Sensors 24 02098 v2
Sensors 24 02098 v2
Article
Secure Computing for Fog-Enabled Industrial IoT
Ahmad Naseem Alvi 1 , Bakhtiar Ali 1 , Mohamed Saad Saleh 2, *, Mohammed Alkhathami 2 , Deafallah Alsadie 3
and Bushra Alghamdi 2
Abstract: Smart cities are powered by several new technologies to enhance connectivity between
devices and develop a network of connected objects which can lead to many smart industrial
applications. This network known as the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) consists of sensor nodes
that have limited computing capacity and are sometimes not able to execute intricate industrial tasks
within their stipulated time frame. For faster execution, these tasks are offloaded to nearby fog nodes.
Internet access and the diverse nature of network types make IIoT nodes vulnerable and are under
serious malicious attacks. Malicious attacks can cause anomalies in the IIoT network by overloading
complex tasks, which can compromise the fog processing capabilities. This results in an increased
delay of task computation for trustworthy nodes. To improve the task execution capability of the fog
computing node, it is important to avoid complex offloaded tasks due to malicious attacks. However,
even after avoiding the malicious tasks, if the offloaded tasks are too complex for the fog node to
execute, then the fog nodes may struggle to process all legitimate tasks within their stipulated time
frame. To address these challenges, the Trust-based Efficient Execution of Offloaded IIoT Trusted
tasks (EEOIT) is proposed for fog nodes. EEOIT proposes a mechanism to detect malicious nodes
Citation: Alvi, A.N.; Ali, B.; Saleh, as well as manage the allocation of computing resources so that IIoT tasks can be completed in
M.S.; Alkhathami, M.; Alsadie, D.; the specified time frame. Simulation results demonstrate that EEOIT outperforms other techniques
Alghamdi, B. Secure Computing for in the literature in an IIoT setting with different task densities. Another significant feature of the
Fog-Enabled Industrial IoT. Sensors proposed EEOIT technique is that it enhances the computation of trustable tasks in the network.
2024, 24, 2098. https://doi.org/ The results show that EEOIT entertains more legitimate nodes in executing their offloaded tasks
10.3390/s24072098
with more executed data, with reduced time and with increased mean trust values as compared to
Academic Editors: Giuseppe Ruggeri, other schemes.
Marica Amadeo and Chaker
Abdelaziz Kerrache Keywords: secure computing; industrial IoT; trustable computing
2. Related Work
There have been several techniques that have worked on securing communications
and computing in smart city-enabled IoT. Numerous studies have explored trustful com-
munication in various communication domains.
The work in Ref. [24] proposed the MATS framework by using a game theoretical
approach to solve the issue of trustful communications. Moreover, the framework also
considers different situations and possible malicious issues for each scenario. The proposed
technique presents a dynamic trust solution that works for multiple scenarios. Experimental
results validate the framework’s performance in their work.
In Ref. [25], authors considered an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) scenario that can
assist IoT-based Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). The proposal provides a trustable
data collection scheme that also considers data deadlines. Furthermore, the trajectory of
UAVs is also optimized so that trustable communications can be enhanced. Results provide
reduced delays and costs by the developed system.
Authors in Ref. [26] highlighted the scenario of online social networks where trust is a
major challenge and proposed a trust aware framework for online networks. The proposed
technique provides a mechanism to handle malicious nodes in the network. The trust
model is developed to assign a trust value to each user. Moreover, the work also provided
a data balancing technique. The simulation results highlight the improvement achievement
in terms of trust and data precision.
In Ref. [27], authors proposed a MapReduce-based Framework for the management
of big data along with handling trust. MapReduce-based framework focused on big data
problems for data processing. A trust framework is developed to handle the scheduling
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of MapReduce. Results show the significance of the proposed technique for managing
trustable big data.
