School of Law

LL.M. Assignment Submission Form

Student Name: Asiah Trovato

Student ID Number: 24358525

LL.M Course Title: L.L.M. General

Module Title: LL.M CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN EU LAW

Assignment Title: DMA: Empowering SMEs or Burdening Europe’s Digital

Backbone?

Lecturer(s): Catherine Donnelly

Date Submitted: 23rd April

Word Count/Page Count: 5460 words, 22 pages

I have read and I understand the plagiarism provisions in the General Regulations of the
University Calendar for the current year, found at http://www.tcd.ie/calendar

I have also completed the Online Tutorial on avoiding plagiarism ‘Ready, Steady, Write”, located
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Signed: Date: 23rd April 2025

DMA: Empowering SMEs or Burdening Europe’s

Digital Backbone?

1. Introduction: The Digital Markets Act and SME Challenges

The Digital Markets Act (DMA), enacted in 2022 under Article 114 of the Treaty on the

Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)1, stands as a pivotal pillar of the European

Union’s Digital Single Market strategy. Its ambitious goal? To rein in the dominance of

digital gatekeepers and cultivate markets that are both contestable and fair. By targeting

gatekeepers—major platforms that control access to digital markets—rather than small

and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the DMA seeks to foster competition, as

outlined in Article 1(1)2. Yet, while its primary focus is on regulating tech giants, the

ripple effects touch SMEs, which form the backbone of the EU’s economy, constituting

99% of its businesses and driving innovation3. These smaller players, often competing

with or relying on gatekeeper platforms, find themselves navigating a complex

regulatory landscape. Although the DMA includes provisions to level the playing field for

SMEs4, its uniform framework inadvertently imposes burdens that undermine its fairness

objectives, paradoxically disadvantaging the very entities it aims to empower5.

1
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47, art 114.
2
Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable
and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital
Markets Act) [2022] OJ L265/1, art 1(1).
3
European Commission, ‘The 2025 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report’ (Communication)
COM(2025) 26 final, 12.
4
Sigurd Næss-Schmidt and others, ‘The Implications of the DMA for External Trade and EU Firms’ (Copenhagen
Economics, 10 June 2021) 24.
5
Ibid 33–36.
The DMA’s commitment to fairness is unmistakable, with the term appearing 18 times in

its text and “unfairness” cited 43 times6. Yet, a gap persists between this lofty intent and

its real-world outcomes. Articles 5 and 6 impose stringent obligations on gatekeepers,

such as ensuring interoperability7 and providing data access8. These measures, in

theory, empower SMEs by dismantling barriers erected by dominant platforms.

However, SMEs often lack the resources—be it advanced software or legal expertise—

to capitalise on these opportunities. What should be a springboard becomes an

operational hurdle. This tension mirrors findings in CJEU rulings, such as Google

Shopping9, which condemned unfair gatekeeper practices and underscored the need for

proportionate regulation under Protocol No. 210.

Why, then, does the DMA falter in its mission to uplift SMEs? The answer lies in its one-

size-fits-all approach, which overlooks the resource constraints of smaller firms. For

instance, while interoperability requirements aim to foster competition, they demand

technical capabilities that many SMEs simply cannot afford. Similarly, data access

provisions, while promising, require sophisticated analytics tools to translate raw data

into actionable insights. These challenges echo broader questions about regulatory

design: can a uniform framework truly serve both giants and smaller players equitably?

This essay critically explores the DMA’s unintended burdens on SMEs, examining

gatekeeper adjustments, protective measures, and their legal implications. It

6
Behrang Kianzad, ‘Fairness, Digital Markets and Competition Law – Reconciling Fairness Norms in Digital
Markets Act, Data Act and AI Act with Competition Law’ (2025) 4(1) J L Market Innov 134.
7
DMA 2022 (n2), art 7.
8
DMA 2022 (n2), art 6(10).
9
Case T-612/17 Google LLC and Alphabet, Inc. v European Commission (Google Shopping) [2021]
ECLI:EU:T:2021:763.
10
Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality [2008] OJ C115/206.
investigates how collaborative ecosystems, recalibrated obligations, and robust

enforcement could bridge the gap between intent and impact. Ultimately, it proposes a

balanced framework to empower SMEs, ensuring they flourish in a truly contestable

digital economy.

2. The DMA’s Paradox: Burdening the SMEs It Seeks to

Empower

The Digital Markets Act champions fairness in digital markets, yet it unwittingly creates

a paradox: regulations crafted to curb gatekeeper dominance often weigh heavily on

small and medium-sised enterprises. Designed to foster a level playing field, the DMA’s

provisions inadvertently impose challenges that undermine its noble intentions,

particularly for SMEs, the lifeblood of the EU’s economy.

