should expect new societies, for instance, there always ex-
culture patterns and themes to emerge. isted a largeislandof achievementin a sea
But if dispositions are formed by cumu- of ascription-the celibate clergy, which
lative learning, they should emerge only hardly could be ascriptively recruited.
slowly (overgenerations)and, in the tran- The clergy, in fact, played a considerable
sitional period, at great costs resulting role in the emergenceof modernpolitical
from raw power, withdrawal, and institutions-despite its stakein the distri-
(becauseof withdrawal)forced mobiliza- bution of [Link],
tion and rebelliousnessagainst it. Thus, socially "marginal"groups-groups that
the processof reformationof politicalcul- occupy the fluid intersticesof established
tures should be prolonged and socially cultures-should be highly susceptibleto
costly. This is all the more likely to be the reorientation,thus "vanguards"in the re-
case if parochial units remain intact orientingof unsettledsocieties. Thereis a
refuges from discontinuities in society, good deal of literaturemaking the case
economy, or polity. that this is indeed so (e.g., Rejai and
The expectationis logical also if older Phillips1979 and Wolf 1973).
people, as is likely, cling to long-fixed
dispositionseven in face of strong forces
that might [Link] might thus Political Transformation
posit as a generalexpectationthat in the
process of culturalreformationconsider- By transformationI mean the use of
able age-relateddifferencesshould occur. political power and artifice to engineer
In fact, age, in cases of pronounceddis- radically changed social and political
continuity,mighteven be expectedto be a structures, thus culture patterns and
major basis for subcultural differentia- themes:to set society and polity on new
tion. If indeed this were found to be so, coursestoward unprecedentedobjectives.
the cultural perspective upon theory Transformation,typically, is the objec-
would be enormously strengthenedover tive of [Link] can also be
[Link] pertinentto the objective of military conquerorsand
the expectation, however, is oddly lack- of nation builders or other modernizers.
ing; and as culturalistshave built adult Revolutions, however, provide the most
learningincreasinglyinto their approach unambiguousand dramaticcases. I will
in orderto accommodateill-fitting facts, thereforeconfine my remarksto them-
the incentive to inquire into age-related though what is said about them should
cultural differences, in both established also apply to transformationattemptedin
and transitionalcontexts, has regrettably other ways.
declined. Hannah Arendt (1963) undoubtedly
I want to make anotherpoint about the was right in arguing that attempts at
reformation of dispositions and culture revolutionarytransformationare distinc-
patterns, more briefly. As the young tively modern-that revolutions as we
should be more susceptibleto reorienta- think of them (not mererebelliousattacks
tion than the old, so one should expectto on authoritiesor theiractions)begin with
find in social macrostructuresparticular the Frenchand [Link]
segmentsthat have traits especially con- long as politicaland social structureswere
ducive or susceptibleto [Link] considereddivinely ordained,or natural,

