THE TASK OF THEOLOGY

I. INTRODUCTION

The theological question most likely to promote widespread dis-

unity among theologians is the question that asks about the unity that
is proper to theologians. From my perspective, the situation seems to
be such today that the best way to dissolve a gathering of theologians is
to raise the basic question: what is theology? A few biographical
observations might help to express my point. I belong to a regional,
ecumenical, theological society. Our interests range far and wide. Our
success in staying together as a society lies in our uncanny ability to
avoid direct discussion on the nature of the discipline that brought us
together in the first place. I have had some small involvement in field
education. Experts in this area assure us that theological reflection is at
the heart of the enterprise. It has been my experience that the reflec-
tion that is done is oftentimes Christian, at all times impassioned, and
rarely theological. Every so often the newspapers report outrageous
remarks made at gatherings of theologians, such as a recent meeting in
New York City that raised the question, is God a woman? Someone
must have inquired what should be done with passages in Scripture
which seem offensive to women. Surely that person never bothered to
raise the question—what is theology?—who responded that there is
absolutely no reason why all those stories, which never really happened
anyway, could not be dropped from the Scriptures. I have tried to
receive with a listening heart much liberation-theology of the various
kinds. I have been frequently enlightened as to what it is that makes
liberation-theology liberational. I have not been as frequently enlighten-
ed as to what it is that makes liberation-theology theological. So much
for theology as biography! These random observations are not made
with the intent to quash adventurous theology. I would not relish being
numbered among those whom Rosemary Haughton aptly describes as
busybodies whose insensitivity to real theology is only equalled by their
zeal for the preservation of sacred cliches.1 My purpose in these re-
1
Rosemary Haughton, The Theology of Experience (New York: Newman
Press, 1972), p. 15.

1
 2 The Task of Theology 2

marks has been to describe a mood. I would like now to comment on

the title of my paper.
The omni-competent theologian lives today, if at all, only in the
history books. Accordingly, wisdom dictates that I assure my readers
that this particular paper, notwithstanding its omni-competent sound-
ing title, is not an effort on the part of one who teaches systematic
theology to lecture his biblical, historical, and practical theological col-
leagues on the specifics of their diverse duties. Rather, the paper that
follows, intended as a key-note presentation and the first of four reflec-
tions on the convention's question "Is there a Catholic theology?" has
been designed as a modest consideration of theology's essential unity.
My paper develops in the following way. This introduction sets the
scene. The second section isolates the problem and asks some questions.
The third section, in response to these questions, discusses the one
theology and reflects upon its basic task. In terms of logic, a fourth
section should follow. Its purpose would be to discuss the many theolo-
gies and reflect upon their specialized tasks. But that would be to revive
the omni-competent theologian of the previous paragraph. This fourth
section is the work of the specialists themselves. The final section con-
siders some practical consequences which, I trust, are pertinent to my
paper, to this convention, and to the work of the CTSA. The issue at
hand is foundational. It concerns the very right of theology to claim
scientific existence. Such an issue is not the glamor-type concern that
will push Harvey Cox and Andrew Greeley from the theological head-
lines. On the contrary, if the issue is dealt with successfully, it will help
to keep them there. My topic in more familiar terms deals with the
relationship between faith and theology.2
It is not without significance that the 1974 meeting of the CTSA
coincides with the seven hundredth anniversary of the death of Thomas
Aquinas.3 I emphasize that there is no little insignificance in this coin-
2
See Schubert Ogden, "What is Theology?" in The Journal of Religion 52
(1972), 22-40. The author answers his question in a series of theses. Theses eleven
and twelve stimulated my interest in the faith-theology relationship.
There is considerable scholarly interest in the Thomist centennial. See,
for example, James A. Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas D'Aquino (New York:
Doubleday, 1974); Armand A. Maurer, Editor in chief, St. Thomas Aquinas. Com-
memorative Studies, 2 vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies,
 The Task of Theology 3

cidence because Catholic theology over these past seven hundred years
can be broadly described in terms of the rise and fall of Scholasti-
cism—of which St. Thomas is the outstanding exemplar.4 This issue of
Scholasticism, its magnificent aphievements and its subsequent demise,
sets the challenge that faces the work of Catholic theology in our time.
As Lonergan has described the situation, "Scholastic theology was a
monumental achievement. Its influence in the Catholic Church has been
profound and enduring. Up to Vatican I I . . . it has provided much of
the background of pontifical documents and conciliar decrees. Yet
today, by and large, it is abandoned, partly because of the inadequacy
of medieval aims and partly because of the short-comings of the Aristo-
telian corpus."5 This abandonment, leading to the present crisis, pro-
vides Catholic theology with its present, urgent challenge. This theology
is the product of the faith it seeks to understand and express. It is also
the product of the culture in which it labors to understand its faith and
bring it to speech. And so Lonergan reminds us, "It is cultural change
that has made Scholasticism no longer relevant and demands the
development of a new theological method and style, continuous with
the old yet meeting all the genuine exigencies of the Christian religion
and of up to date philosophy, science and scholarship."6
These words—up to date philosophy, science and scholarship—seem
innocent enough. They express the new resources which our times offer
to the work of the theologian. From one point of view, this work,
reflection on faith intent upon reaching the status of a science,7 is the

1974); The Review of Metaphysics 27, No. 3 (March, 1974), and The Thomist 38,
No. 1 (January, 1974), have published centennial studies.
A
As Chenu indicates, "Scholasticism is always the word used, whether with
eulogizing or disparaging intent, to qualify medieval thought in theology as well as
in philosophy, and even in law and other fields of instruction." See M.-D. Chenu,
O.P., Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, trans, by A. M. Landry, O.P., and
D. Hughes, O.P. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964), p. 59.
s
Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., Method in Theology (London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1972), p. 279.
Bernard Lonergan, S.J., Doctrinal Pluralism (Milwaukee: Marquette Uni-
versity Press, 1971), pp. 32-3.
7
This is Congar's expression. See Yves M. J. Congar, O.P., "Theology's
Tasks after Vatican II," in Renewal of Religious Thought, ed. by L. K. Shook,
4 The Task of Theology 4

sort of work the theologian has always had to do. From another point
of view, because the theologian must use the valid resources of his
culture at an exacting and technical level,8 this work always seems to
be changing. This did not prove to be a problem for Aquinas as he
pursued his study of the Scriptures and of Aristotle. It did prove to be
an insuperable difficulty for Stephen Tempier.9 This is not a problem
today for the membership of the CTSA. It is a real problem in the
American Church today. This is evidenced in the unfortunate rift that
seems to exist between the doctrinal-pastoral teaching authority and
the Catholic theological community. This community recognizes the
need to confront the questions of today and to do so by utilizing the
resources of today. This obviously involves the various turns of philo-
sophical reflection, the developments in biblical criticism, the results of
the anthropological sciences. As the Catholic theological community
strives to come to grips with new and complex problems, for example,
the task of dealing with the problems of demythologization, and the
task of defending the possibility of objective religious statements, it
recognizes the need to recast its notion of theological method in a most
thorough-going and profound fashion. 10 Misunderstanding is inevitable
in such matters. Therefore, it would seem to be the responsibility of the
Catholic theological community to make clear to all concerned that this
work of recasting does not endanger theology's essential unity.
The word that describes the present theological scene is plural-
ism. 1 Theology has always known some form of pluralism. The

C.C.S.B., vol. 1 (Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1968), p. 47. For an expansion of this
essay, see the same author's Situation et Tâches Présentes de la Théologie (Paris:
Les Éditions du Cerf, 1967).
8
See Congar, "Theology's Tasks after Vatican II," pp. 53-4.
a
Stephen Tempier was appointed bishop of Paris in 1268. For his role in
the theological problems of the day, see Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino,
pp. 242, 274, 277, 285, 333-4.
10
See Bernard J. Lonergan, S.J., "The Absence of God in Modern Culture,"
in The Presence and Absence of God, ed. by Christopher F. Mooney, S.J. (New
York: Fordham University Press, 1969), p. 173.
See Heinrich Fries, "Theological Reflections on the Problem of Plural-
ism," Theological Studies 28 (1967), 3-26; Edward SchiUebeeckx, ed., Dogma and
Pluralism (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970); Bernard Lonergan, Doctrinal
 The Task of Theology 5

history books remind us of the various schools of theology "upholding

contradictory opinions, starting from different assumptions, and
developing different patterns of thought." 12 The pluralism that prevails
in theology today, however, is vastly different. Rahner offers the fol-
lowing description:

Formerly there were controversies between the schools and to some

extent different patterns of thought.... But fundamentally they
knew each other, spoke more or less the same language, and could
try to clarify their differences and eliminate them in a higher
synthesis. The materials and methods of theology, linguistic, histor-
ical, speculative, were accessible to all-or completely outside of
their range of interests. But today the intellectual and social envi-
ronment of theology is different. Methods are different. There are
so many different starting points and languages in philosophy that
no single individual can master them adequately. The mass of mate-
rial in exegesis and history of dogma is such that no sin ;le individual
can take in and master theology even as it is at present. f l

The topic of pluralism could occupy the attention of several conven-

tions. Rahner's description suffices to suggest the nature of the actual
situation confronting the contemporary theologian who for weal or
woe seems well on the way to becoming more and more the impossible
person.14 My purpose in mentioning pluralism at this time is to intro-
duce the theme that will be of central concern in this paper. Pluralism
in theology quite obviously introduces a proliferation of all sorts of
specializations. These specializations are essential to the effective divi-
sion of labor that will enable theology to do its many tasks in the light
of up to date philosophy, science and scholarship. However, special-
ization can lead to fragmentation and fragmentation can lead to isola-

Pluralism', William M. Thompson, "Rahner's Theology of Pluralism," The Ecu-

menist 11 (1973), 17-22.
12
K. Rahner, "Theology," Sacramentum Mundi 6 (New York: Herder and
Herder, 1969), p. 239.
13
Ibid.
1 4

This is Congar's quotation from Lacordaire. See Congar, "Theology's

Tasks after Vatican II," p. 65.
 6 The Task of Theology 6

tion and the loss of communication.15 This loss of communication can

threaten theology's understanding of its own essential unity. This unity
provides the basis for our understanding the nature of the many theol-
ogies that must work together in service to the Church. 16 As I shall be
suggesting, given the actual situation today, the fundamental tasks of
theology, of common concern to all the specializations, is to recover
and then to foster, in the context of diversity, the sense of its own
unity.
I will conclude these introductory remarks by delineating several
assumptions. First of all, I am presuming, within the Catholic theologi-
cal confraternity, the existence of a good measure of agreement over
the nature of aggiornamento, the sign under which Catholic theology is
at work at this time. 17 Furthermore, I am assuming that, before we
talk properly about the theology of renewal, we had better attend first
to the renewal of theology. As we inquire into what the renewed theol-
ogy is doing, we ought to ask who is doing the renewed theology, that
is, what sort of persons we ought to be if we are to do properly the
work of theology under the sign of aggiornamento, if we are to advance
that work into the future, "if we are to do so without doing more harm
than good, without projecting into the Catholic community and the
world any inauthenticity that we have imbibed from others or created
on our own." 18 This observation presumes quite peacefully that there
is a Catholic community in a theological sense and not just in a socio-

15
These particular expressions are used by Ogden, "What is Theology 9 "
pp. 34-5.
1
In a later section, I shall maintain that theology is basically ecclesial in
nature. For the notion of theology as ecclesial deaconry, see Congar, "Theology's
Tasks after Vatican II," p. 47.
17c.,,

ror aggiornamento is not some simple-minded rejection of all that is old

and some breezy acceptance of everything new. Rather it is a disengagement from
a culture that no longer exists and an involvement in a distinct culture that has
replaced it Aggiornamento is not desertion of the past but only a discerning
and discriminating disengagement from its limitations. Aggiornamento is not just
acceptance of the present; it is acknowledgement of its evils as well as of its
good." See Lonergan, "The Absence of God from Modem Culture," p. 175.
18
Bernard Lonergan, S.J., "Existenz and Aggiornamento," in Collection,
ed. by F. E. Crowe, S.J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), p. 248.
 The Task of Theology 7

logical sense, that there are theologians of proper self-identification

who are in service to that community, that it is quite possible for such
theologians, if careless in their self-identity or if resistant to the proc-
esses of the requisite conversions, to do more harm than good and thus
project into their community an inauthenticity that is an ill-conceived
creation unwarranted by the tradition or an ill-advised and uncritical
borrowing from elsewhere.
These remarks can suffice as introductory. I shall proceed now to
isolate the problem at hand.