2.1 Gatekeeper Adjustments: Opportunities or Obstacles?

Gatekeeper adjustments, intended to dismantle barriers, frequently place SMEs in a

precarious position. For instance, Article 7 mandates interoperability for messaging

services, compelling gatekeepers to share core functions (e.g., end-to-end text texting 11)

with third parties, including SMEs. In theory, this opens doors for smaller firms. In

practice, however, many SMEs lack the technical infrastructure or expertise to meet

these interoperability standards, risking exclusion from the very benefits the DMA

promises12. Similarly, Article 6(10) requires gatekeepers to provide business users,

11
DMA 2022 (n2) article 7(2)(a)(i.)
12
The App Association, Digital Markets Position Paper: Act (March 2021) 5.
often SMEs, with free, real-time data access 13. Yet, without sophisticated software or

skilled analysts, SMEs struggle to transform this data into actionable insights. What

should be an opportunity becomes a compliance burden, exposing a critical flaw in the

DMA’s fairness framework14. Can regulations truly empower smaller players if they

demand resources those players rarely possess?

2.2 Protective Measures: Relief or Added Pressure?

Even the DMA’s protective measures, designed to shield SMEs, often overwhelm them.

Article 5(3), for example, prohibits gatekeepers from restricting SMEs’ pricing or terms

on other platforms, enabling sales across channels without gatekeeper fees 15. This

provision seems promising, especially since 82% of SMEs rely on search engines for

market access16. However, limited marketing budgets hinder SMEs’ ability to compete

effectively across multiple platforms, diluting the intended benefits. Likewise, Article 6(2)

prevents gatekeepers from exploiting SMEs’ private data, safeguarding their competitive

position17. Yet, these protections assume SMEs can market broadly and hold their own

against larger rivals—an assumption that falters when resource constraints take hold.

As a result, the DMA’s relief measures often morph into compliance challenges,

empowering SMEs only if they can bear the collateral costs 18. The question looms: how

can the DMA truly uplift SMEs without addressing their structural limitations?

13
DMA 2022 (n2) article 6(10).
14
RC Härting and A Sprengel, ‘Cost-Benefit Considerations for Data Analytics: An SME-Oriented Framework
Enhanced by a Management Perspective and the Process of Idea Generation’ (2019) 159 Procedia Computer Science
p. 1537.
15
DMA 2022 (n2) article 5(3)..
16
Sigurd Næss-Schmidt and others (n4) 24.
17
DMA 2022 (n2) article 6(2).
18
Carmelo Cennamo and Juan Santaló, Potential Risks and Unintended Effects of the New EU Digital Markets Act
(Open Internet Governance Institute Paper Series #4, February 2023) 10–11.
2.3 Legal and Competitive Implications: A Fair Framework or an
Uneven Burden?
19
Apple’s Core Technology Fee (CTF) , introduced in the EU in 2024, highlights the

DMA’s impact on SMEs. Under Article 6(4), which mandates sideloading 20 to disrupt

monopolies like Apple’s App Store, gatekeepers must allow apps from third-party

sources. Apple complied by opening iOS but imposed a €0.50 fee per “first annual

install” after 1 million installs, citing security costs. For SMEs at critical growth stages,

this fee transforms opportunity into a financial hurdle. Consider the stark calculation 21 by

Nikita Bier, former founder of Gas: an app with $10 million in sales and 10 million

installs faces monthly fees of $515,942, including a $407,609 CTF, totalling $6.2 million

annually22. Such costs disproportionately burden SMEs, who lack the financial reserves

of tech giants.

Operational barriers compound these challenges. Article 5(4) requires gatekeepers to

support alternative payment systems, yet Apple’s compliance—introducing warning

screens that highlight risks of non-Apple payment options 23 —deters users from

choosing SME alternatives. This tactic, noted in Recital 7024, undermines the payment

freedom intended by Article 5(4) and may violate Article 13(4) 25, which prohibits
19
Apple, ‘Apple announces changes to iOS, Safari, and the App Store in the European Union’ (Apple Newsroom, 25
January 2024) https://www.apple.com/ie/newsroom/2024/01/apple-announces-changes-to-ios-safari-and-the-app-
store-in-the-european-union/ accessed 22 Marchl 2025.
20
DMA 2022 (n2) article 6(4).
21
Apple, ‘Fee Calculator for Apps in the EU’ (Apple Developer) https://developer.apple.com/support/fee-calculator-
for-apps-in-the-eu/ accessed 22 April 2025.
22
Nikita Bier (@nikitabier), ‘Under the App Store's new fee structure’ (X, 25 January 2024, 18:53)
https://x.com/nikitabier/status/1750592825060921353 accessed 12 April 2025.
23
Natasha Lomas and Romain Dillet, ‘EU sends Apple first DMA interoperability instructions for apps and
connected devices’ (TechCrunch, 19 March 2025) https://techcrunch.com/2025/03/19/eu-sends-apple-first-dma-
interoperability-instructions-for-apps-and-connected-devices/ accessed 12 April 2025.
24
DMA 2022 (n2) recital 70.
25
Christian Karbaum and others, ‘Scare screens and dark patterns: The prohibition on circumvention pursuant to
Article 13(4) DMA’ (Glade Michel Wirtz Blog, 2024), Section III https://www.glademichelwirtz.com/en/blog/scare-
screens-and-dark-patterns-the-prohibition-on-circumvention-pursuant-to-article-134-dma/ accessed 10 April 2025.
gatekeepers from subverting obligations designed to protect SMEs 26. How, then, can

the DMA claim to empower smaller players when gatekeepers can shift compliance

burdens downstream?