Authors in Ref. [28] proposed a trust management for online systems that focused on
online web-based trust challenges and considered a virtual network scenario. Particularly,
the focus of the work is on handling the issues of virtual networks during their running
time as well as when the system reboots. Furthermore, the work also developed trust
management procedures. The work also implemented a prototype using an open-source
MANO platform and evaluated network performance in a dynamic environment.
In Ref. [29], an IoT-based healthcare system with a decentralized trust management
system for secure and distributed healthcare is explored. To implement trust-based com-
munication in the network, an evidence–theory-reliant solution is proposed. A reward
and punishment system is established to manage trust-based data communications. The
performance analysis of the proposed technique shows robustness and efficiency with
security against various types of attacks.
In Ref. [30], authors focused on how technicians can easily and confidently intervene
on industrial equipment with the joint adoption of new technologies. In this work, the
authors describe the design of a software architecture aimed at simplifying the management,
configuration, and assessment of IIoT systems. Furthermore, they discuss their experiences
with the proposed architecture in a railways use case.
Authors in Ref. [31] addressed the management difficulty faced by such data owners’
authority that depends on a Trusted Third Party (TTP) by applying key aggregate searchable
encryption (KASE). The authors proposed a secure data-sharing system based on KASE in a
fog-enabled IoT environment using blockchain and applied Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN)
logic. The authors claimed that their proposed scheme guaranteed secure mutual authentication.
The authors of [32] have identified the conventional real-time security concerns that
end-users face in an IoT network. They have proposed a layered architecture within the fog
computing paradigm to address these issues. Furthermore, they have explored a range of
existing solutions that have been proposed to overcome these real-time security challenges.
A summary of all the references discussed in this section are represented in Table 1.
3. System Model
The IoT-based industrial applications demand varying computing and processing
tasks. As the computing capability of these nodes is not high, these tasks can not be
processed in the required time frame and must utilize nearby fog servers. These tasks to
be offloaded are different in size and associated computing requirements. The fog node
receives a different number of offloaded tasks in different time intervals. There are chances
of malicious attacks in the network that may create anomalies in the network by offloading
tasks that may require a higher processing time; while the fog server has higher capacity
than the IIoT node, it still has a limited computing space, and if the offloaded tasks are more
than its processing capacity, these will be forwarded to the cloud servers for processing.
The considered system model is shown in Figure 2.
IIoT nodes are directly connected with fog nodes. The fog node after regular time in-
tervals monitors the tasks at their input. The monitoring time is calculated as the maximum
time (tmax ) required by a node in transferring its task to the fog node. In this IIoT network,
there are N nodes attached to the fog node that is a combination of L number of trustable
nodes and M number of malicious nodes. A fog node receives the trust values from all the
attached IIoT nodes within its tmax . The fog node after each tmax time interval re-assesses
the values of trust for all attached nodes.
Suppose the number of tasks sent for computation by user A is Ti , and K out of the
available N number of nodes offloaded one or more tasks to the fog server. The sum of all
offloaded tasks σTot at the fog node after M number of processing intervals is calculated as
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K M
σTot = ∑ ∑ Tij (1)
i =1 j =1
If the data size of task Ti is Di and the computation capacity for processing tasks of
the fog node is PB , then the total amount of data executed (θ Tot ) by the fog node along with
the processing time (ζ Tot ) required by the fog node to execute σTot tasks is calculated as
mentioned in Equations (2) and (3), respectively.
K M
θ Tot = ∑ ∑ Dij (2)
i =1 j =1
K M Dij
ζ Tot = ∑∑ PB
(3)
i =1 j =1
Suppose, out of the N number of nodes, there are NT non-trusted nodes in the
network, and out of these NT nodes, H number of nodes offloaded their tasks with data
D H , then the total legal offloaded data θ NT computed by fog node in M number of sessions
is calculated as
K M
θleg = ∑ ∑ Dij − DH (4)
i =1 j =1
The task computation time for all trustable nodes ζ leg is given by
K M Dij − D H
ζ leg = ∑∑ PB
(5)
i =1 j =1
by exchanging its information with other nodes. Suppose node A receives P packets from
its neighboring node B during the last periodic cycle. Out of these P packets, Pc packets
are error-free and correctly received by node A. To calculate the trustworthiness of node
B (TBA ), node A considers the previously calculated trust value for the last N packets and
applies the following formula:
( TBA × P) + ( Pc × N × SNR BA )
TBA = (6)
2P × SNRmax
Here, SNR BA represents the signal-to-noise ratio between node A and node B which is
Signal Power
given as SNR = Noise Power . The SNR gives us a measure of link quality among the nodes.