II. THE PROBLEM AND SOME QUESTIONS

The precise point at issue is theology's right to scientific existence.

No one raises the question "Why biological science?" It is taken for
granted that life exists. This is a datum open to all. The biologist is the
one who proceeds to study this "given" in a technically competent
manner. In theology, however, the 'why' question is crucial. In dialogue
with the belief and the unbelief of the believer, and in dialogue with the
unbelief and the belief of the unbeliever, the theologian must raise the
question "Why theology?" in order to explore the conditions for the
possibility of theology's existence. In other words, that God and man
can be in communication is the prime concern of that sort of theology
which I like to call philosophical theology. That God and man are as a
matter of fact in communication—I shall refer to this as the Christian
fact19—is the good news of the Christian gospel received through the
inner grace of faith. This Christian fact is a matter of faith. 20 In sec-
19
I had settled on this expression, the Christian fact, before reading the
valuable essay of D. Tracy, "The Task of Fundamental Theology," The Journal of
Religion 54, No. 1 (January, 1974), 13-34. Tracy makes use of this same expres-
sion. For me the Christian fact embraces both the inner word of the grace of faith
and the outer word of Christian witness.
20-
In the modern period some Catholic theologians began to out-rationalize
the rationalists. The more authentic tradition would regard the fact of revelation
as an object of faith, not of ordinary knowledge. See John L. Murphy, With the
Eyes of Faith (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1966), pp. 57-79; Charles Davis, "With or With-
out Faith," in Theology for Today (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962),
pp. 25-43. The classic study of this problem is Roger Aubert's Le Probleme de
I'Acte de Foi (Louvain: E. Warny, 1958).
 8 The Task of Theology 8

tions two and three of this paper I will be reflecting on theology's right
to scientific existence not as possible but as actual.
At the heart of our issue is a theology of revelation. As far as the
understanding of the meaning of revelation is concerned, the problem is
one of mediation. On the one hand there is immanentism; on the other
there is a purely extrinsic view of revelation from which frankly positiv-
ist explanations of theology's task follow as a matter of course. 21 The
immanentist position sees revelation as the inevitable, infra-historical
development of mankind's religious needs. The extrinsicist position sees
revelation as divine intervention coming exclusively from outside man's
history and speaking to man in the form of propositions.22 That we are
touching here on a key issue is supported by a recent review of Moran's
volume, The Present Revelation.23 The review states in part:

Gabriel Moran has his finger on the rawest nerve in contemporary

theology. Many, if not most, of its practitioners operate without
reference to their own scientific foundations. Otherwise intelligent
and erudite scholars, whether working in the area of biblical exege-
sis, patristics, medieval thought, modern dogmatic problems, or even
theological method, continue to be satisfied with frankly positivist
definitions of the enterprise. For some, theology is the study of
God's revelation in the Bible; for others, it is the study of God's
revelation in the teachings of the Church. In both cases, revelation is
identified with a given source: Scripture or doctrine. The question is
simply not raised: By what process have Scripture and doctrine
come into being? Indeed, it is that process which must be isolated
and defined if we are to understand the meaning and the task of
theology.

The sweeping charge, that many if not most of theology's practi-

tioners operate without reference to their own scientific foundations,
21
K. Rahner, "Revelation," Sacramentum Mundi 5 (New York: Herder and
Herder, 1969), pp. 342-53.
22
Ibid., p. 349.
23
Gabriel Moran, The Present Revelation (New York: Herder and Herder
1972).
2 4
Richard P. McBrien in Commonweal, June 29,1973, pp. 363-5. It is from
this review that the present paper has taken its concern. Theology's task at this
time is to account for its own scientific foundations.
 The Task of Theology 9

has a breadth to it which I am not concerned to investigate in any

detail. I accept the statement as a satisfying description of the theologi-
cal state of things. Positivist definitions of the theological enterprise are
everywhere to be found. However, it does not follow that a particular
writer actually thinks of theology in a positivist manner just because he
carelessly defines it in such a manner. In this connection I am reminded
of a distinguished German theologian who made reference to St.
' Thomas as a "conclusions-theologian" precisely on the basis of certain,
inadequately expressed definitions.2 5 (Helpful in this context is
Lonergan's frequent reference in class lectures to Einstein's remark that
if one wants to know what is going on in the science of physics, one
does not ask a physicist for a definition; rather, one watches carefully
what a good physicist does.) The question, then, stands: how does
theology make reference to its own scientific foundations? The task of
theology is to answer this question in a manner that will express theol-
ogy's essential unity. It is a question of the relationship between faith
and theology. Concern with the proper response to this question be-
longs to all the theological specializations. Only when this question is
properly confronted and answered can theology proceed to make the
more obvious inquiries about its many tasks. As I shall describe the
matter, it is a question of the one and the many, the one noun and the
many adjectives, the one, basic task common to all the theological
specialties and the many special tasks which conspire to accomplish the
one basic task. Theology as such does not have some sort of separate
existence. There exist the many theologies, philosophical, historical (in-
cluding biblical), systematic (including theological ethics), and practi-
cal. The one theology exists only in the various forms of the many
theologies. Two fundamental questions arise. There exist philosophical,
historical, systematic, and practical theologies. What is it that consti-
tutes them as theological? When this is answered, the second question
comes to the fore. What constitutes these theologies as philosophical,
historical, systematic and practical? The concern of this paper is with
the first of these two questions.
My procedure in this section is as follows: I will investigate two
2 5
The reference is to Johannes Beumer, author of Theologie als Glaubens-
verstandnis (Wurzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1953). See Bernard Lonergan, "Theology
and Understanding," in Collection, pp. 121-41.
 10 The Task of Theology

recent theological pieces which direct our attention to the matter at

hand. Then I shall describe the situation in Catholic theology as I see it
at the present time and from the viewpoint of this paper's special
concern. In the light of my findings I shall formulate three specific
questions which will be examined in section three. My overall purpose
is relatively uncomplex. I intend to examine theology's integral
self-understanding. If theology is not only the product of the faith that
it seeks to understand but also of the culture in which it seeks such
understanding, then it follows that human experience and the Christian
fact constitute the bipolar origin of Christian theology. Immanentism is
a form of reductionism that tends to neglect the pole of Christian fact.
Positivism, biblical or doctrinal, is a form of reductionism that tends to
neglect the pole of human experience. As a matter of fact, each form of
reductionism is a positivism. Immanentism is positivism of a secularist
sort. I shall be maintaining that positivism in any form distorts theol-
ogy's integral self-understanding because it describes theology's unity
by eliminating something essential to that unity. Positivism in theology
has all sorts of harmful influences, especially on the progress of
ecumenism. It is Rahner who reminds us of these ecumenical implica-
tions. He writes, "Tendencies to positivist self-assertion in theology are
hostile to the work of ecumenism."26
The first of the two writers I would like to discuss is Professor
Schubert Ogden whose particular theses I had intended to consider
before I became aware that he had graciously agreed to be the distin-
guished critic of my observations. Although it will be clear when I refer
to a particular view of Professor Ogden as being reductionist that I have
some problems with several of his theses, I want to affirm first of all
how valuable his article has been in helping me to recognize the
importance of stressing theology's essential unity. Writing in the
Journal of Religion21 Ogden raises the question "What is theology?"
and proceeds to give his answer in a series of twelve theses. It is the
twelfth thesis that concerns me at the moment. It reads as follows:
"For this reason, and also because theology is subject to no other
criterion of meaning and truth than apply to its cognate fields general-
26
K. Rahner, "Revelation," Sacramentum Mundi 5, p. 346.
27
Ogden, "What is Theology?" pp. 22-40.
 The Task of Theology 11

ly, there can be no question of its right in principle to exist beside such
other forms of reflective understanding as philosophy, the special
sciences, and the various arts." 28 The phrase, "for this reason," refers
to the last sentence offered in explanation of the eleventh thesis. In this
particular sentence, Ogden affirms, "Thus, even though faith without
theology is not really faith at all, theology without faith is still theology
and quite possibly good theology at that." 2 9 In defending this twelfth
thesis, Ogden refers to typical, modern doubts about theology's right to
scientific existence. These doubts arise in opposition to two theological
suppositions which are scientifically unacceptable to certain non-theo-
logical persons reflecting on theology's claims from the perspective of
other disciplines, and to some theological practitioners as well. The first
of these unacceptable suppositions concerns criteria, and affirms that
theology by its very nature involves an appeal to special criteria of
meaning and truth in order to establish some or all of its statements.
The second supposition concerns faith in the theologian, and holds that
the actual theological practitioner must be a believer already committed
to the Christian understanding of reality, and thus committed to the
truths of the statements that theological reflection ostensibly seeks to
establish. These two suppositions, the author stresses, are not the
invention of hostile critics unfriendly to the theological enterprise. On
the contrary, these suppositions have been operative and still are opera-
tive in vast numbers of theologians. Now the problem that Professor
Ogden sees is this: on the one hand, no one can deny that these sup-
positions are rooted in theology's own self-understanding, a self-under-
standing described as traditional; on the other hand, it is also undeni-
able, at least by anyone sharing the basic outlook of modern secularity,
that these suppositions furnish more than sufficient reason to question
theology's claim to be a legitimate form of human understanding. From
this Ogden concludes, "If theology is the kind of undertaking it is
widely supposed to be, by theologians themselves as well as by their
modern critics, its right to exist, even in principle, is far from clear." 30
Now it is more than obvious to this particular audience that Professor

2S
Ibid., p. 38.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid„ pp. 38-9.
 12 The Task of Theology 12

Ogden does not question theology's right to scientific existence.