The DMA’s legal foundation, rooted in Article 114 TFEU, enables the EU to standardise

rules for a unified market. Yet, its uniform approach may lacks proportionality, a

principle enshrined in Protocol No. 2 and clarified in CJEU case law. In Vodafone (C-

58/08)27, the CJEU upheld mobile roaming price caps, deeming them proportionate

because consumer benefits outweighed uneven industry burdens. Under the DMA,

however, SMEs face a starkly different reality: compliance costs, such as adapting to

fees or technical requirements, often eclipse benefits. Limited resources hinder SMEs’

ability to leverage market-opening measures, contradicting the proportionality

demanded by Protocol No. 2. Similarly, Google Shopping (T-612/17) offers a precedent

for SMEs to challenge gatekeeper tactics under Article 102(a) TFEU, which prohibits

abusive dominance through unfair conditions28. Apple’s CTF, by imposing costs that

disproportionately affect growing SMEs, could be seen as such an abusive condition,

stifling their competitive viability.

Some argue that the DMA’s one-size-fits-all approach ensures a level playing field by

holding gatekeepers accountable and preventing exploitative loopholes 29. In fact, Article

6(7) mandates that gatekeepers provide standardised application programming

26
DMA 2022 (n2) article 13(4).
27
Case C-58/08 The Queen, on the application of Vodafone Ltd v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform [2010] ECR I-4999 para 69.
28
TFEU (n1) article 102(a)
29
Nicolas Petit, 'The Proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA) - A Legal and Policy Review' (2021) SSRN Working
Paper 2-3.
interfaces (APIs)30, ensuring SMEs have reliable access to their ecosystems.

Theoretically, this fosters equitable competition by guaranteeing predictable entry points

for smaller firms. In practice, however, this assumes SMEs possess the technical and

financial capacity to capitalise on such access—an assumption that falters when

resource constraints bite31. Gatekeepers adapt seamlessly, but SMEs face

disproportionate strain, suggesting that the DMA’s uniform framework.

In conclusion, the DMA’s promise of fairness falters as SMEs bear burdens gatekeepers

evade. Financial hurdles like the CTF and operational barriers like warning screens

transform opportunities into overload, exposing a gap between the DMA’s intent and its

outcomes. Articles 5 and 6 offer theoretical protections, yet these vanish when SMEs

cannot meet the technical or economic demands 32. By prioritising uniformity over

proportionality, the DMA risks weakening Europe’s digital edge, as SME failures could

cede ground to U.S. gatekeepers, contradicting its market-reclaiming ambitions.

3. Mitigating the Burden: Potential Solutions for SMEs

3.1 Strengthening SME Resilience

The capacity of SME to thrive under the DMA is pivotal, not only to counter its

unintended side effects but also to uphold the proportionality principle enshrined in

Protocol No. 2. By leveraging European Digital Innovation Hubs (EDIHs) and targeted

30
DMA 2022 (n2) article 6(7).
31
A Kalpaka and others, 'Digital Maturity Assessment (DMA) Framework and Questionnaires for SMEs/PSOs: A
Guidance Document for EDIHs' (European Commission 2023) JRC133234, 4-6, 37.
32
The App Association (n12) 3.
financial support, SMEs can navigate the complexities of digital transformation, fostering

a competitive and inclusive digital marketplace.

EDIHs, backed by €273 million from the Digital Europe Programme, play a critical role in

bolstering SME capabilities. These hubs deliver tailored training, particularly for micro-

enterprises, which, as SMEunited highlights, often grapple with digital adoption and

accessing reliable, harmonised data33. In 2023, only 57.7% of SMEs reached a basic

level of digital intensity, a stark contrast to the ambitious 90% target set for 2030 34.

Through workshops on application programming interfaces (APIs) and data

management tools, EDIHs empower SMEs to surmount technical barriers, such as

those posed by gatekeepers’ compliance with Article 6(10) of the DMA. How can SMEs

compete effectively without such support?