All the trust values calculated are in the range of 0 to 1.
F TBA + TFB
TMTN = (7)
2
When multiple trustworthy nodes are connected directly to the source node that is
linked with the trust-finding node, the directly connected nodes with the highest trust
value will be given preference. Suppose there is a fog node that needs to determine the
trust value of a node F. Node F is directly connected to nodes A, B, and C, which have
trust values of 0.9, 0.8, and 0.9, respectively. The fog node has calculated the trust values of
nodes A, B, and C to be 0.9, 0.8, and 0.7, respectively, as shown in Figure 3. In this scenario,
the trust value of node F will be computed through node A because it has the highest trust
value among all three nodes. If there are multiple directly connected nodes with the same
trust value, the node with the highest trust value towards the target node will be selected.
This increases the chances of finding the legitimate end node, as trustworthy nodes will
pass on all relevant information.
F ∑iX=1 TiF
Tind = (8)
X
1
σTF = tf
(9)
−[ H ( TBTF )+ M( TMTN
TF )+ L ( T )]
1+e ind
Here, H, M, and L are the weights added to the different trust values calculated for the
trust finding node TF with H representing the highest weight, M representing the medium
weight, and L representing the least weight. The trust evaluation mechanism is depicted
in Figure 4.
Fog servers after computing the trust value of each node present in the network
perform a comparison with a threshold. If the trust value calculated is higher than the
threshold value then it is considered as a legitimate node. However, if the trust value is
less than the threshold value, then it is considered a malicious node. A complete procedure
in differentiating the legitimate and malicious nodes is represented in the Algorithm 1.
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list provided to it. In this work, the TOPSIS is used to scrutinize the offloaded tasks that
are required to be executed by the fog node. The tasks with the highest TOPSIS value are
selected within the processing capacity of the fog node. The TOPSIS value in scrutinizing
the offloaded tasks is based on the following parameters.
1. Trust Value of Tasks The trust is an important parameter in scrutinizing the tasks to be
executed. The higher the trust value of the task, the higher the preference for the task.
2. Task Size The task size is also considered in such a way that the higher the size of the
tasks, the more will be their preferences.
3. Task Elapsed Duration The task deadline is another parameter that is taken into
consideration in computing the TOPSIS value of the task. The shorter the deadline of
the task, the higher its preference will be.
Considering the above-mentioned parameters, the TOPSIS value is calculated against
all the received tasks offloaded by legitimate nodes. After applying the TOPSIS algorithm,
a TOPSIS value for each legitimate task is calculated. The tasks with the highest TOPSIS
values are selected for the execution process. If there is still room for the tasks to be
placed in the queue, then the next highest TOPSIS value tasks are scrutinized. The process
continues until the processing capacity of the fog computing node is reached. A complete
task scrutiny mechanism for execution of offloaded tasks is shown in Algorithm 2.
0.4 as compared to 0.5 threshold values. It has also been observed from the results that the
number of executed task requests by SJF is more than Random and LJF in both sub-figures
as SJF allows the fog node to execute those tasks that are shorter in size, resulting in more
tasks to execute within the specified processing cycle.