Consequently, his reflections on the matter would suggest that if his
arguments for rejecting the two suppositions are sound, it would follow
for him that "the usual doubts about theology's right to exist pertain
not to theology itself but only to the traditional understanding of it
which can and should be overcome."31
My purpose at this stage is not to quarrel. It is merely the effort to
isolate a particular theological problem. What I conclude from Professor
Ogden's clear presentation is this: if theology is to defend its right to
scientific existence, it must eliminate the supposition that the theologi-
cal practitioner must be a believer already "committed to the Christian
understanding of reality, and thus to the truths of the statements that
theological reflection ostensibly seeks to establish." From my perspec-
tive, however, if, for a Christian, theology's origin is bipolar, involving
human experience and the Christian fact, then the elimination of this
supposition seems to involve a reductionism that emphasizes human
experience but does not take seriously the Christian fact. This strikes
me as being a form of positivism, of a secularist variety.
The second writer who can assist us in locating our problem is
Gabriel Moran. The point that concerns Moran in the opening chapter
of his recent volume, The Present Revelation,32 is theology's starting
point. He seems to be searching not for a new starting point but for a
new kind of starting point. It is in connection with this quest that he
quotes approvingly the following excerpt from Herbert Muller's reflec-
tions on church and theology in the light of contemporary culture's
emphasis on relativity. Muller stated: "Most Churchmen failed to meet
the challenge of relativity. They simply reaffirmed the absolute truths
of Christianity, involving the authority of the Bible: a sacred knowledge
that had been revealed to a minority of mankind and on the proper
interpretation of which Christians themselves have never been able to
agree." 33 Moran seeks his new sort of starting point in the realm of the
relative. He argues, therefore, for the deabsolutization of theology. His
31
Ibid., p. 39.
32
See Moran, The Present Revelation.
3 3
Ibid., p. 8. The citation is from Herbert Muller, Religion and Freedom in
the Modern World (Chicago, 1963).
 The Task of Theology 13

anti-positivist thrust is evident. To him, "Christian writings presume

that there are some divinely bestowed truths, however few or obscure
they may be." 3 4 Moran feels that the attempt to make the relative the
starting point for theology will never be attempted as long as the pre-
sumption prevails that something must always function as an absolute.
The key for Moran's search and for his efforts to renew theology from
outside theology-he despairs of theology's ability to overcome
positivism from within-is found in the rejection of the traditional
thinking that theology presupposes revelation. 35 By virtue of this
presupposition the implication will always remain in the mind of the
theologian that somewhere there is to be found some identifiable Some-
thing called revelation which operates as the special source of certain a
priori truths. These truths constitute, in the traditional thinking, the
absolute departure point. This means, so Moran insists, that in practice
Christianity's concept of revelation is not developed from human
experience but is dictated by positive, Christian sources. If the word
revelation cannot be established on its own as a non-Christian word and
even a non-religious word, it is always going to pose an insoluble
problem in Christian theology. It will always be that inexplicable little
blip that one has to accept to get the whole thing moving. 36
My suspicion is that Moran has undertaken an impossible quest. He
not only sets out to redesign Christian theology but any sort of theol-
ogy. His effort to make revelation a non-religious word seems doomed.
Revelation has seemingly always functioned as part and parcel of the
self-understanding of any religion claiming its origin from divine gift
and not from human construct. However, my purpose at this time is
not to quarrel. I am trying to define and isolate a particular theological
problem. (I might add by way of this parenthesis that if I were to
quarrel, the source from which I would draw, in my effort to overcome
positivism and yet deal effectively with the Christian notion of revela-
tion and the accompanying "scandal of particularity," would be The
Theology of Revelation by Gabriel Moran. 37 ) If my reading of Moran's
34
Ibid., p. 9.
3S
Ibid„ p. 32.
36
Ibid„ p. 34.
3 7
G. Moran, Theology of Revelation (New York: Herder and Herder,
1966).
14 The Task of Theology 14

thesis is correct, what I conclude is simply this: if theology is to defend

its right to scientific existence, then the theologian cannot suppose that
theology itself supposes revelation.38 This means that Christian theol-
ogy "has to face the possibility that there is no Christian revelation."39
However, if for a Christian, theology's origin is bipolar, involving
human experience and the Christian fact, I would consider the elimina-
tion of revelation as a Christian word and as a religious word to involve
a form of reductionism that emphasizes human experience in such a
way that it does not take seriously the Christian fact. This strikes me as
a form of positivism, of a secularist variety.
Thus far I have described some efforts of two contemporary
writers who are concerned to safeguard theology's right to scientific
existence. In their laudable intentions they feel constrained to jettison
elements of theology's traditional self-understanding which to my mind
are essential to the theological enterprise. I have described their posi-
tions as reductionist. It is precisely this issue of reductionism, from a
somewhat different perspective, that is very much a problem on the
present Catholic theological scene. I would like to turn my attention to
the Catholic theological world and to describe, admittedly in large
strokes, what I see to be taking place. The word theological in this
context has a broad connotation. I intend it to embrace pastoral
preaching and the doctrinal-pastoral teaching of the magisterium as well
as the work of scientific theology. It strikes me that a reductionism is
being carried out on two fronts. One form of this reductionism seems
to do injustice to the role of human experience, scholarship and culture
in the work of theology; the other seems to endanger the Christian fact
3 8
As will be evident in section three of this paper, I am not pleased with the
use of the word "suppose" in Moran's phrasing as well as in Ogden's phrasing. The
word as used by these authors already suggests a positivist position. In connection
with Moran's volume, The Present Revelation, it would be interesting to raise the
convention's question "Is there a Catholic theology?" On page 38 Moran writes,
"If revelation, that is, the only revelation there is, is everywhere, then those who
are in charge of the church will see themselves in trouble." Moran adds the
following comments as well: "I suspect that the reason the term supernatural has
survived is because it was necessary for justifying the existence of a church."
"There are other distinctions which I suspect are traceable to the instinct of
church leaders to prop up the church's need to exist."
3 9
The Present Revelation, p. 31.
 The Task of Theology 15

received through the inner grace of faith and the outer word of
Christian witness. The precise point at issue is the relationship between
faith and theology. There are some who so separate faith and theology
that they fail to see that when they are discussing matters of faith, they
are always confronting the question of theology, at least in a pre-
scientific form. It is in this way that they do injustice to the roles of
human experience, scholarship and culture. The temptation in this situ-
ation is to define as faith what is really yesterday's theologized expres-
sion of faith. On the other hand, there are some who so separate faith
and theology that they tend to bring under the umbrella of theology
what is not really theology at all. Their enthusiasm for the role of
human experience, scholarship and culture can obscure their vision on
the place of the Christian fact. I will describe these reductions more
concretely without promising any sort of satisfying survey.
There are some who so separate faith and theology that they fail to
do justice to the task of interpretation and thus fall into a fundamen-
talism of the word of dogma.40 Walter Principe directs our attention to
an odd quirk in theological history. By and large, he suggests, Roman
Catholic theologians down the centuries have managed to escape the
difficulties of biblical fundamentalism. They have not always been suc-
cessful in escaping a sort of magisterial fundamentalism that suggests
that dogmatic formulae can somehow escape the vicissitudes of time
and history. Dogmatic positivism on the Catholic scene is not a present
problem for the scientific theological community which is moving ef-
fectively "towards a Catholic use of hermeneutics" and which has come
to understand "that we are not addressed by . . . a word of God with-
out alloy, coming down to us, as it were, vertically, in a purely divine
statement." 41 The membership of the CTSA needs no instruction that
believing always comes about in the here and now as interpretative
understanding. As Schillebeeckx expresses it: "Without faith there is no
understanding of faith, but without understanding there is no faith." 42
4 0
This expression is from Walter Principe in his helpful essay, "The Herme-
neutic of Roman Catholic Dogmatic Statements," in Studies in Religion/Sciences
Religieuses 2, No. 2 (1972), 157-75.
4 1

See Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P., 'Towards a Catholic Use of Hermeneu-

tics," 42
in God the Future of Man (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), p. 5.
Ibid., p. 16.
16 The Task of Theology 16

What can be said of the scientific theological community cannot be

affirmed as readily of the rest of the Catholic community, not except-
ing the doctrinal-pastoral magisterium. I have already made reference to
the gap that exists between the scientific theological community and
the rest of the Church. The crux of the matter is the hermeneutic
question. In simpler terms that are pertinent to this particular paper,
the issue is the relationship between faith and theology, faith and cul-
ture. The task of harmonizing culture and Christian teaching, the task
of remaining fully Christian yet open to the good things that can be
drawn from the prevailing culture, a task never fully accomplished at
any given time in history, must never be abandoned in favor of some
form of reductionism. This seems to be the message that comes from
Gaudium et spes:

These difficulties [resulting from apparent conflict between

Christian teaching and culture] do not necessarily harm the life of
faith, rather they can stimulate the mind to deeper and more accu-
rate understanding of the faith. The studies and recent findings of
science, history and philosophy raise new questions which influence
life and demand new theological investigations. Furthermore, while
adhering to the methods and requirements proper to theology, theo-
logians are invited to seek continually for more suitable ways of
communicating doctrine to the men of their times. 43

As an example of Christian positivism at work, 44 I would like to

cite an instance of pastoral teaching which seems to separate faith and
theology in such a manner that fundamentalism of dogma results. I
have in mind the "Faith and Theology" lecture given by John Cardinal
Wright to various audiences in the United States and printed in a collec-

4 3
See Gaudium et spes, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World, no. 62. Cf. The Documents of Vatican II, ed. by Walter Abbott, S.J. (New
York: Herder and Herder, 1966).
4 4

"What Karl Rahner refers to as Denzingertheologie, the late Pierre Charles

of Louvain names Christian positivism. It conceived the function of the theolo-
gian to be that of a propagandist for Church doctrines. He did his duty when he
repeated, explained, defended just what had been said in Church documents. He
had no contribution of his own to make and so there could be no question of his
possessing any autonomy in making it. Now it is true, of course, that theology is
neither a source of divine revelation nor an addition to the inspired scriptures nor
 The Task of Theology 17

tion of lectures under the title, The Church: Hope of the World.45 The
lecturer stated that the present crisis in the Church is not one of faith
but of theology, and he warns his hearers that "theology is not faith
and all the 'theologians' combined do not add up to the faith." 46 He
then states his thesis: "It is this last theme that I wish to emphasize, for
'theologies' are influenced by human conditionings (cultural, political,
subjective) but the faith is from God and its content is from His revela-
tion through Christ Jesus." 47 The impression I receive from this essay
is that somewhere faith exists uninfluenced by historical conditionings.
This seems to say that one can think about the faith, or articulate it,
apart from some historical and therefore theological form. This impres-
sion is strengthened by the following citation: "God's revelations are
the object of the faith. His Church authoritatively sets forth God's
revelation. The Church is not a forum nor a school of theologians and
theologies Only what the Church teaches authoritatively as the
mind and will of Christ the Lord is the object of faith; all the theolo-
gies, even those which most she welcomes as helpful in understanding
the faith or blesses as most consistent with the contents of the faith, are
secondary and marginal, related to the faith, perhaps, but not to be
confused with it." 4 8 It goes without saying that I too affirm that the
Church is the authoritative teacher of God's word. I agree too that
"much of the present crisis is perhaps due to confusion arising from
failure to keep clear those distinctions between 'the theologies' and the
faith." However, a distinction is not a separation, and to speak of a
distinction and to mean in reality a separation is a disastrous step in the
direction of a dogmatic positivism which critics, friendly or otherwise,

an authority that promulgates Church doctrines. It is also true that a Christian

theologian should be an authentic human being and an authentic Christian and so
will be second to none in his acceptance of revelation, Scripture and his Church
doctrine. But these premises do not lead to the conclusion that the theologian is
just a parrot with nothing to do but repeat what has already been said." Loner-
gan, Method in Theology, pp. 330-1.
John Cardinal Wright, The Church: Hope of the World, ed. by Rev.
Donald W. Wuerl (Kenosha, Wisconsin: PROW Books, 1972).
46
Ibid., p. 43.
Ibid.
4%
Ibid., p. 45.
18 The Task of Theology 18

will consider to be theology's traditional starting point. 49

Any satisfying survey on the matter at hand-which I have not
promised-would have to consider the views on the nature of theology
which underlie the interpretations of dogmatic statements in the areas
of original sin, the Eucharist, Trinitarian and Christological questions,
the issue of infallibility.50 The question of dogmas in their historical
contexts has a prominent place in the recent document Mysterium
ecclesiae.51 Theologians who were profoundly disappointed with the
way Mysterium fidei52 dealt with the relationship between faith and
theology will doubtless find the new document more sensitive to this
relationship. Mysterium ecclesiae presupposes no absolute distinction
between articles of faith and theological statements. It even mentions
the "considerable assistance" which theologians render to the magis-
terium. However, as Rahner notes in his helpful commentary, the docu-
ment could have said that this considerable assistance is "historically
and theologically an indispensable aid which by no means detracts from
the dignity and specific function of the magisterium."53
This issue of Christian positivism, almost omnipresent as a problem
for the Church at large in our country, is really not very much of a
problem for the membership of the CTSA. Could it be, however, that
our specific problem runs in the opposite direction? Are there some
who so separate faith and theology that they tend to bring under the
umbrella of theology what is not really theology at all? If this is so,
would this not constitute an unacceptable reductionism that would do
49
See Charles Davis" opening paragraph of his essay, "Theology and Praxis,"
Cross Currents 23, No. 2 (Summer, 1973), 154. Davis characterizes, or carica-
tures, theology as positivist.
S0
For copious references to the contemporary literature on these specific
issues, see Principe, "The Hermeneutic of Roman Catholic Dogmatic Statements."
51
See the Declaration in Defense of the Catholic Doctrine on the Church
against Certain Errors of the Present Day (Rome: The Sacred Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith, June 24, 1973). Latin text in AAS 65, n 7 (July 31
1973), 396-408. '
Pope Paul VI, Mysterium fidei, September 3, 1965. Latín text in AAS 57
n. 11 (October 30,1965), 753-74.
5 3 »
K. Rahner, "Mysterium Ecclesiae," Cross Currents 23, No. 2 (Summer,
1973), 183-98. The passage cited is on p. 187.
 The Task of Theology 19

injustice to the question of the Christian fact? Eric Mascall writes that
the task of the theologian is "to help the Church acquire a deeper
understanding of the Christian faith and to mediate, interpret and com-
mend that faith to the contemporary world." 54 He feels the need to
distinguish theology in the strict sense from the vast number of studies
commonly listed under "theology" in modern university catalogues.
These studies have acquired the perfectly legitimate status of secular
disciplines in their own right. At the same time, the theologian sees
them as being most helpful to his own work. Their inter-disciplinary
value, however, does not constitute them as theological. Mascall ex-
presses it this way:

In the wider sense theology includes a vast range of disciplines in

which scholars apply to the documents, monuments, events and
behavioral patterns of Judaism and Christianity the same techniques
and criteria that other scholars apply to the documents, monu-
ments, events and behavioral patterns of other movements of human
thought and culture: Old Testament history, the literary criticism of
the Bible, Biblical Archeology, Ecclesiastical History, Liturgiology
. . . and so o n . . . . They provide material of the utmost value for
the consideration of the Biblical and dogmatic theologian
Where these disciplines differ from theology in the strict sense
is the fact that, while they are concerned with the Christian religion
as a phenomenon for study, they do not appeal to the Christian
revelation for either their techniques or their criteria. The Old Testa-
ment historian, the Biblical critic, the ecclesiastical historian, the
liturgical scholar scrutinize and evaluate the events of Jewish his-
tory, the authorship and composition of the Bible, the . . . episodes
of the Church's past, and the behavior of Christians at worship with
the same ruthless and impartial objectivity with which other schol-
ars investigate the history of ancient China, the provenance of the
Rig Veda and the Upanishads, the development and ramifications of
Buddhism and the ritual performances of the Aztecs. ss

Once again I want to stress that these scholarly activities, which owe
nothing whatsoever to theology for their legitimacy, are as a matter of
fact immensely valuable for the work of theology. However, just be-
54
E. L. Mascall, Theology and the Future (New York: Morehouse-Barlow,
1968), p. 16.
ss
Ibid., pp. 17-8.
20 The Task of Theology 20

cause they are related to theology and just because they are the work of
Christian believers is no warrant for calling them theological.
So much then for the state of our question! I have been saying that
there are many theologies. These many theologies constitute "one
single movement of reflection, having an integral task." 56 To talk
about this task, to ask what it is that makes these many theologies
theological, to inquire about theology's essential unity, to come to grips
with theology's starting point, to talk about the relation between faith
and theology—these are all one and the same. If my reflections thus far
bear some resemblance to the actual state of things, I see three specific
questions emerging that could be of some interest to this convention
with its chosen theme. The questions are as follows: (1) Can theology
come to grips with its own self-understanding and defend its right to
scientific existence without falling victim to reductionism, whether of
the secularist variety or of the positivist variety, biblical or doctrinal?
(2) What is the relationship between the scientia of the theological
practitioner and the inner grace of faith? Is faith necessary for the work
of theology? In other words, if it is true that there cannot be faith
without theology, is it likewise true that there can be no theology
without faith? (3) The third question is the question of the convention.
Is there a Catholic theology?

SOME ANSWERS

1) Faith and Theology

The charge is made that many theological practitioners go about
their business without reference to their scientific foundations. They
accept, in uncritical fashion, positivist explanations of their discipline
which, as their critics are quick to point out, are no explanations at all.
Doubts therefore arise with reference to theology's right to claim scien-
tific existence. Some of these doubts, I presume, come from fields
other than theology, perhaps from the area of religious studies. The
problem in this instance, it is alleged, is theology itself. In question is
the possibility of reconciling the commitment of faith with the freedom
of intellectual inquiry. At the moment, doubts of this sort do not
concern me. As a matter of fact, I am not particularly sanguine about
S6
Ogden, "What is Theology?" pp. 27-8.
 The Task of Theology 21

the possibility of banishing them by way of dialogue. Theology and

religious studies, it seems to me, are quite different realities and ought
never to be lumped together in any careless and clumsy manner. Reli-
gious studies can survive the death of God and even thrive. On the
contrary, if God is dead, so is theology.
Other doubts arise from within the camp of theology itself. The
problem here is not theology itself, but what is called theology's tradi-
tional self-understanding which is equated, in the minds of the
doubters, with Christian positivism. Various questions are raised. Does
theology find its starting point from within the circle of faith or from
outside? Does theology make use of the notion of revelation in such a
way that the viewpoint of the theologian can be considered uncommit-
ted? 7 I would like now to suggest that theology cannot be theology
unless it finds its starting point from within the circle of faith; and that
theology cannot be theology if the theologian speaks of revelation from
some uncommitted viewpoint. This does not mean, however, that one
succumbs to a positivist definition of the theological enterprise.
This, then, is the first of my three questions: Can theology defend
its right to scientific existence without falling victim to reductionism,
whether of the secularist variety or of the positivist variety-biblical or
doctrinal? My intent is not a search for some new definition. Workable
definitions abound in the literature 58 and I will make use of some for
my own purpose. That purpose is to delineate theology's starting point.
In the traditional expression fides quaerens intellectum I hope to locate
theology's awareness of its own scientific foundations and the basic
ground of its unity.
Three observations precede my specific response. First of all, I
would point once again to the distinction between the question of
theology's possibility and the question of the nature of theology as seen
in its actual performance. The special task called philosophical theology
has the function of investigating the conditions for the possibility of
5 7
See Gerald O'Collins, S.J., Foundations of Theology (Chicago: Loyola
University Press), p. 2.
5 8
See Richard P. McBrien, Church: The Continuing Quest (Paramus, N.J.:
Newman Press, 1970), pp. 5-21; René Latourelle, S.J., Theology: Science of Sal-
vation, trans, by Sister Mary Dominic (New York: Alba House, 1969); O'Collins,
Foundations of Theology, pp. 1-20.
22 The Task of Theology 22

theology. Theology, I presume, is possible if faith is possible, and faith

is possible if God and man can be in some sort of saving communica-
tion. Our present concern, however, is theology's actual performance.
Believers affirm the reality of God and his grace. "No one has ever seen
God" (Jn 1:18). What then is the source of the believing affirmation?
Christian believers affirm the reality of God and his grace in and
through Jesus of Nazareth who is the Christ of their faith. "It is God
the only Son, ever at the Father's side who has revealed him" (Jn
1:18). Our discussion, then, must focus on revelation. This should not
surprise us. At the very least, the history of religions would seem to
suggest "that revelation is part of the self-understanding of all religions
which claim to be divine creations and not human constructions."5 9
A second preliminary remark concerns what I would like to call the
scientistic myth of the a priori. The question is this: in locating theol-
ogy's starting point in a way that overcomes biblical and doctrinal
positivism, is there anything that can function legitimately as an a
priori, or is one doomed in advance to commit himself to a secularist
reduction? Congar makes an observation which can be a help in this
regard. He reminds us that modern thought cherishes an ambition
which the Christian believer will always call impossible, that is, the
ambition to construct the totality of life outside the faith, the ambition
to grasp the whole of reality and reality as a whole independently of
the light of faith. 60 It is in response to this spirit of irreligious rational-
ism that I suggest the need to avoid the myth of the a priori in any
analysis of theology's starting point. In other words, in asking about
theology's starting point, one must avoid the myth of thinking that the
only escape from Christian positivism is by way of a secularist reduc-
tion. As I trust my paper will make clear, there is that reality which will
always remain beyond human control, the inner word, instinctus fidei,
which theology has always called the grace of faith.
Finally, what is meant in the question by the word "scientific"? It
conveys here the notion of any discipline "which has the advantages of
its own object and method and leads to a communicable synthesis."61

5 9

K. Rahner, "Revelation," Sacramentum Mundi 5, p. 342.

°Congar, "Theology's Tasks after Vatican II," p. 48.
61
See Latourelle, Theology: Science of Salvation, p. 42; see also Macquar-
 The Task of Theology 23

Theology is far more than a science. It is a wisdom constructed on the

ground of a datum.62 As a science, however, theology is more akin to
the "spirit-sciences" than to the "nature-sciences." As Rahner reminds
us, 'To restrict science . . . to experimentally verifiable facts would not
deprive theology of its claim to be a science. It would only deprive
theology of a claim to be a science in a way foreign to itself."6 3 The
fact that the subject matter of theology is the Christian faith does not
mean that theological procedures are unscientific in character. The
commitment of faith is not incompatible with a commitment to the
critical procedures of scientific investigation. Theology excludes
nothing a priori from its range of questioning. This quite obviously
includes the question of its own starting point. 64
Two definitions from the available literature will start us off on our
answer. John Macquarrie defines theology as "the study which, through
participation in and reflection upon a religious faith, seeks to express
the contents of this faith in the clearest and most coherent language
possible."65 Theology, then, while in continuity with faith, remains
distinct from faith. It operates as an intellectual discipline. It is an
ecclesial reality because it deals not with faith in general but with the
faith of a community. The theological practitioner speaks out of some
historic faith-community and does not work as an individual investiga-
tor after the fashion of a philosopher of religion. In a certain sense, the
theologian is a spokesman of the community because he is charged with
a special responsibility within it. 6 6
While Macquarrie speaks of the connection between theology and
faith in his definition, Latourelle stresses the connection between theol-
ogy and revelation. "Theology is the science of God which sets out
from revelation.... Theology's point of departure is the living God in

rie, Principles of Christian Theology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966),
pp. 2-3; Schmaus, Dogma I. God in Revelation (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1968), pp. 272-81.
62
Congar, "Theology's Tasks after Vatican II," p. 54.
K. Rahner, "Theology," Sacramentum Mundi 6, p. 234.
M
Ibid.
65
Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p. 2.
66
Ibid.
24 The Task of Theology 24

the free witness which he gives of himself." 67 The objection might be

raised that these definitions of Macquarrie and Latourelle could be read
in a positivist fashion. I think not, but that is irrelevant at the moment.
I have used them precisely to stress the connections existing between
revelation, faith and theology. The issue that must be faced is this: can
the theologian recognize these connections and proceed to justify his
discipline's right to scientific existence without being forced to go secu-
lar or to settle uncritically for a form of positivism? Rahner poses the
question in this fashion: how can the inaccessible God communicate
himself to us in such a way that we can have experience of him? Now
there is of course a positivism with regard to revelation that simply
responds to this question by saying, "in the obedience of faith within
the Church." 8 This positivist response is incomplete and superficial. It
does not adequately describe theology's foundations.
My response to our first question is necessarily a schematic re-
sponse and owes its ingredients to the two complex areas of the theol-
ogy of revelation and the theology of faith. In summary my argument
runs as follows: for the Christian believer, God enters into human his-
tory and human language through the law of grace. This law includes
two elements which form a unity: the inner word which is the grace of
faith and the outer word of communication which is called the Chris-
tian fact or the Christian witness of faith. 6 ' Because the inner word
contains a non-conceptual intellectual element and because the outer
word already contains conceptual elements which are part and parcel of
faith, faith can be called incipient theology. Theology is faith seeking
some sort of scientific expression. Thus, I agree with Congar who
writes, "Theology puts a rational method to work in order to construct
intellectually a datum received in the Church on the basis of faith." 70
This argument needs some expounding.
What is meant by datuml Every science has its given. What is
theology's given? The given is the reality of God in his self-

Latourelle, Theology: Science of Salvation, p. 7.