Financial mechanisms are equally vital to bridge the digital divide and ensure that

compliance costs do not overwhelm smaller firms. Targeted funding, including grants

and low-cost loans, can address the 0.9% SME loan stock gap identified in the Single

Market Report 202535. Such support enables SMEs to adopt real-time data tools and

meet interoperability standards, seizing opportunities presented by the DMA without

financial strain. Expanding initiatives like the Digital Europe Programme could prove

transformative, ensuring SMEs remain agile and competitive in a rapidly evolving digital

landscape.

33
SMEunited, ‘Position Paper on Upgrading Digital Company Law’ (2022) 2.
34
European Commission (n3) 16.
35
European Commission (n3) 12.
Beyond funding, a tailored compliance framework could significantly alleviate the

regulatory burden on SMEs while preserving the DMA’s core objectives. A tiered

support model, for instance, would mitigate disproportionate challenges faced by

smaller firms, particularly those with limited digital capacity, in adapting to mandates like

Article 6(10)’s data access requirements. Micro-enterprises, often constrained by

resources, could benefit from exemptions or simplified obligations, aligning with the

proportionality principle of Protocol No. 2. The CJEU’s ruling in the Google Shopping

case (T-612/17) underscores this need, penalising Google for imposing unfair

conditions that disadvantaged smaller competitors. A graduated approach ensures

compliance remains feasible, fostering innovation without stifling growth.36

To maximise the effectiveness of these measures, rigorous impact assessments are

essential, as mandated by Protocol No. 2. These evaluations must carefully weigh the

financial and operational burdens on SMEs, ensuring proportionality in regulation 37. By

pinpointing specific challenges—such as resource constraints—assessments can

inform tailored exemptions or streamlined obligations, promoting a fair digital market

without compromising the DMA’s competition policy goals.

Through the synergy of EDIH support, strategic funding, tiered compliance frameworks,

and thorough impact assessments, SMEs can mitigate the indirect impacts of the DMA.

This multifaceted approach not only empowers smaller firms but also ensures a

balanced, competitive digital market anchored in proportionate regulation.

36
Sigurd Næss-Schmidt and others (n4) 12.
37
Heike Schweitzer, ‘The Art to Make Gatekeeper Positions Contestable and the Challenge to Know What is Fair: A
Discussion of the Digital Markets Act Proposal’ (2021) ZEuP (forthcoming) 34.
3.2 Adjusting Gatekeeper Obligations

While bolstering SME capabilities addresses internal constraints, recalibrating the

DMA’s gatekeeper obligations is essential to alleviate external pressures. Targeted

amendments to Articles 3, 6, and 13, grounded in competition law precedents, can

redistribute compliance burdens more equitably, aligning with Recital 27’s call for

proportionate regulation38. Such adjustments ensure gatekeepers shoulder a fairer

share of costs, empowering SMEs to thrive in a contestable digital market.

To this end, Article 3 should exempt SMEs with fewer than 5 million installs or

equivalent revenue from gatekeeper designation. This aligns with Recital 24’s flexibility

for smaller firms and Këllezi’s argument that SMEs, absent traditional dominance, face

exclusionary practices due to economic dependence 39. Similarly, Article 6(4) should

mandate gatekeepers to provide free, user-friendly sideloading APIs, reducing technical

barriers and enabling SMEs to distribute apps via alternative channels 40. Article 6(10)

should require free, simplified data access and portability tools to spur innovation and

ease compliance41. Finally, Article 13 should prohibit gatekeeper fees on SMEs,

preventing financial exclusion and fostering competitive fairness42.

These proposals draw on established competition law principles. The Google Shopping

case (T-612/17) underscores that gatekeeper platforms, like app stores, function as

38
DMA 2022 (n2) recital 27.
39
P Këllezi, ‘Abuse below the Threshold of Dominance? Market Power, Market Dominance, and Abuse of
Economic Dependence’ in MO Mackenrodt, BC Gallego and S Enchelmaier (eds), Abuse of Dominant Position:
New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms? (Springer 2008) 62.
40
Friso Bostoen, ‘Understanding the Digital Markets Act’ (2023) 68(2) Antitrust Bulletin 263, 50.
41
Ç Çavuş, ‘Does DMA Interoperability Promote Innovation: A Comparative Study from EU Competition Law to
the DMA’ (2024) 21(1) Eur Comp J 161, 22.
42
Luis MB Cabral and others, The EU Digital Markets Act: A Report from a Panel of Economic Experts
(Publications Office of the European Union 2021) 30.
“quasi-essential facilities” vital for SME market access 43. Mandating free sideloading

APIs under Article 6(4) ensures non-discriminatory access, enabling SMEs to innovate

in complementary markets, such as third-party app stores 44. Likewise, the Microsoft

case (T-201/04) prioritised SME innovation by enforcing interoperability 45, supporting

free data access tools under Article 6(10) to facilitate cost-effective data use 46. Këllezi

highlights SMEs’ vulnerability to dominant buyers, where exclusionary practices mirror

gatekeeper dynamics47. Exempting SMEs under Article 3 prevents disproportionate

burdens, while banning fees under Article 13, as Afuwape critiques arbitrary thresholds,

addresses compliance costs that stifle smaller firms4849.