Trust Threshold = 0.4
15
Proposed
SJF
Executed Tasks
LJF
10
Random
0
10 15 20 25 30
Processing Capacity
Trust Threshold = 0.5
10
Proposed
8 SJF
Executed Tasks
LJF
6 Random
0
10 15 20 25 30
Processing Capacity
LJF
6 Random
0
10 15 20 25 30
Task Requests
Trust Threshold = 0.5
10
Proposed
8 SJF
Executed Tasks
LJF
6 Random
0
10 15 20 25 30
Task Requests
The same trend follows for a varying number of offloaded tasks when the number
of offloaded tasks is increased by fixing the fog node’s processing capacity as shown in
both sub-plots of Figure 6. It is evident for both threshold values of 0.4 and 0.5 that the
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number of offloaded tasks executed by the fog node in EEOIT is higher than for all the
compared schemes. It has been observed from the results that for a threshold value of
0.4, more offloaded tasks are considered as legal as compared to a threshold value of 0.5.
The higher the trusted tasks, the more the tasks will be executed by SJF, LJF, and Random.
However, the number of executed tasks in EEOIT is the same when task requests increase
because the fog node has already executed the maximum number of tasks. The results
further show that the task requests entertained in LJF are the minimum among all, because,
with the increased number of tasks, the number of larger tasks increases, and a smaller
number of larger tasks will be executed in a specified time.
Trust Threshold = 0.4
100
Proposed
Trusted nodes served
SJF
80
LJF
(Percentage)
Random
60
40
20
0
10 15 20 25 30
Processing Capacity
80 LJF
(Percentage)
Random
60
40
20
0
10 15 20 25 30
Processing Capacity
Proposed
60 SJF
(Percentage)
LJF
Random
40
20
0
10 15 20 25 30
Task Requests
Trust Threshold = 0.5
80
Trusted nodes served
Proposed
60 SJF
(Percentage)
LJF
Random
40
20
0
10 15 20 25 30
Task Requests
Figure 8. Percentage of executed legal tasks against varying number of task requests.
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The percentage of the executed tasks is observed for an increasing trend of computing
capability of the fog machine as well as for an increasing number of received tasks as
shown in Figures 7 and 8, respectively. Each of the results is a combination of two sub-plots
with trust threshold values of 0.4 and 0.5. The percentage is determined by calculating
the total number of legitimate tasks executed by the fog node against the legitimate task
requests of IIoT nodes. It is evident from the results in both sub-figures that the percentage
calculated for the executed tasks in the proposed EEOIT algorithm is more than the
other three schemes. Results in Figure 7 represent that the increased task computing
capability of the fog machine improves the execution percentage of task requests for both
trust threshold values of 0.4 and 0.5. The fog node executes more tasks against the fixed
number of 10 offloaded tasks in all processing cycles, and the percentage of executed tasks
increases from 37% to 90% when the trust threshold is 0.4 and from 42% to 96% for the
trust threshold value of 0.5 for the same amount of tasks requests. The same trend follows
in all the compared algorithms as the executed tasks percentage improves with the rise
in fog computing capability. However, the maximum percentage of the executed tasks in
SJF, LJF, and Random are 72%, 48%, and 62%, respectively, for both the threshold values of
0.4 and 0.5.
For varying numbers of received task requests, the executed tasks percentage in
EEOIT is more than the other three schemes for both trust threshold values as shown in
both sub-plots of Figure 8. It is emphasized from the results that an increased number of
task requests reduces the executed tasks percentage as the fog machine holds the same
computing capability and can execute only a limited number of offloaded tasks, and
consequently, the percentage of the executed tasks reduces. The results show that when the
threshold value is 0.4, the executed tasks percentage reduces from 67% to 23% as compared
to 52% to 23% in SJF, 35% to 8% in LJF, and 42% to 16% in Random. The results further show
that for a threshold value of 0.4, there will be more offloaded trusted nodes in different
sizes. For a threshold value of 0.5, the number of legitimate nodes in the offloaded tasks is
less as compared to the threshold value of 0.4. For a threshold value of 0.5, the executed
tasks by the proposed scheme are more than the other three schemes for fixed processing
capacity and consequently an increase in the percentage of the executed tasks. The results
show that the task execution percentage in the proposed scheme decreased from 78% to
32% as compared to 50% to 24% in SJF, 30% to 8% in LJF, and 40% to 15% in Random.