68
K. Rahner, "Revelation," Sacramentum Mundi 5, p. 346.
E. Schiilebeeckx, Revelation and Theology, vol. 2, trans, by N. D. Smith
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), p. 43.
7 0
Congar, 'Theology's Tasks after Vatican II," p. 47.
 The Task of Theology 25

communication. The first reality for faith and thus for theology is God
himself in his initiating self-giving. Rahner writes, "If theology takes
seriously its own standard doctrine of divinizing grace, of God's univer-
sal, salvific will, of the necessity of interior, elevating grace for faith
. . . and applies these doctrines to revelation, then it is quite possible,
without falling into modernism, to recognize that the history of revela-
tion . . . is the historical self-unfolding in predicamental terms... of
the transcendental relation between man and God which is constituted
by God's self-communication."71 Students of Rahner's theology of
history are familiar with his somewhat clumsy terms—"general salvation
and redemption history" and "special, official salvation and redemption
history." (It is important to note the order of discovery. We know
about the former in terms of and by the light of the latter.) These
expressions are translated to mean God's transcendental revelation and
God's predicamental or historical revelation. To emphasize the unity
involved, one should speak of the mediating factors, transcendental and
predicamental, of the one revelation and its history. 72 For my pur-
poses, I will use the expressions inner word and outer word. Inner word
is constitutive of faith. Inner word conjoined with the outer word of
Christian witness is constitutive of Christian faith. Aquinas brought
inner and outer word together, especially after his more developed
understanding of the initium fidei debate at the time of the semi-
Pelagian difficulties of the early Church. 73 He writes in his commen-
tary on Romans: "Man's vocation is two-fold: one is exterior, through
the mouth of the preacher; the other is interior, which is nothing other
than a certain instinct of the mind whereby a man's heart is moved by

71 K. Rahner, "Revelation," Sacramentum Mundi 5, p. 349.

7 2
Ibid., pp. 342-55; see also Rahner, "History of the World and Salvation-
History," in Theological Investigations, vol. 5, pp. 97-114; "Christianity and the
Non-Christian Religions," ibid., pp. 115-34; "Christianity and the New Man,"
ibid., pp. 135-53.
7 3
See Schillebeeckx, Revelation and Theology, vol. 2, pp. 30-75. This essay
deals with the non-conceptual, intellectual element in the act of faith. In particu-
lar, it studies the contribution of Max Seckler, Instinkt und Glaubenswille nach
Thomas von Aquin (Mainz, 1962). See H. Rondet, The Grace of Christ, ed. and
trans, by Tad W. Guzie, S.J. (Westminster: Newman Press, 1967), cc. 9 and 12.
26 The Task of Theology 26

God to assent to those things which are of faith " 7 4 Lonergan

specifies this vocation in his discussion of religious conversion. "First,
then, the root and ground of unity is being in love with God, the fact
that God's love has flooded our hearts through the Holy Spirit he has
given us (Rom 5:5). The acceptance of that gift constitutes religious
conversion and leads to moral and intellectual conversion. Secondly,
religious conversion, if it is Christian, is not just a state of mind and
heart. Essential to it is an inter-subjective, inter-personal component.
Besides the gift of the Holy Spirit within, there is the outer encounter
with the Christian witness. That witness recalls the fact that of old in
many ways God has spoken to us through the prophets but in this latest
age through his Son" (Heb 1:1-2).7S
First I will speak of this inter-subjective, inter-personal component
of the religious vocation which I am calling the outer word. Then I will
speak of the inner word, instinctus fidei, which is the grace of faith. I
am using these expressions to indicate the transcendental and historical
factors of the one revelation and its history, that is, the reality of God's
self-communication. My intention is to ground the scientific nature of
the theology that seeks to bring to speech the Christian fact. It is
precisely here that we encounter the danger of positivism. My recourse
is once again to Rahner. "Without a principle," he writes, "the under-
standing of revelation would lead to various positivisms . . . . According
to the various approaches (this means the various, positivist approaches
to revelation), the Old Testament and the New Testament, and hence
Judaism and Christianity, would be irreparably sundered. Or within
Christianity, schools would be formed oriented to the word, to works,
or to existential anthropology. And this, as experience shows, hardens
into opposing confessions. Schools of positivism with regard to revela-
tion bring about and maintain the ecumenical problem." 76 Thus the
fragmentation of the Church comes about when positivist approaches
to the outer word dissolve the one revelation which is the reality of
God's self-communication into revelations. How is this to be avoided?

7 4
See Schillebeeckx, Revelation and Theology, vol. 2, p. 55, footnote 33.
The reference to Aquinas is in Ep. ad Rom. 8,30, lect. 6.
7 5 Lonergan, Doctrinal Pluralism, pp. 27-8.

76
Rahner, "Revelation," Sacramentum Mundi 5, p. 346.
 The Task of Theology 27

Theology must "focus its gaze on Jesus Christ, in whom the fullness of
revelation as the self-communication of God has appeared." 77 This I
suspect is what theology has always tried to do. However, theology has
not always thematized its procedures with the utmost of precision nor
has it always experienced the need even to attend to the thematizing
task at all. As a result, positivist conceptions have prevailed with regard
to the revelata without subsuming these under the one revelatio and its
fullness in Christ. 78 It is Christ who makes salvation manifest as
inter-personal communication. It is theology's task to render an ac-
count of this salvation-dialogue so as to ground itself as a legitimate
scientific activity, scientia fidei, without turning the divine gift into a
human creation and without effecting a fragmentation of the divine gift
through positivist explanations. To perform its task, theology must
have recourse to the basic phenomena of human experience and human
language. These are the horizons in which God's self-giving in Christ can
be understood and in which theology can justify its procedures as scien-
tific. Moran's volume, Theology of Revelation, has always been so very
helpful to me precisely for this task. 79 Behind the datum-discourse of
doctrine is the datum-discourse of Scripture. Behind the datum-
discourse of Scripture is the datum-discourse of the apostolic preaching.
Behind the apostolic preaching is the apostolic experience of Christ and
the language that brought this experience to speech. Behind the apos-
tolic experience and language is the human history and human language
of Christ. The theologian thus points to Christ, God's very Word spoken
in a human way, and says: there is God's self-communication grounded
in human experience and in human language; there the inaccessible God
communicates himself to us in such a way that we can experience him
and develop a discourse on his self-communication that inevitably seeks
the status of a science. The stress here is on the outer word. Rahner can
say of it, "Methodological reflection . . . is possible and necessary be-
11
Ibid.
7 8
The reference here is to the difference in approach between Dei Filius of
Vatican I (see DS 3008-3010) and Dei verbum of Vatican II (see art. 5). Cf. Rat-
zinger, Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, vol. 3, general editor
H. Vorgrimler, trans, by William Glen-Doepel et al. (New York: Herder and
Herder, 1969), pp. 170-80.
7 9 Moran, Theology of Revelation.
28 The Task of Theology 28

cause the official word of God already contains a conceptual and prop-
ositional element which, as an element of faith and its responsible
communication to others, demands further explanations, reflections,
confrontations, with other truths. Revelation is intrinsically amenable
to reflection." 80
The primacy, however, must always belong to the inner word. God
himself, the personal reality which is God, is at work within the be-
liever, drawing the believer to faith. As Schillebeeckx notes, "Humanity
itself can . . . never be the initium fidei and can never of its own accord
be a de facto offer of grace." 81 The believer ultimately must always
affirm that God has brought him to the assent of faith. Faith is not
some blind leap into another world, but it is a leap. This language is the
necessarily inadequate expression of the transcendent nature of faith.
The power to make the leap of faith is from God moving the believer
inwardly by grace. Thus, it is the inner word as the light of faith which
effects in the believer an experience which is non-reflective, non-
thematic, confused ("in the sense of being impossible to point out
directly").82 Schillebeeckx explains this more precisely: "The inward
divine invitation to believe is itself a (non-reflective) experience on
man's side, an experience which, on reflection and in the light of the
revelation in Word, can and m u s t . . . be understood as coming from
grace." 83 The inner grace, the inner word, acts as a principle of know-
ledge in faith. "It makes the truth of revelation that comes from the
evangelical message an authentic knowledge in faith " 8 4 The inner
word and the outer word, kept separate for purposes of discussion,
must always be seen in their primordial unity in the Christian vision of
things. Transcendence, that is, God himself in his self-communication
through the grace of faith, must find mediation in that human history

80
Rahner,'"Revelation," Sacramentum Mundi 5.
81
S2
Schillebeeckx, Revelation and Theology, vol. 2, p. 71.
Ibid., p. 72.
83
Ibid.
8 4
Ibid., p. 45. For an excellent study of some key texts from Aquinas, see
Jean Mouroux, / Believe, trans, by Michael Turner (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1959), pp. 13-37. For a full-scale treatment of the theology of faith, see Juan
Alfaro, Fides, Spes, Caritas (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1968).
 The Task of Theology 29

(Israel and the Christ-event) which is the outer word. Thus the inner
word is God communicating himself as absolute mystery. The outer
word is this same absolute mystery as historical mediation.85
I can now summarize my answer to our first question. Theology, it
seems to me, must carefully avoid a secularist reduction that would
separate revelation from theology and turn revelation into some sort of
human construct from an exclusively human origin. Yet theology need
not settle for the half-way explanations of a biblical or a dogmatic
positivism. Theology begins where faith begins because faith itself is
incipient theology. In Rahner's analogy, just as the human existent
grasps his own self-understanding in the act of existence and proceeds
to bring this understanding to speech in a thematic manner-yet this
reflective knowledge is not some leisurely afterthought but rather a
constitutive element of existence-so the Christian believer who
becomes the theologian grasps the meaning of faith in the very act of
faith and proceeds to thematize the meaning in a technically respon-
sible manner. 86 This work of the theologian likewise is no leisurely
afterthought. Faith itself contains this element of reflection which be-
comes articulate in theology. Thus the science of faith is a moment of
critical responsibility within faith. This inner moment or element con-
stitutes theology's starting point. Theology is faith in scientific form.