Some contend that the DMA’s existing interoperability rules, like Articles 6(4) and 6(10),

already empower SMEs by granting access to gatekeeper ecosystems, fostering

innovation50. Bostoen notes that these provisions promote contestability by enabling

third-party app stores and sideloading, potentially lowering fees 51. Yet, high fees and

technical barriers often nullify these benefits, as SMEs lack the resources to capitalise

on such access52. The proposed amendments—exempting SMEs under Article 3 and

banning fees under Article 13—remove these obstacles, enabling smaller firms to

compete effectively.

43
Çavuş (n 41) 14.
44
ibid 22.
45
Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, para 7.
46
Çavuş (n 41) 11-12.
47
Këllezi (n39) 62.
48
Këllezi (n39) 85.
49
KO Afuwape, ‘Digital Markets Act: A Hindrance to Innovation and Business Development’ (2024) 5(2) Digital
Law J 8, 7.
50
Ibid 27.
51
Bostoen (n40) 51, 53.
52
Bostoen (n40) 47.
In conclusion, these recalibrations mitigate SME burdens while preserving the DMA’s

mission to curb gatekeeper dominance. By embedding proportionality these

adjustments foster a digital market where SMEs can flourish, ensuring fairness guides

the law’s application.

3.3 Enhancing DMA Enforcement for SME Protection

While recalibrating gatekeeper obligations eases SME burdens, robust enforcement is

critical to prevent gatekeepers from undermining reforms through tactics like restrictive

warning screens. Strengthening oversight under Articles 27 and 38 empowers SMEs to

challenge violations swiftly, ensuring their access to a truly contestable digital market.

A streamlined mechanism for SMEs to report gatekeeper infractions is paramount.

Prolonged delays, as seen in the Google Android case (T-604/18), left SMEs grappling

with market exclusion due to sluggish enforcement 53. To address this, the European

Commission should establish an accessible portal under Article 27, enabling SMEs to

report issues like discriminatory ranking (Article 6(5)) or restricted data access (Article

5(4)) with ease54. Given that 82% of SMEs rely on platforms like search engines for

visibility55, such delays can be devastating. A user-friendly reporting system would lower

barriers, allowing smaller firms to voice concerns promptly and enabling the

Commission to tackle gatekeeper misconduct efficiently56.

53
J Cremer and others, ‘Enforcing the Digital Markets Act: Institutional Choices, Compliance, and Antitrust’ (2023)
11(3) J Antitrust Enforcement 315, 31.
54
Commission, ‘Annual Report on Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector and Amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828
(Digital Markets Act)’ COM (2024) 106 final, 7.
55
Sigurd Næss-Schmidt and others (n4) 24.
56
Cremer (n53) 12-14.
Equally vital is empowering National Competition Authorities (NCAs) under Article 38 to

conduct rigorous audits of gatekeeper compliance. Apple’s DMA Compliance Function

illustrates the potential of structured audits, which could verify adherence to mandates

like Article 5(4) on non-discriminatory access57. Martinez highlights NCAs’ investigative

capabilities, which can be leveraged to ensure local market fairness for SMEs 58. By

tailoring oversight to national contexts, NCAs can provide responsive enforcement,

safeguarding smaller firms from gatekeeper overreach.

To avoid inconsistent enforcement or overburdening NCAs, the Commission must

standardise audit protocols. Copenhagen Economics warns of disproportionate

regulatory impacts, underscoring the need for uniformity59. By developing harmonised

methodologies, the Commission can ensure consistent DMA application across the EU,

creating a level playing field for SMEs. This coordinated approach prevents fragmented

enforcement, fostering equity in diverse markets.

Through enhanced SME reporting and standardised NCA audits, DMA enforcement can

proactively counter gatekeeper circumvention. This vigilant stance not only upholds the

DMA’s objectives but also cultivates a digital market where SMEs can compete fairly,

unhindered by gatekeeper tactics60.

57
Apple, ‘Non-Confidential Summary to Apple’s DMA Compliance Report of March 7, 2025’ (7 March 2025)
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/digital_markets_act/compliance_reports/apple_2025.pdf accessed 2 April 2025
236-240.
58
Alba Ribera Martínez, ‘The Supporting and Complementary Role of National Authorities in Enforcing the DMA:
All Enforcement Systems Go’ (2024) 2024(3) Mededingingsrecht in de Praktikj 41, 4.
59
Sigurd Næss-Schmidt and others (n4) 12.
60
European Commission, ‘Commission Sends Preliminary Findings to Apple and Opens Additional Non-
Compliance Investigation Against Apple under the Digital Markets Act’ (Press Release, Brussels, 24 June 2024).
4. Fostering SME Resilience Through Collaborative