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 Political Change

or simply the ways of a folk, the idea of bases. After all, transformativeprocesses
their deliberate transformation hardly involve not only adjustmentto necessity
could occur. "History"then could only be but also the deliberate engineering of
endlessrepetitionor an intrinsicprogress great change, and they are typically
toward a preordainedend. Societies and backed by great power and control.
polities could no more be "transformed" As a first expectationwe may posit that
than the heavenlybodies set upon new or- revolutionary transformationis strictly
bits. One of the decisive traits of modem impossible in the short run. Revolutions
societies then is the belief that a "new certainlybring upheaval. They may also
beginning"-a felicitous and not redun- be expectedto bring about movement in
dant expression-could be made in politi- the direction of their professedgoals by
cal and social life. readily accomplishedactions-instituting
Initially, making a new beginning did wide suffrage, kicking out the landlords
not seem to call for much artifice-no and redistributingland, ending feudal
more, perhaps, than a proper constitu- privileges and obligations, and the like.
tion. Achieving liberty or equality But if discontinuitybegets "formlessness"
throughoutsociety simply called for set- of culture,then revolutionariescan hard-
ting polities and societies on their in- ly do much to reorientpeople in the short
herentlyrightcourse-right, given human run (say, in a generationor so). Reorien-
nature. For reasons not necessary to tation is, of course, the less likely the
sketchin the age of the "Godthat failed," more intact is the prerevolutionary
really making revolution-not seizing culture: the more it provides parochial
power but the accomplishmentof trans- refugesfrom transformativepower or in-
formation-came increasinglyto be seen stitutionalcenters of resistanceto it. But
as a task, and a difficulttask, for political even if revolution only reflects discon-
artificers. Unfortunately, systematic tinuity instead of engenderingit, the ex-
studies of that process are few, although pectationstated still should hold.
the exceptions often have been notable: If the conventionalnormsand practices
for instance,Massell'sstudy of Soviet at- of political life are disruptedby revolu-
tempts to bring Soviet CentralAsia into tion, what can be put in their place?We
modernity (1974) and Kelley and Klein's may posit the answer that revolutionary
study of the effects on inequality of the transformationwill initiallybe attempted
Bolivian Revolution of 1951 (1981). In- by despotic or legalistic means. What,
quirersinto revolutionstill are hooked on afterall, can "order"societiesand polities
the issue of their etiology. in place of conventional, internalized
Since revolutionsare themselvesmajor culture?Only brutepower, or else the use
discontinuitiesand since they generally of external legal prescriptionsas a sur-
occur in periods of social or political up- rogate for internalorientationalguides to
heavals, not least governmental break- behavior. "Revolutionarylegalism"was
down (Edwards1927; Brinton1965), the in fact a device used early after the
expectationslisted in the preceding sec- Bolshevik seizure of power, and it over-
tion shouldapply to [Link] lapped a good deal (even before Stalin)
want to state here some expectationsthat with attempts to "storm" society
follow from the culturalist perspective (especiallyits more backwardparts)with
especially for processes of revolutionary head-on "administrative assault."
[Link] con- Neither, accordingto Massell (1974), ac-
temporary relevance aside, these proc- complishedmuch toward the realization
esses seem to me especially critical for of transformation;responses to it, he
evaluating culturalist theories and their writes, included "avoidance,""selective

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 82

participation,""evasion," "limited retri- holds power, gets privilege,and so on. No

bution,"and "massivebacklash." inevitable Thermidorean Reaction is
"Legalism,"it might be noted here, is posited. The argumentis somewhat less
likely to be a generalresponseto massive categorical:reconstructedculturepatterns
cultural disruption, whether revolution- and themes will diverge widely from
ary or situationalor both. Indeed, it can revolutionary visions and will tend to
become, in highly unusual cases, a per- divergefrom them in the directionof the
sistent surrogatefor normative culture patterns of the old society and regime.
indeed, a cultureform. I have arguedthis The degreeto which the expectationholds
elsewhere (1979b), defining 'legalist" obviously dependson the extent to which
cultures as cultures in which legal rules the old culturewas alreadyin disarray.
are widely known, such rules are widely Severalpoints made earlierlead to this
used (instead of justice or prudence) to [Link] still be learned
justify political standpointsor decisions, on a comprehensive scale, as in all
legal actions are the normalmode of deal- societies; and although revolutionary
ing with conflictsand disputes,and there- teachingcan no doubt play a considerable
fore laws deal in highly detailed-if pos- role in shaping the young, it can hardly
sible comprehensive-ways with social replace socialization in small parochial
interaction and tend to be punctiliously units. Nor are teachers or role models
adheredto. Durkheim(1960) argued the likely to be, extensively, the sort of
even more general, related proposition marginalindividuals who are steeped in
that in the course of development civil revolutionary dogma as a surrogatefor
law (which regulates social interactions) convention-or people for whom the
constantly grows, while criminal, or revolutionaryvision has muchmeaningat
restitutive, law declines. His argument all. Sheer culturalinertiawill also play a
makes sense if indeed development role in the processof revolutionarydecay;
'loosens"normativeculturalprescription, so will the tendency toward turning
as I argued, and lessens cultural simili- change into pattern maintenance-per-
tude, as Durkheimargues. haps by a progressivetransformationof
The case I used to make this argument revolutionary visions into mere revolu-
is contemporary West Germany. That, tionary rhetoric; so-to the extent that
we should note, also is the case Rogowski the new rulers succeed in modernizing-
(1974) mainly relies on to argue that re- will the tendencyof modernculturesto be
orientationcan occurrapidly-the crucial general, abstract, and (especially perti-
point in his critiqueof culturalisttheory. nent here)flexible;so will "retreatist" and
Rogowskiseemsto me to miss the realim- "ritualist"responsesto discontinuity;and
port of "deviant cases"-that through so will the tendencyof opportunisticcon-
their very abnormal characteristicsthey formiststo get ahead, by schemingor ap-
can be used to shed light upon the factors proval, in unfamiliarcontexts.
that condition typical cases. In fact, it may well be the case that the
What of the long-run prospects of short-run effects of attempted transfor-
revolutionary transformation?I suggest mation are greaterthan the longer-runef-
the expectationthat the long-run effects fects. More can be done in upheavalthan
of attempted revolutionary transforma- when life again acquiresfixity. Kelleyand
tion will diverge considerably from Klein (1981) have argued precisely this
revolutionary intentions and resemble point, on the basis of generalizingthe case
more the prerevolutionarycondition of of the Bolivian Revolutionof 1951.
society. The expectationis not that little Whetherall this also entails the expec-
change in "content"will occur: in who tation that in the longer run incremental