amount of data expected by the proposed scheme is 725 kB as compared to 530 kB, 375 kB,
and 430 kB data in SJF, LJF, and Random, respectively,
Trust Threshold = 0.4
1000
Proposed
400
200
0
10 15 20 25 30
Processing Capacity
SJF
600 LJF
Random
400
200
0
10 15 20 25 30
Processing Capacity
SJF
400 LJF
Random
300
200
100
0
10 15 20 25 30
Task Requests
Trust Threshold = 0.5
600
Proposed
Executed Data (kBytes)
SJF
LJF
400 Random
200
0
10 15 20 25 30
Task Requests
Figure 10. Total executed data against varying number of task requests.
To validate the performance of our proposed scheme for the executed amount of
data, the expected data by the fog machine for increasing the trend of task requests are
represented in Figure 10. It is highlighted from the results that threshold trust values of
0.4 and 0.5 are represented in subplots. The results show that for both the threshold trust
values of 0.4 and 0.5, when the number of legitimate tasks is more, the amount of data
executed by the fog node also increases. When the threshold value is 0.4, the amount of
Sensors 2024, 24, 2098 16 of 21
data executed by the fog node in the proposed scheme increases from 300 kB to 330 kB,
when task requests rise from 10 to 30 tasks. However, the amount of data executed in SJF,
LJF, and Random increased from 250 kB to 310 kB, 160 kB to 130 kB, and 210 kB to 210 kB of
executed data, respectively. When the threshold trust value is 0.5, the amount of executed
data is reduced as the number of legitimate tasks reduces. The results show that EEOIT
due to an efficient TOPSIS-based algorithm executes 350 kB of data as compared to 285 kB
in SJF, 110 kB in LJF, and 180 kB in Random algorithms when the number of offloaded tasks
is 30 tasks.
1
Mean trust value
LJF
Random
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
10 15 20 25 30
Processing Capacity
1
Mean trust value
LJF
Random
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
10 15 20 25 30
Processing Capacity
of Executed Tasks
Random
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
10 15 20 25 30
Task Requests
Random
Mean trust value
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
10 15 20 25 30
Task Requests
Figure 12. Mean trust value against varying number of task requests.
The results in Figure 12 consist of two subplots and represent the MTV of the executed
tasks for increasing the trend of requested tasks when the threshold trust value is 0.4 and 0.5.
It is evident from the results that the MTV calculated in the proposed scheme is significantly
greater than the other three schemes for all different task requests. It has been observed from
the results that the MTV calculated in the proposed EEOIT reaches 0.76 when the threshold
value is 0.4. However, the MTV calculated in SJF, LJF, and Random is just above 0.4 for all
task requests against the same trust threshold value. For the trust threshold value of 0.5, the
MTV calculated in the proposed scheme is 0.78 for all originating task requests. However,
the MTV calculated in SJF, LJF, and Random is less than 0.4 for all varying amounts of
offloaded tasks. This is because, SJF, LJF, and Random execute tasks without considering
their trust values. However, in the proposed scheme, preference is given to tasks with
higher trust values than others by applying the TOPSIS-based algorithm.
X Y Dj
D
Ttot = ∑ PRiF + ∑ PRC (11)
i =1 j =1
Here, PR F and PRC represent the data processing rate calculated by the fog node and
cloud servers including their propagation delay, respectively.
The results shown in Figures 13 and 14 represent the accumulated time calculated in
executing all the legitimate tasks offloaded by nodes for varying processing capacity of fog
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nodes and for varying numbers of offloaded tasks, respectively. The results in each figure
are calculated for trust threshold values of 0.4 and 0.5.