Ecosystems

The Digital Markets Act aims to foster fair and contestable digital markets 61, yet its

uniform rules inadvertently burden small and medium-sized enterprises with financial

and technical compliance costs, as discussed previously. To address these challenges,

this section proposes a systemic approach: collaborative digital ecosystems—networks

uniting SMEs, gatekeepers, regulators, industry associations, and tech providers to

share resources, knowledge, and infrastructure. Unlike Section 2’s focus on SME

burdens and Section 3’s solutions targeting individual capacity and gatekeeper

obligations, ecosystems tackle structural barriers through partnerships, enhancing SME

competitiveness without replicating gatekeeper dominance. This cooperative model

aligns with the DMA’s contestability goals and the EU’s Digital Single Market vision of

harmonised, innovative markets. By pooling expertise and costs, ecosystems empower

SMEs to navigate DMA complexities, ensuring equitable markets. This section explores

this paradigm shift, first examining ecosystem models and their role in mitigating SME

burdens, then grounding them in EU legal and policy frameworks, followed by practical

implementation challenges and broader digital policy implications, ultimately positioning

SMEs as pillars of a contestable digital economy.

61
DMA 2022 (n2) article 1, recital 2.
4.1 The Role of Ecosystems in Alleviating SME Burdens

The DMA imposes significant burdens on SMEs, but collaborative ecosystems reduce

these burdens by pooling resources and expertise 62. Unlike standalone support

mechanisms, these networks—uniting SMEs, gatekeepers, regulators, and industry

bodies—tackle systemic barriers, fostering fair competition as envisioned in Article 1. By

creating shared platforms for innovation and compliance, ecosystems empower SMEs

to navigate the DMA’s complexities without succumbing to financial or technical strain.

Central to this approach are European Digital Innovation Hubs (EDIHs), funded by the

Digital Europe Programme, which span 90% of EU regions and foster cross-border

collaboration63. EDIHs provide SMEs with access to shared digital infrastructure, such

as test environments and technical services, slashing the costs of complying with Article

6(10)’s data access mandates64. For example, PhotonDelta, a Dutch hub, enables

SMEs to leverage shared photonic technology and collaborative roadmaps, significantly

reducing individual R&D expenses65. By connecting 2,355 organisations, EDIHs amplify

SME influence far beyond what solo efforts could achieve66.

Ecosystems also bolster competition through shared tools and collective bargaining,

enabling SMEs to innovate within platform environments 67. Initiatives like Gaia-X and

62
E Carpentier and others, European Digital Innovation Hubs Network’s Activities and Customers (Publications
Office of the European Union 2025) 5–6 <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/7784020> accessed 23 March 2025.
63
Ibid 4, 9.
64
A Kalpaka, J Sörvik and A Tasigiorgou, Digital Innovation Hubs as Policy Instruments to Boost Digitalization of
SMEs (A Kalpaka and G Rissola eds, Publications Office of the European Union 2020) 36.
65
A Kalpaka, J Sörvik and A Tasigiorgou (n64) 35.
66
E Carpentier and others (n62) 5.
67
P Larouche and A de Streel, ‘Will the Digital Markets Act Kill Innovation in Europe?’ (2021) University of
Montreal Faculty of Law Research Paper 4 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3855505> accessed 13 April 2025.
the European Alliance for Industrial Data, Edge, and Cloud deliver interoperable cloud

infrastructure, reducing SME dependence on foreign providers and easing compliance

with Article 6’s data requirements68. Moreover, the assignment model—where SMEs

transfer legal claims to specialised firms—streamlines enforcement of DMA violations,

alleviating financial and procedural burdens69. Such collaborative strategies transform

regulatory hurdles into opportunities for incremental innovation.

However, ecosystems are not without risks. Overreliance on shared infrastructure could

inadvertently replicate gatekeeper dominance, trapping SMEs in new dependencies.

Yet, models like PhotonDelta counter this through decentralised governance,

empowering SMEs to shape strategic decisions and maintain autonomy 70. By enabling

collective negotiations, ecosystems resolve the DMA’s “fairness paradox,” where SMEs

struggle to access gatekeeper infrastructure individually 71. Industry alliances, for

instance, secure equitable platform access, ensuring SMEs thrive 72. Backed by Digital

Europe Programme funding, this scalable framework positions SMEs to flourish

collaboratively, anchoring a dynamic, contestable digital economy.