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 Political Change

changewill accomplishmore than at- positions should, for a considerable

temptsat radicaltransformation we can period, be "formless"-incoherentin in-
perhapsleavean [Link] dividuals and fragmentedin aggregates;
note that the rulersof the SovietUnion that in such cases retreatinginto intact
came increasinglyto view the achieve- parochial structures occurs, while con-
ment of culturalchangeas a matterfor formity should become ritualisticor op-
what they called "systematicsocial portunistic; that revolutionary artifice
engineering"for-as Massell (1974) cannot accomplish cultural transforma-
describesit-"a pragmatic commitment to tion in the short run; that such transfor-
relativelypatientandsystematicsocialac- mation will be attempted by despotic
tion,whereinat leastas muchtimeandef- power or (mainlyhopeful) legal prescrip-
fort wouldbe devotedto the buildingof tions; and that, in the longer run, at-
society... as to ac-
bridgesto traditional tempts at revolutionary transformation
tual and direct confrontationwith the will tend to be regressiveor at least have
traditionalsystem." quite unintended outcomes. Note,
however, that nothing here rules out
engineeredchange, so to speak-attempt-
Conclusion ed structuralreforms of politics. In the
modem world, political tinkering, on
It maywellbe thecasethatthepolitical small or grand scales, is endemic. The
cultureapproachhasbeenusedto explain theory simply states what should result
politicalchangesin thesortof ad hoc and from such tinkering.
post hoc mannerthat saves-and thus The problem of testing the theory
weakens-theoriesratherthantestingand against experienceobviously remains, as
strengthening them. Culturalistshardly do problemsof operationalizingconcepts
have a monopoly on such theoretical for that purpose. But obviously theory
legerdemain-certainlynot when com- comes first.
paredto rationalchoicetheorists-when If the power of a culturalistaccount of
discomfitingfacts confrontthem. But I political change is to be comparedwith
have triedto show herethat culturalists that of different approaches to political
musthavea strongpropensitytowardim- theory and explanation,then generalac-
provisedtheorysavingwhendealingwith counts of change, derived from non-
politicalchange,sincetheirassumptions culturalpostulatesand similarto that pre-
lead, necessarily,to an expectationof sented here, are needed. Political-culture
culturalcontinuity-at any rate in a theories, admittedly,have not heretofore
"pure"(abstract,ideal-typical)cultural met the challengeof developinga general
world, where all mattersfalling under theory of change;but neitherhave others.
"ceterisparibus"arein fact "equal."
Nevertheless,it shouldbe evidentthata Appendix: Culture
cogent, potentiallypowerfultheory of
political change can be derived from The termculture,unfortunately,has no
[Link] theorysketched precise, settled technical meaning in the
herespecifiesthatchangesin dispositions, social sciences, despite its centrality in
in responseto contextualchanges,should them. The variableand ambiguoususe of
bepattern-maintaining changesor-if the key conceptsgeneratesunprofitableargu-
contextualchangesinvolve moderniza- ments that are merely [Link]
tion-changestowardnormativegeneral- I appenda note that places my use of the
ity and flexibility;that in responseto term, as sketchedin the first section, in its
abruptsocialdiscontinuities culturaldis- conceptualcontext.
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FigureA-1. Interactionin the Action Frameof Reference