Trust Threshold = 0.4
50 Proposed
SJF
40 LJF
Time (sec) 30
Random
20
10
0
10 15 20 25 30
Processing Capacity
Trust Threshold = 0.5
Proposed
40
SJF
LJF
Time (sec)
30 Random
20
10
0
10 15 20 25 30
Processing Capacity
40 Random
20
0
10 15 20 25 30
Task Requests
Trust Threshold = 0.5
60
Proposed
SJF
LJF
Time (sec)
40
Random
20
0
10 15 20 25 30
Task Requests
Figure 14. Time against varying number of task requests.
The results in Figure 13 show that the accumulated time in task execution in the pro-
posed scheme is less than the other three schemes for both the trust threshold values. This
is because the proposed scheme scrutinizes trusted tasks by applying a trust management
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system. It has also been observed that the task execution time reduces with the increase
in processing capacity of the fog node as it can execute more offloaded tasks itself, and
lower numbers of tasks are forwarded to the remotely placed cloud server. It has also been
observed that for higher trust threshold values, the execution time is reduced as compared
to lower threshold values for the same number of offloaded tasks. This is due to the fact
that an increased threshold value means there are less legitimate tasks in the total offloaded
tasks, and most of these tasks are executed by the fog node with a reduced execution time.
The results shown in Figure 14 verify that the task execution time of the proposed
scheme is less than the other three schemes for varying numbers of offloaded task requests.
The results show that with the increase in several offloaded tasks with limited fog execution
capacity, the task execution time increases for both the trust threshold values. This is due to
the reason that only a limited number of offloaded tasks are executed by the fog node and
the rest are forwarded to the remotely placed cloud server. The results further show that
the task execution time of legitimate tasks is higher for smaller threshold values because in
such cases, the number of legitimate tasks increases and the accumulated time in executing
these tasks increases.
6. Conclusions
The quality of service of the IIoT network is compromised due to malicious node
attacks in the network. Malicious nodes create anomalies by compromising the computing
capability of the fog machine. In this work, the offloaded tasks are scrutinized by con-
sidering their legitimacy. In addition, if the number of offloaded tasks is more than the
processing capacity of the fog node, then they are scrutinized by applying the TOPSIS
algorithm by considering their trust value, task sizes, and task numbers. The performance
of the proposed EEOIT algorithm is compared with Random, SJF, and LJF for different
computing capabilities of fog machines and all different numbers of task requests for the
trust threshold values of 0.4 and 0.5. It has been observed from the results that EEOIT
executes up to 20% more legitimate tasks as compared to SJF, 66% more tasks from Random,
and 150% more legitimated tasks as compared to LJF for different computing capabilities
of fog machines for both the trust threshold values. The results further show that the
EEOIT executes 38%, 65%, and 153% more tasks from SJF, Random, and LJF, respectively,
for all varying numbers of task requests. The results clearly show that the executed data
of legitimate tasks in EEOIT is up to 32%, 55%, and 164% more than SJF, Random, and
LJF, respectively, for both the trust threshold values. It is evident from the results that the
execution time of all the offloaded legitimate tasks in the proposed scheme is up to 18%
less for varying processing capacity of fog node and 21% less than the other schemes for
varying number of offloaded tasks. Similarly, the mean trust value calculated in EEOIT
against executed tasks is 68%, 70%, and 73% higher than SJF, Random, and LJF, respectively,
when the trust threshold values are 0.3 and 0.5. In future, we will work on improving
the trust evaluation metric for different network attacks and efficient load balancing of
fog nodes.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, A.N.A., B.A. (Bakhtiar Ali), M.S.S., M.A., D.A., and
B.A. (Bushra Alghamdi); Writing—original draft, A.N.A., B.A. (Bakhtiar Ali), M.S.S., and M.A.;
Writing—review and editing, D.A. and B.A. (Bushra Alghamdi). All authors have read and agreed to
the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This work was supported and funded by the Deanship of Scientific Research at Imam
Mohammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU) (grant number IMSIU-RG23112).
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: Data are contained within the article.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
Sensors 2024, 24, 2098 20 of 21
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