4.2 Legal and Policy Foundations for Ecosystem Support

The collaborative ecosystem model, designed to bolster small and medium-sized

enterprises (SMEs) under the Digital Markets Act (DMA), finds robust grounding in EU
68
FG Blancato, ‘The Cloud Sovereignty Nexus: How the European Union Seeks to Reverse Strategic Dependencies
in its Digital Ecosystem’ (2023) 16(1) Policy & Internet 12, 12 <https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.358> accessed 15
April 2025.
69
L Hornkohl and A Ribera Martínez, ‘Collective Actions and the Digital Markets Act: A Bird Without Wings’
[2023] Antitrust Bulletin 82, 82–84.
70
A Kalpaka, J Sörvik and A Tasigiorgou (n64) 35.
71
DMA 2022 (n2) recital 70.
72
E Carpentier and others (n62) 39.
law, aligning seamlessly with the DMA’s mission to foster contestable markets (Article

1). Rooted in Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

(TFEU), ecosystems promote harmonised measures that enhance market

competitiveness by reducing regulatory fragmentation, as de Pablo emphasises 73. By

distributing compliance costs, these networks uphold the proportionality principle

enshrined in Protocol No. 2, countering critiques of the DMA’s harmonisation gaps7475.

Article 40 of the DMA catalyses ecosystems by establishing a high-level stakeholder

group that includes SMEs76. This body aligns ecosystems with sector-specific

regulations77, ensuring consistent, tailored support for smaller firms. Complementing

this, Article 24 of the Digital Services Act (DSA) mandates platform transparency 78,

requiring gatekeepers to disclose user metrics that SMEs can leverage for marketing

insights79. Yet, gatekeepers may resist sharing data, wielding their control over platform

access to stifle competition80. To counter this, Article 40’s co-regulatory incentives, such

as compliance credits, encourage gatekeeper participation, fostering equitable data

access81.

73
Alfonso Lamadrid de Pablo and Nieves Bayón Fernández, ‘Why the Proposed DMA Might Be Illegal under
Article 114 TFEU, and How to Fix It’ [2021] J Eur Competition L & Prac 19.
74
ibid 5.
75
Sophia Catharina Gröf, ‘Regulating BigTech: An Investigation on the Admissibility of Article 114 TFEU as the
Appropriate Legal Basis for the Digital Markets Act based on an Analysis of the Objectives and Regulatory
Mechanisms’ (2023) SSRN Working Paper https://ssrn.com/abstract=4549209 accessed 3 April 2025, 34.
76
DMA 2022 (n2) article 40(1).
77
DMA 2022 (n2) article 40(6).
78
Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital
Services Act) [2022] OJ L277/1, art 24.
79
M Maroni, ‘Mediated Transparency: The Digital Services Act and the Legitimisation of Platform Power’ in M
Hillebrandt, P Leino-Sandberg and I Koivisto (eds), (In)visible European Government: Critical Approaches to
Transparency as an Ideal and a Practice (Routledge 2023) 317.
80
Gröf (n75) 13.
81
Maroni (n79) 319.
The EU’s Media Freedom Act provides a compelling parallel, harmonising stakeholder

interests through Articles 19 and 1282. This suggests ecosystems could bridge SME and

gatekeeper priorities, creating mutual benefits. However, Maroni warns that

transparency measures risk entrenching gatekeeper power by legitimising their control

over information flows83. Robust safeguards within ecosystems are thus essential to

prevent manipulation. Recital 27 of the DMA offers flexibility in obligations, mitigating

gatekeeper resistance and reinforcing ecosystem viability84. By harnessing Article 40’s

cooperative framework and DSA’s transparency mandates, ecosystems align with the

EU’s broader digital policy, alleviating SME burdens while advancing a dynamic,

contestable digital market.

4.3 Practical Implementation and Challenges

To empower small and medium-sized enterprises to navigate the Digital Markets Act, a

pilot program is proposed under the European Commission’s stewardship, in

partnership with SME trade associations like SMEunited85. Financed by the Digital

Europe Programme’s €273 million budget86 this initiative establishes DMA compliance

hubs coordinated by regional European Digital Innovation Hubs (EDIHs). These hubs

prioritise collective strategies—such as shared legal support—over individual training,

fostering collaborative resilience87. A steering committee, comprising Commission

82
Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and
amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act) [2024] OJ L2024/1083, arts 12, 19.
83
Maroni (n79) 317-318.
84
de Pablo and Fernández (n73) 16.
85
SMEunited, 'Best Practices on Assisting SMEs with the Digital Transformation' (2019) 11
https://smeunited.eu/publications/best-practices-on-assisting-smes-with-the-digital-transformation accessed 15 April
2025.
86
European Commission, Report on the State of the Digital Decade 2024 (Publications Office of the European
Union 2024) 4.
87
SMEunited (n85) 2.
officials, SMEunited representatives, and sector experts, ensures SME voices shape

resource allocation. Funds are allocated through competitive calls, with 60% as grants

for less digitalised sectors and 40% for ecosystem coordination, optimising impact88.