8 5
See the following essays of K. Rahner: "The Concept of Mystery in
Catholic Theology," in Theological Investigations, vol. 4, trans, by Kevin Smyth
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), pp. 36-73; "The Theology of Symbol," ibid.,
pp. 221-52. In his essay, "Revelation," in Sacramentum MundiS, p. 349, Rahner
stresses the unity of the inner and the outer word: "Active revelation always
presents two aspects. On the one hand, it constitutes man's supernaturally eleva-
ted transcendence as his permanent though grace-given existential, always and
everywhere operative, present even when refused. It is the transcendental experi-
ence of the absolute and merciful closeness of God, even if this cannot be concep-
tually expressed at will by everyone. On the other hand, the active revelation-
event is also a historical mediation and conceptual objectivation of the supernatu-
rally transcendental experience. The latter takes place in history It is what is
called the history of revelation in the usual sense when it really is the history of
the true self-interpretation of the supernaturally transcendental experience and
not the misinterpretation, and when, therefore, it is really the result of God's
self-communication in grace . . . . "
6
Rahner, "Theology," Sacramentum Mundi 6, p. 233.
30 The Task of Theology 30

2) Theology and Faith

If my answer to the first question constitutes an adequate re-
sponse, it follows that there can be no faith without theology. Theol-
ogy is faith in so far as faith seeks to bring its self-understanding to
scientific expression. As M. Schmaus states succinctly: "Faith is impos-
sible without some measure of understanding and experience, and so
understanding is a necessary part of its existential structure. Under-
standing is not something incidental added to faith from outside. It
belongs to the heart of faith." 87 We must now consider this same issue
of faith and theology in reverse perspective. Can there be theology
without faith? What is the relationship between the scientia of the
theological practitioner and the grace of faith? Is faith requisite for the
work of the theologian? In so far as our first response has indicated that
theology is an inner moment of critical responsibility within faith, and
that therefore faith is incipient theology, our second question seems to
be already answered in the affirmative. The issue, however, is significant
enough to justify some modest elaboration. It is important for the sake
of the discussion to note that our second question does not speak of
faith being presupposed. The word presupposition is connotative of a
positivist thrust which already distorts the sense of the question. It is
not an issue of theology's presupposing faith in order to do its work.
Such terminology already betrays an understanding of the faith-
theology relationship that is altogether too extrinsic.
If theology's questions were soluble by a process of head-counting,
the present issue would disappear. The vast majority of theologians,
past and present, has answered our question in the affirmative: yes,
faith is necessary for the work of the theologian. Sheer numbers, how-
ever, have not prevented Professor Ogden from espousing a position
that seems to contradict theology's traditional response. In this section,
I would like to defend theology's traditional answer but with a note of
nuance. The nuance results from a study of Lonergan's functional spe-
cialties.
The traditional position has always recognized something basically
autobiographical about the work of the theologian. Personal appropria-
tion of the community's faith has been considered a constitutive ele-
ment in the theological venture. Faith does not operate solely as some
on
Schmaus, Dogma I. God in Revelation, p. 258.
 The Task of Theology 31

point of departure for theological reflection. Faith so constitutes theol-

ogy's center and goal that when the theologian is engaged in his endeav-
ors, he is engaged in an activity that is salviflc. Theology is always an
exercise of faith. 88 What has been said traditionally of the theologian
has not usually Ijeen affirmed of the philosopher of religion. Meaningful
God-talk for the theologian is specifically different from meaningful
God-talk for the religious philosopher. According to Macquarrie's defi-
nition, theology means participation in, and reflection on, a religious
faith. I take this to mean reflection upon precisely because of participa-
tion in a religious faith. God-talk for the theologian can flow only from
the personal appropriation (under grace) of the religious community's
faith-affirmation that God is for real as the transcendent reality at the
very heart of human experience and human history. God-talk for the
Christian theologian can flow only from the personal appropriation
(under grace) of the Christian community's faith-affirmation that the
transcendent reality of God becomes definitively revealed in Jesus of
Nazareth proclaimed as Lord in the datum-discourse of Sacred Scrip-
ture and proclaimed as true God and true man in the datum-discourse
of church doctrine. Theology is faith seeking understanding, according
to the answer to our first question. If we ask whose faith is seeking
understanding, it would seem that the answer would point to the faith
of the religious community as more or less appropriated by the theolo-
gian who acts somewhat as a spokesman for his community. To say
otherwise would seem to imply that theology is concerned with the
content of faith but not with the act of faith. It would seem to imply
that the fides quae is not posterior to fides qua-as though act and
content were not inseparable.
In his volume, The Old Testament and Theology, G. Ernest Wright
makes the remark, "Theology is the effort of a man to explicate his
own or someone else's tradition meaningfully in his conceptual world,
so that he can understand it. To restrict theology to the proclamation
of Israel's or the Church's kerygma is too confining." 89 I have two
problems with this observation. Because this description seems to con-

88
Ibid., p. 266. The entire chapter, pp. 257-85, is helpful.
8 9
G. Ernest Wright, The Old Testament and Theology (New York: Harper
and Row, 1969), p. 62.
32 The Task of Theology 32

sider only the content of faith, it seems to leave undifferentiated the

theologian and the scholar of religious phenomena. Furthermore, I
would be looking for a more restrictive description of theology. For
example, theology for the Christian believer can not at all be limited to
Israel's proclamation of the kerygma except in so far as such proclama-
tion is related to the Christ-event. Otherwise, it would be, I presume,
non-Christian Old Testament theology. As I understand the matter,
there are various interpretations of the Old Testament. The New Testa-
ment happens to be one of them which the Christian believer accepts as
the interpretation. One has to distinguish, then, an Old Testament the-
ology which is non-Christian, an Old Testament history of Israelite
religion which is non-theological, and an Old Testament theology that is
Christian.
I have been suggesting the main lines of what I take to be Christian
theology's traditional judgment that the theological practitioner must
be a believer. After all, the theologian is not engaged in a nominalism.
Rather, he is involved in the scholarly endeavor to understand reality,
the reality of God's self-communication proclaimed by Christian wit-
ness and accepted and affirmed in faith under the initiating grace of
faith. St. Thomas insists that the believer's act of faith terminates at
what is real. It is precisely the function of faith to put the believer,
and thus the theologian, in contact with the reality he must endeavor to
understand, that is, the reality of God. Faith, after all, is one of those
virtues the tradition has called theological, or divine, because they are
directed to God himself. "In and through the theological virtues, God
in his self-communication effects both the capacity for, and actual
participation in, the life of God himself... ," 9 1
G. O'Collins in his helpful volume, Foundations of Theology, main-
tains the traditional answer to the question at hand. He offers what he
calls two "riders" to his understanding of theologian as believer. In so
far as belief and unbelief are not mutually exclusive, that is, entirely
complete entities which one either experiences totally or not at all, it

9 0

"Actus autem credentis non terminatur ad enuntiabile, sed ad rem; non

enim formamus enuntiabilia nisi per ea de eis rebus cognitionem habeamus, sicut
in scientia,
Of
ita et in fide." II-II, 1, 2 ad 2.
K. Rahner, "Virtue, Sacramentum Mundi 6, p. 337.
 The Task of Theology 33

follows that no one is the complete believer or the complete unbeliever.

Theology has always recognized in principle the many gradations that
are possible in this matter. (With reference to these gradations, I would
add here the fundamental distinction between uninformed faith and
faith informed by charity, a distinction of no little significance for the
question that asks about the faith of the theological practitioner.) Fur-
thermore, O'Collins suggests, "Theology may obviously be studied after
a fashion by one who professes unbelief. The theologian can engage in
serious academic discussion with him, just as the preacher can put some
account of what the Christian message is to the ordinary non-
believer."92
Thus far I have been but repeating the tradition. Yet Professor
Ogden would proceed quite differently. He finds unacceptable what he
calls the common insistence "that one of the conditions of the possibil-
ity of theological understanding is that the theologian himself must
have already accepted the Christian witness by an existential decision of
faith." 93 He adds immediately, "One might suppose that the obvious
impossibility of insisting on such a condition in the case of historical
theology would have long since proved the insistence mistaken." 94 This
paper is arguing that such insistence, even in the case of historical
theology, is not mistaken at all. What is true of the basic task of
theology is true of the special tasks of theology. In the case of historical
theology, this is to affirm that faith cannot exist without historical
theology and that historical theology cannot exist without faith.
The questions that Professor Ogden's position raises could lead us
on several theological journeys, each constituting a complex theological
issue. One such journey would demand extended treatment of the the-
olbgy of faith. Another journey would take us into the theology of
justification in order to investigate the relationship between faith and
good works, for Ogden places theology squarely in the domain of good
works. 95 As a matter of fact, these two journeys seem to have come
together at Vatican II in the discussions that preceded the final develop-
9 2

O'Collins, Foundations of Theology, p. 36.

93
0gden, "What is Theology?" p. 36.
94
Ibid.
95
Ibid., pp. 36-40, esp. p. 39.
34 The Task of Theology 34

ment of the text of Dei verbum. The pertinent section in the document
is paragraph five. Vatican I had already described faith both as donum
Dei and opus ad salutem pertinens.96 Dei verbum touches on this same
distinction in the sentence that concludes the fifth paragraph: "to bring
about an ever deeper understanding of révélation, the same Holy Spirit
constantly brings faith to completion by his gifts." Ratzinger comments
on this sentence. To him, it "shows surprisingly clearly how automati-
cally, despite all the stimulus that they received from Protestant theolo-
gians the authors moved within the tradition of Catholic thought. For it
would have been very difficult for Protestant theologians to use an
expression such as the 'perfecting' of faith. For them faith is a decision
between 'yes' and 'no,' which is made either entirely or not at all, but
which cannot be conceived of in terms of different degrees. The funda-
mental point here is the extent to which one regards faith as a 'posses-
sion' of man himself or merely as God's paradoxical action in relation
to nian which cannot then be regarded as a 'virtue' that gradually takes
over wider areas of man's existence, but is rather the total nature of his
existence and cannot be thought of as being on the same level with
human practices and virtues." 97 The dialectic here is between donum
and opus. The document on divine revelation sees the Holy Spirit as the
"effective subject of the perfectio that is related to the opus. Thus God
remains here the one who is really acting, but his activity penetrates
man steadily and increasingly."98 At the heart of this matter is the
question of tradition. Ratzinger suggests, as he describes the Catholic
emphasis on tradition as the perfecting of the faith which the Spirit
brings about in the Church, "This is the crux of the difference between
Catholic and Protestant theology in the question of tradition." 99 He
means of course the divergent ways of understanding the relation be-
tween God's acts and the acts of man. These observations are not
intended as any full-scale or even satisfying response to Ogden's posi-
tion on the question of theology and faith. In defense of theology's
so-called traditional posture in this matter, I merely want to say that it
96
DS 3010.
97
Ratzinger, Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, p. 178.
9
*Ibid„ p. 179.
99
Ibid.
 The Task of Theology 35

does not suffice to indicate that theology has a close connection with
the witness of faith. This would once again separate the act and content
of faith. As I have already mentioned, scholars of religious phenomena,
whether psychologists, sociologists, or philosophers, affirm that their
disciplines are closely connected with the witness of faith, but this does
not make their disciplines theological. Then too, it does not suffice to
locate theology squarely within the domain of good works in any theol-
ogy of justification that unduly separates faith and the works of faith.
Theology is indeed a good work, often a good work done badly, but it
always has to be a work of faith. Theology is not devoid of salvific
significance. Theology is an exercise of faith.
Our second question has asked about the relationship between the
scientia of the theological practitioner and the grace of faith. Is faith
necessary for the work of the theologian? I have answered this question
in the affirmative in defense of theology's traditional response. I have
promised, however, a note of nuance which I borrow from a reflection
on Lonergan's functional specialties. Lonergan conceives of theology as
dividing into a mediating phase that encounters the past and a mediated
phase that encounters the future. 1 0 0 The shift from the one phase to
the other is the subject studied under the fifth of the eight specialties,
i.e., foundations. As regards this specialty Lonergan writes, "We are
seeking the foundations, not of the whole of theology but of the three
last specialties, doctrines, systematics, and communications. We are
seeking not the whole foundation of these specialties—for they obvi-
ously will depend on research, interpretation, history, and dialectic—
but just the added foundation needed to move from the indirect dis-
course that sets forth the convictions and opinions of others to the
direct discourse that states what is so." 1 0 1 What is being discussed here
is the matter of conversion. This leads to the nuance in my answer to
the second question. One does not have to be in love with God, one
does not have to be a believer, to do the work of research, interpreta-
tion, history or dialectic. The reason for this seems obvious enough.
"Neither the converted nor the unconverted are to be excluded from
research, interpretation, history or dialectic. Neither the converted nor

1
°Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 144.
101
Ibid:, p. 267.
36 The Task of Theology 36

the unconverted are to follow different methods in these functional

specialties. But one's interpretation of others is affected by one's under-
standing of oneself and the converted have a self to understand that is
quite different from the self the unconverted have to understand." 102
The distinction is between the specialist and the specialty. As Lonergan
himself says in connection with the specialist who is converted, "The
three-fold conversion is, not a set of propositions that a theologian
utters, but a fundamental and momentous change, in the human reality
that a theologian is." 1 0 3 This momentous change, the faith-vision that
seeks scientific expression, is what transforms the disciplines of re-
search, interpretation, history and dialectic, which are related to theol-
ogy, into theological disciplines. The historical theologian, for example,
will see his work as part of a greater reality, the present faith of the
Church seeking understanding. To follow Ogden's description of theol-
ogy as a single movement of thought with distinct moments within the
single movement, it is the systematic question that will precede the
question for the historical theologian. It is the answer of the historical
theologian that will precede the systematic answer. It is indeed true
that the unconverted is not to be excluded from the functional spe-
cialty which is history. However, it belongs to the converted to do the
task called historical theology.