Situation Ego

Cognition Cultue
Cathexis

internalization

institutionalization =
(roles and sanctions)

Goal Orientations
(Includes c+
Facilities) Communications.- signs (symbolic systems)

Alter

My use of the termculturetriesto make The action frame of referenceis based,

explicit,at the axiomaticlevel, what is im- at the microlevel, on Parsons'notion of
plicit (occasionallyalmost explicit)in the an interaction,societies being complexes
works of Almond and his various col- of interactions(some earlier sociologists
laborators (Coleman 1960; Powell 1966; called them acts of "sociation").The no-
Verba1963;Verba1979). Theiruse of the tion is depicted on FigureA-1. In brief
concept seems to be based squarely on translation, (1) ego (an actor) is in a
Talcott Parsons' "action frame of refer- "situation"-an objectivecontext; (2) ego
ence." Parsons first worked out that cognitively decodes that context and in-
"frameof reference"as a way of synthe- vests it with feeling (cathexis)-thus the
sizing four apparentlydiverse, all highly contextcomesto have meaningfor the ac-
influential,early modem social scientists: tor; (3) the mannerof investingsituations
Marshall,Pareto, Durkheim,and Weber with meaningis acquiredthroughsociali-
(Parsons 1937). He and collaborators zation, which consists mainly of early
developed action theory in a large series learning-this imparts the modes of
of works, the most useful of which prob- understandingand valuing prevalent in
ably is the multiauthoredbook, Towarda societiesor subsocietiesor both. In aggre-
General Theory of Action (Parsons and gate, these may be called a society's
Shils 1951). "culture";(4) socializationleads to the in-

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 Political Change

ternalization of cognitive and affective societies from one another, for the pur-
meanings(viz., the culturalbecomesper- pose of idiographicdescriptionbut also
sonal) and their institutionalization(the for theorizing through comparisonsand
definition of expected behavior in social contrasts(agreementsand differences)-I
roles and that of sanctions in case of take the seminal work here to be Malin-
deviation from expectedbehavior-these owski's (1944); (4) culture is the distinc-
make smooth and regular patterns of tive, variable set of ways in which socie-
interactionpossible;(5) cognitionsand af- ties normativelyregulatesocial behavior
fective responsesto them definegoals and (Goodenough1968; Sumner1906).
ways to pursuethem; (6) cognitions,feel- The fourth set of meanings comes
ings, and goals are communicatedto alter closest to that used here. My use of the
(anotheractor) throughthe use of "signs" concept of culturehere seems to be justi-
(symbolic expressions of culture that fied by usage in political science and,
make ego's actions intelligibleto alter)- more important, by its suitability to
but actions also depend on objective testing theories through the catholic
facilitiesthat are part of any actor'ssitua- deductionof unknownsonce it postulates
tion and that independently affect the are [Link], my version
choice of goals; (7) alterresponds,chang- of the conceptis that aboutwhich theoret-
ing the situationin some respect, so that ical conflicts have thus far occurred in
the process resumes. political inquiry.
Note especiallythat the action frameof
reference emphasizes neither subjective
nor objective factors but ratherhow the
two arelinkedin [Link] References
focus on the matters in the box on the
right, but they should also bring that on Almond, GabrielA., and JamesS. Coleman.1960.
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Harry Eckstein is DistinguishedProfessor of Political Science, University of Cali-

fornia, Irvine, CA 92717.

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