Implementing these digitalisation strategies faces significant hurdles. Sectoral diversity

demands tailored approaches, as digital adoption varies widely, with micro-enterprises

and older firms often lagging in digital asset investment 89. Resistance to adoption—

rooted in reliance on traditional capital or gaps in digital skills—further complicates

progress9091. Gatekeepers may also resist measures that curb their dominance, but

Article 30’s fines, reaching up to 10% of annual turnover 92, enforce compliance,

ensuring hub accessibility93. Moreover, inconsistent standards across regions risk

fragmentation, necessitating rigorous Commission-led audits to maintain uniformity94.

Despite these challenges, compliance hubs bolster SME resilience by pooling

resources, slashing costs in fast-evolving markets95. By enabling collective navigation of

obligations like Article 6(4)’s sideloading requirements, hubs spark innovation through

shared expertise96. Aligned with the EU’s SME innovation priorities, they advance Article

88
CSES and others, Study on the Effectiveness of Public Innovation Support for SMEs in Europe: Final Report
(European Commission, Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs 2021) 42.
89
J Kren and C O'Toole, 'What Drives SME Investment in Digitalisation? Micro-data Evidence for Ireland' (2024)
ESRI Working Paper 777, 7 https://www.esri.ie/publications/what-drives-sme-investment-in-digitalisation-micro-
data-evidence-for-ireland accessed 5 April 2025.
90
CSES (n88) 114.
91
Kren (n89) 33.
92
DMA 2022 (n2) article 30.
93
A De Streel and P Alexiadis, 'The EU’s Digital Markets Act: Opportunities and Challenges Ahead' (2022) 23
Business Law International 163, 166.
94
P Larouche and J Baron, 'The European Standardisation System at a Crossroads' (2023) University of Montreal
Faculty of Law Research Paper, 79 https://ssrn.com/abstract=4466316 accessed 16 April 2025.
95
G H Sagala and D Őri, 'Exploring Digital Transformation Strategy to Achieve SMEs Resilience and Antifragility:
A Systematic Literature Review' (2025) 37 Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship 495.
96
European Commission, DG CONNECT, Digital Innovation Hubs Working Group Meeting 1 - SME Engagement
(2018) 10.
1’s vision of fair, contestable markets 97. This systemic framework empowers SMEs to

thrive collaboratively, ensuring equitable competition in a dynamic digital landscape98.

4.4 Broader Implications for EU Digital Policy

Collaborative ecosystems align seamlessly with the EU’s ambition for digital

sovereignty, reducing dependence on U.S.-based gatekeepers. By empowering small

and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as engines of innovation, these networks foster

economic democracy, enabling smaller players to shape vibrant, contestable markets

as envisioned in Article 1. DMA compliance hubs bridge the Act’s fairness gap,

bolstering SME resilience and levelling the competitive playing field. Their success

could inform revisions to the Digital Services Act, embedding SME-centric policies to

nurture market diversity. The Digital Single Market’s vision—harmonised, innovative

markets—gains momentum as ecosystems distribute compliance burdens, enhancing

the EU’s global competitiveness 99.

Yet, challenges loom. Larger SMEs risk dominating shared resources, potentially

sidelining micro-enterprises100101. Sustained funding through the Digital Europe

Programme and genuine gatekeeper cooperation are vital to ensure equitable access.

Despite these hurdles, ecosystem pilots offer a bold, proactive strategy to mitigate DMA

burdens. By prioritising collaborative frameworks, the EU can fortify its digital strategy,

positioning SMEs as cornerstones of a sovereign, democratic, and contestable digital

economy, poised to set global standards.

97
L Schmerber, R Tõnnisson and M Veliste, 'Interreg Europe Policy Learning Platform on SME Competitiveness:
Policy Brief' (Interreg Europe 2022) 2 https://interregeurope.eu accessed 3 April 2025.
98
Ibid 4.
99
Ibid 4.
100
European Commission (n86) 22.
101
P Larouche (n94) 79.
5. Conclusion: Harmonising Equity and Innovation in the

Digital Markets Act

Aequitas Sequitur Legem—equity follows the law—captures the Digital Markets Act’s

(DMA) ambition to foster fair, contestable EU digital markets (Article 1). Yet, its uniform

approach burdens SMEs, the backbone of Europe’s economy, with compliance costs

that undermine its fairness goals. Articles 5 and 6, meant to empower SMEs, impose

technical and financial demands gatekeepers easily navigate, risking SME innovation.

Collaborative ecosystems, backed by Article 40 and €273 million from the Digital

Europe Programme, enable SMEs to pool resources, as seen in European Digital

Innovation Hubs. Tailoring Articles 3, 6, and 13 to exempt SMEs from gatekeeper fees

and simplify compliance, per Google Shopping (T-612/17), ensures proportionality.

Robust enforcement via Article 27’s SME reporting portal and Article 38’s NCA audits

prevents gatekeeper circumvention. By embracing ecosystems, targeted reforms, and

vigilant enforcement, the DMA can empower SMEs to drive a competitive, equitable

digital economy, strengthening the EU’s global standing.