3) A Significant Adjective
The answers to our first two questions support the claims that faith
does not exist without theology and that theology does not exist with-
out faith. Yet faith and theology are not the same. As the traditional
manual would teach, they differ in motive, certitude and object. 10 ^
The identification of faith and theology, which paradoxically results
when one rejects our first claim, is as unacceptable as the separation of
faith and theology which happens when one rejects our second claim.
The art at work in this matter is the vanishing art of the distinction.
We come now to our third and final question which is the question
of the convention. Is there a Catholic theology? It is neither my task
102
Ibid., p. 271.
103
Ibid., p. 270.
1 0 4
Latourelle, Theology: Science of Salvation, pp. 45-6.
 The Task of Theology 37

nor my competence to try my hand at any exhaustive response. This

paper with its faith-theology concern is but one of four presentations
which are directed to the convention's question. However, because this
paper also functions after the fashion of a key-note address, its scope is
necessarily broader than the faith-theology issues which have been dis-
cussed thus far. Accordingly, I shall make a few observations which
may be of some assistance in approaching the question. Then I shall
suggest several elements or basic principles which I consider to be pecu-
liar to that endeavor called Catholic theology which, in a properly
ecumenical context, it is the express business of the membership of the
CTSA to cherish and to foster. In my approach I shall stress more the
formal aspects of the question. Were I to stress doctrinal content, I
would begin by indicating as peculiarly Catholic the faith-theology re-
flections already discussed.
First, then, is our convention's question frivolous? Some might
suggest that it is. After all, in the small world of the history of theol-
ogy, the existence of what many have called Catholic theology would
seem to be a massive fact. But our concern is not with some sociological
existent. Our theme is theological. It inquires about those elements
which are peculiar to and necessary for the existence of Catholic theol-
ogy. Our convention's question raises the precise issue considered by
the Catholic bishops of Germany in their statement made in connection
with the publication of Hans Kung's volume on the question of infalli-
bility. At that time, the German bishops observed, "It is not the task of
bishops to take a position on the points of technical theological contro-
versy which the book has revived for discussion. The German Bishops'
Conference does see it as its duty, however, to call to mind a few
non-negotiable items which a theology cannot deny if it is to continue
to-be called Catholic." 105 The word "non-negotiable" in our present
society is part of the language of confrontation. Such is not the inten-
tion of the convention's question. Our purpose is a serious but irenic
effort to come to grips with what the Scholastics would probably have
called the esse theologicum of Catholic theology. It hardly seems neces-
sary for me to add that we are dealing with a complex issue. Cornelius
10S
I have used the translation given in Theology Digest 19, No. 2 (Summer,
1971), 124-5. The translation is made from the original text appearing inPublik
4:7 <February 12,1971), 15.
38 The Task of Theology 38

Ernst writes, "Reception of the Church's continuing tradition of theol-

ogy is a matter of faith. This is not of course to say that every proposi-
tion in every theological system is an object of faith; but faith is a
presupposition of insight into the meaning of these diverse theologies,
of understanding that they are unified in the object or realm of their
concern-very simply, are trying to talk about the same things." 106
This observation is of some concern in view of the situation of plural-
ism.

It is no longer seriously possible to offer an anonymous handbook,

however large, and call it simply "Catholic theology"; it was not
long ago that even Karl Barth, with some justification, seemed to
suppose that this was so. Communion, ordinary or extraordinary, in
the Church in faith, offers access to a universe of meaning, not open
to those who reject this communion. So the Church as a continuing
historical institution, and active spiritual communion of faith in the
Ch urch, together form the double a priori of theological
meaning. 10

This suggests a second preliminary remark, the question of faith's

"ecclesiality." The response to our second question rejected the possi-
bility of theology without faith. I would affirm in the present context
that there can be no theology without ecclesial faith. Faith is social in
structure because it is intimately tied to a community. As Schmaus
reminds us, it is the Church which must be called the transindividual
subject of faith. The individual becomes the believing subject in so far
as he or she enters into the Church's subjectivity and shares in the faith
of the Church. 108 Theology as such and Christian theology as such are
abstractions. Theology always exists as something ecclesial. "It grows
but of the Church, and it reacts upon the Church. Theology is not a
private enterprise of the theologian but a life utterance of the commu-
nity of the Church." 109 Rahner expresses it this way: "Since human
inter-subjectivity is at its peak in faith . . . while faith, the hearing of

Cornelius Ernst, "Theological Methodology," Sacramentum Mundi 6,

p. 219.
101
Ibid.
108
Schmaus, Dogma I. God in Revelation, p. 260.
109
Ibid„ p. 269.
 The Task of Theology 39

the revelation directed to the people of God, is the faith of the Church
and faith within the Church, theology is necessarily ecclesial. Other-
wise, it ceases to be itself and becomes the prey of the wayward subjec-
tive spirituality of the individual which is today less fitted than ever to
be the cohesive force of a community." 110 Does the fact that theology
is ecclesial deprive it of its critical function with regard to the Church
and its life of faith? The answer is in the negative. In fact it is precisely
because it is an ecclesial science, and hence an element of the Church
itself, that theology can and must exercise its function as the Church's
self-criticism. This means "the constantly renewed effort to purge the
faith from all that is merely human and questionable or historically
transient." 111
How does one move from ecclesial theology to Catholic theology?
The question "What is theology?" is fundamentally the God-question.
The question "What is Christian theology?" is fundamentally Christol-
ogy, the reality of God in Christ giving meaning and purpose, hope and
direction, to human history both personal and corporate. Christian the-
ology is the task of theology for those believers who strive to bring to
expression in language their belief in God at work in Christ in their
experience and in their history. But Christians as such do not exist.
Christians are ecclesial. Hence there is the task of theology for ecclesial
Christians. Thus the question "What is Catholic theology?" is a matter
of ecclesiology. For my purposes, ecclesiology means from one perspec-
tive Lumen gentium-, from another perspective Gaudium et spes\ and
from a third perspective Unitatis redintegratio and the spirit that sup-
ports serious Catholic participation in the various bilateral consultations
which are on-going at this time, nationally and internationally. Catholic
theology is what happens when Catholic faith becomes reflective. Cath-
olic faith becomes reflective when it sees itself as the scandal of particu-
larity, that is, when it wrestles with the mystery of how God in Christ
wills to give himself in redeeming love, a self-giving which is made to all,
but a self-giving which is made known specifically through the predica-
mental aspects of divine revelation. But Catholic theology in itself is
also an abstraction. What exist are the many theologies-philosophical,

II
°Rahner, "Theology," Sacramentum Mundi 6, p. 235.
III
Ibid.
40 The Task of Theology 40

historical, systematic and practical; and these many theologies are all
ecclesial. A reminder is in order. There is a negative and a positive
element operative in this ecclesiality. As Ernst sees it, " . . . the continu-
ing validity of the expression 'Catholic theology' is due to the self-
defining activity of the Church from time to time in excluding theologi-
cal articulations of faith declared not to be Catholic: the positive unity
of Catholic theology is not itself capable of exhaustive theological artic-
ulation but is the one reality of God, Christ, the Church." 112
By way of a parenthesis, I would like to set the question at hand in
a popular context which bears some relevance for the theological scene.
It would seem that many, not excluding teachers of Catholic theology,
view the adjective "Catholic" as a sociological indicator, not infrequent-
ly of an embarrassing nature. In March of this year, Commonweal pub-
lished an exchange of views on "the future of the Catholic Peace Move-
ment." 1 1 3 One partner to the dialogue argued for a broadening of the
meaning of the adjective. He suggested, "For young people particularly
the traditional definitions of what is 'good' Catholic practice have sim-
ply disappeared; they do not marry in the Catholic Church; they, and
an increasing number of their elders... do not attend Mass on Sun-
days; yet they have no qualms about calling themselves Catholic, as one
might call himself American, or a Minneapolitan or an Atlantan, and
still regard their values, their resistance to war and oppression as pecu-
liarly Catholic." Commenting on this remark several weeks later, 114
Michael Novak observed that John Cogley had raised a similar point but
to the opposite effect; Cogley did not regard being a Catholic as a form
of ethnic, regional or tribal identity but as adherence in conscience to
certain intellectual doctrines. Novak adds, "To be a Catholic is to be-
long to a people, and to belong to a people places one under authority
and discipline-under the intellectual and spiritual power of several
historical traditions. That is a far deeper reality than being an Atlantan,
or even being an American. (It is not, I think, as 'doctrinal' as Cogley
has described it.)" In my present response to the question "Is there a
Catholic theology?" although I too would have difficulty in saying that
112
Ernst, "Theological Methodology," •p. 219. (The italics are the author's.)
113
Commonweal, March 8,1974, pp. 14-15.
Commonweal, March 22,1974, p. 55.
 The Task of Theology 41

it is merely a matter of adherence in conscience to certain intellectual

doctrines, I would argue that the matter is far more doctrinal than
Novak would seem to allow. It is in support of this contention that I
will now offer the following observations as belonging to the non-
negotiable aspects of Catholic theology. These observations are neces-
sarily schematic. Each principle I shall discuss would demand a paper,
even a convention, all its own.
How does the inaccessible God communicate himself to us in such
a way that we can have experience of him? The Christian responds that
the inaccessible God, whom no man has ever seen, communicates him-
self to us in and through his incarnate Son, the sole mediator in whom
God's revelation reaches its full and climactic moment. We confront
here the scandal of history, the scandal of particularity. Many who
would be open to the idea of divine revelation are scandalized by the
Christian affirmation of particularism. In agreement with Rahner, we
must not minimize the difficulty in acknowledging that revelation,
divine in origin yet constitutive of the very core of human history, can
and must be present everywhere and at all times for the salvation of all
men without ceasing to be the Word of God's freedom upon which we
can place no demand and conditions. 115 In all its particularity, then,
we have to raise the question of God's predicamental self-revealing. The
peculiar way we answer this question constitutes theology as Catholic.
In asking this question, one is forced to raise a host of other questions.
In summary fashion I will ask these questions and then proceed to
discuss some of the elements, peculiarly Catholic, which their answers
contain. The first I shall call the sacramental principle; the second, the
dogmatic principle; the third, the philosophical principle.
What is the source of our faith in God? We have already answered
this in our earlier sections. Our faith in God arises from the inner word
of the grace of faith and the outer word of Christian witness. But the
experience that results from the inner and outer word presses for articu-
lation, and so a second question arises: how does the believer move
from experience to speech? In the New Testament period this becomes
the question of the preached tradition leading to the Scriptures. But the
11 S
This observation reflects Rahner's constant theme in elaborating a theol-
ogy of history, and also in working out the nature-grace relationship. For a
summary view, see the article on revelation in Sacramentum Mundi 5.
 i

42 The Task of Theology

preaching had to continue because the Scriptures had to be traditioned.

Thus we see the development of post-scriptural reflection and interpre-
tation. In this development the permanent meaning of the initial experi-
ence, first brought to speech in written form in the New Testament
witness, finds expression in a pluralism of communication characteristic
of post-scriptural interpretation. This is the issue of Scripture leading to
tradition. Then inevitably comes the Yes-No question that is always the
contemporary question: how does the community of faith which is the
Church keep alive and intact, as intelligible, the meaning of the original
experience and the language that expressed and interpreted that experi-
ence? This is the hermeneutical task of interpretation that leads to
church doctrine. Preliminary to, and consequent upon, church doctrine
is the indispensable role of theological doctrine: how do members of
the Church achieve an ever deeper and more satisfying understanding of
their faith in God? The answer is a complex of several ingredients. It
includes prayer, the orthopraxis of Christian living and the orthodoxy
of theological doctrine. 116 These questions should suffice for our pres-
ent purposes. Involved in their answers are some of the elements I am
calling peculiarly Catholic. This does not mean that only Catholic theo-
logians (in the sociological sense) hold to these elements, or that all
Catholic theologians (again in the sociological sense) are as a matter of
fact holding to these elements. I merely intend to indicate a reality
called Catholic theology that transcends the sociological confines of
what Catholic theologians are actually doing.
The first principle is the sacramental principle. God as Father of
the Lord Jesus comes to us in his Son and in their common Spirit.
Bernard Cooke notes, "The consciousness Jesus had of the Father is the
supreme manifestation of God in human history, the most direct insight
possessed by man into the reality of God and source of all our under-
standing of God." 1 1 7 The question about the inaccessible God, there-
116
There are other questions, not immediately pertinent to this paper, which
would have to be raised in order to keep this series of questions integral. For
example, how does theology try to show God as present in the experience of the
human person's thinking and doing, as grounding the possibility of belief? How
does theology commend the faith as reasonable and acceptable to those outside
the visible community of faith?
See Bernard Cooke, Beyond Trinity (Milwaukee: Marquette. University
1 1 7

Press, 1969), p. 37.

 The Task of Theology 43

fore, is the question that asks how we today are in saving contact with
the consciousness of Jesus. I submit that there is a specifically Catholic
response to this question which is found in the sacramental nature of
the Church. Between the historical presence of the Lord Jesus as de-
scribed in the gospels and his coming in glory at the end of time, our
present encounter with the Lord takes place in a sacramental manner.
We encounter the risen Lord in the mystery of the Church. 118 Two
quotations from Rahner can help to say in summary fashion what is
meant by seeing Christ as the human symbol of the divine. First, Christ
is sacrament of God. "Christ is the historic presence in the world of the
eschatologically victorious mercy of God. It is possible to point to a
visible, historically manifest fact, located in space in time, and say—
because that is there, God is reconciled with the world." 119 Analogous
to the way Christ is sacrament of God, the Church is sacrament of
Christ: "The Church is the continuance, the contemporary presence of
that real, eschatologically triumphant and irrevocably established pres-
ence in the world, in Christ, of God's salvific will. The Church is the
official presence of the grace of Christ in the public history of the one
human race." 120 The believer, and therefore the theologian, does not
make his initial contact with the Lord by becoming exegete and return-
ing to the pages of the New Testament, important though this return is.
The theologian, like any other believer, encounters Christ here and now
in the sacrament of the Church. I mention this, not to discuss in depth
an issue that is far more complex than I have expressed. I mention it to
denote what I take to be a peculiarly Catholic approach to theol-
ogy's starting point.
The issue is significant because of the ecclesial nature of
theology. If the Church were just some handy way of gather-
ing together, and giving some organization to the followers of the Lord,
that would say one thing about theology's starting point. But such is
118
In speaking of the Church as a sacrament, I am not intending to confine
ecclesiology to this one model. See Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (New
York: Doubleday, 1974). Dulles suggests, with regard to the model of the Church
as sacrament, "During the past generation, it has proved highly attractive to
professional theologians, at least in the Roman Catholic communion" (p. 68).
1 1 9

K. Rahner, The Church and the Sacraments (New York: Herder and
Herder,
120 1963), p. 15.
Ibid„ pp. 18-9.
44 The Task of Theology 44

not the Church. The Church is God's people socially organized as the
Body of the Lord. What does this mean? It means that the faith and
love of the Christian people give expression to the present conscious-
ness of the risen Lord. Hence the starting point for theology is the
living faith of the Church. 121 Then, from this perspective, the theolo-
gian can turn to the Scriptures to learn all he can about the historical
reality of Jesus. One's educated understanding of the Church's present
faith and the careful exegesis of New Testament texts put the theolo-
gian in some contact with the mystery of Christ. 122 The basic starting
point of theology is the present faith of the Church as expressed in the
authentic celebration of the Eucharist. Here God's people are one with
their risen Lord in the worship of the Father through the Spirit. Theol-
ogy begins where faith begins. The theologian is the believer who, in his
technically competent manner, reflects upon the Church's faith. By
virtue of the sacramental principle, this faith is always a present reality
in response to God's ever-present revelation. What Cooke says of the
believer is obviously true of that particular believer who is the theolo-
gian: "The experience of hearing the Scriptural expression of the word
of God, the sacramental experience of enacting the very mystery of
which the Scripture speaks, the experience of confronting the realities
of daily life with the vision of Christian faith and hope and love, all
inter-act to interpret one another and help fashion that matrix of per-
sonal understanding into which God's self-revealing presence is received.
God's revelation takes place within the consciousness of the believers to
whom he reveals himself." 123 With this as starting point, the Catholic
theologian proceeds to his functional specialties.
The second principle is the dogmatic principle. Our question re-
mains the same: how does the inaccessible God reveal himself? as we
turn to Vatican II and its document on revelation, Dei verbum. The
relevant section is the second section, paragraphs seven to ten: "In his
gracious goodness God has seen to it that what he has revealed for the
salvation of all nations would abide perpetually in its full integrity and
be handed on to all generations. Therefore, Christ the Lord, in whom
121
Cooke, Beyond Trinity, pp. 49-51.
Ibid., p. 51.
123
Ibid., p. 50.
 The Task of Theology 45

the full revelation of the supreme God is brought to completion, com-

missioned the Apostles to preach to all men the Gospel which is the
source of all saving truth and moral teaching . . . . But in order to keep
the Gospel forever whole and alive within the Church, the Apostles left
bishops as their successors, 'handing over' to them 'the authority to
teach in their own place.'" 124
But is Christ's teaching authority transferable? Some would argue
that "divine authority is absolutely intransmissable, incommunicable, in
any conceivable fashion to any kind of human authority whatever." 125
Others would argue that such a transfer is legitimate in the case of the
apostles. However, apostolic authority is intransmissable because it is so
intimately tied with the apostolic function which is intransmissable.126
The Catholic claim is quite different as Dei verbum makes clear. 127
The issue involved in the dogmatic principle is quite precise. Bouyer
wrote over a decade ago, "The question outstanding between Protes-
tantism and Catholicism is by no means whether the authority of God's
Word in Scripture can or cannot be limited by some other authority. It
is one of determining in what actual conditions, established by God
Himself as the author of Scripture, their sovereign authority can effec-
tively be upheld in practice. It is not a question here of adding on
another authority to that of God's Word-thus diminishing God's Word.
Rather, it is a question of knowing the specific conditions according to
which God who inspired the Scriptures entrusted them to the
Church." 128 Dei verbum emphasizes that the teaching office is not
above the word of God but serves it, "teaching only what has been
handed on, listening to it devoutly, guarding it scrupulously and ex-
plaining it faithfully in accord with a divine commission, and with the

1 2 4
Paragraph seven. The quotation is from Irenaeus. See art. 7, footnote 3.
1 2 5
Louis Bouyer, Cong. Orat., The Word, Church and Sacraments, trans, by
A. V. Littledale (New York: Desclee, 1961), p. 45. The reference in Bouyer's text
is to Paul Tillich.
1
Ibid. The reference in Bouyer's text is to O. Cullmann.
1 2 7
Dei verbum, nn. 7-10. "The task of authentically interpreting the Word of
God . . . has been entrusted exclusively to the living teaching office of the Church
whose authority is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ" (n. 10).
128Bouyer, The Word, Church and Sacraments, pp. 28-9.
46 The Task of Theology 46

help of the Holy Spirit, it draws from this one deposit of faith every-
thing which it presents for belief as divinely revealed" (#10).
My task at the moment is not extended commentary on Dei
verbum. This particular citation, however, contains the dogmatic princi-
ple: the authority in the Church from a divine commission to present
certain beliefs as divinely revealed. Rahner has made an extended study
of the nature of the dogmatic statement. 12 ' He makes a passing refer-
ence to the matter in his volume on the Trinity: "He who does biblical
theology wishes to say exactly what the Scripture says; yet he cannot
simply repeat the words of Scripture. In this respect, it seems to me,
the only but essential difference between Protestant and Catholic theol-
ogy is this: that for Catholic theology the logical explanation of the
words of the Scripture by the Church can definitely become a state-
ment of faith; whereas for the Protestant theologian it remains basically
theology, and it may always be revised and reversed." 130 For our
summary purposes, five points stressed by the German bishops can help
to put some flesh on the dogmatic principle.
First of all, belief in God's word, in the scriptural witness and in
the Church's profession of faith, supposes that, in spite of the changes
in history and in language, it is at least theoretically possible that there
are statements which are true and which keep the same meaning and
remain irrevocably valid amidst the fluctuations of historical modes of
thought and expression. Secondly, although the faith of the Church
must be examined anew by critical intelligence in changing cultural
1 2 9
K. Rahner, "What is a Dogmatic Statement?" in Theological Investiga-
tions, vol. 5, trans, by Karl H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), pp. 42-66.
W. Pannenberg has written an article with the same title as Rahner's article. See
Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 1, trans, by George H. Kehm (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1970), pp. 182-210.
1 3 0 t
K. Rahner, The Trinity, trans, by Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and
Herder, 1970), p. 56. By a logical explanation of a scriptural passage, Rahner
means an explanation that makes the statement in question clear, that is, more
precise, less liable to be misunderstood. "A logical explanation clarifies the state-
ment independently of anything else. To put it roughly: the logical explanation
explains by making more precise, it does not use one state of affairs to explain
another one." This is said by way of contrast with an ontic explanation which
explicates one state of affairs by taking into account another state of affairs in
such a way that the second state of affairs hopes to clarify what is to be ex-
plained. See The Trinity, pp. 52-3.
 The Task of Theology 47

situations, still it includes an unmistakable Yes and an unmistakable No

which are not interchangeable. This is the obligatory character of God's
word. If this were not so, the Church could not remain the truth of
Jesus Christ. Thirdly, when new questions arise in different historical
situations, the Church must allow a thorough examination of the faith.
However, the Church has the right and duty when necessary to express
anew and in binding form the faith's unmistakable Yes and No. Fourth-
ly, such expression, or dogma, acquires its binding force not from theo-
logical discussion and not from majority assent, but from the charism
given the Church which enables the Church to hold fast to the word
once uttered and to expound it without deception. Responsibility for
remaining in the truth of the gospel is entrusted in a special way to
church office. Fifthly, the power to make binding statements belongs
first of all to ecumenical councils which represent the entire episcopate.
The Catholic Church confesses in addition that this power can be exer-
cised by the bishop of Rome as successor of St. Peter and head of the
episcopal college. The conditions under which he is empowered to
speak with such authority proceed from the tradition and are deline-
ated by both Vatican councils. 131
The third principle is the philosophical principle. Once again our
question is the same: how does the inaccessible God communicate him-
self? Once again my lament remains the same; my present purposes
allow for what is but a cursory summation of an issue that needs more
detailed treatment. By the philosophical principle I have in mind what
Congar discussed many years ago when he studied the formula qf
Chalcedon in an ecumenical context. His concern was with the realism
of the Incarnation and the proper role the human must play in the
work of redemption. 132 By the philosophical principle I have in mind
what Lonergan discusses in his essay, "The Origins of Christian
Realism," in which he writes: "Insofar as Christianity-is a reality, it is
involved in the problem of realism. But this involvement is twofold.
There is a remote involvement in which the problems of realism have
1 3 1
Cf. footnote 105. For an excellent elaboration of the dogmatic principle,
see Richard P. McBrien, Who is a Catholic? (Denville, N.J.: Dimension Books'
1971), pp. 25-39.
1 3 2

Yves M. J. Congar, O.P., Christ, Our Lady and the Church, trans, by
Henry St. John, O.P. (London: Longmans, Green, 1957).
48 The Task of Theology 48

not yet appeared. There is a proximate involvement in which the

problems of realism gradually manifest themselves and meet with an
implicit solution. Finally, there is the explicit involvement which arises
when people discuss whether or not there is a Christian philos-
ophy." 1 3 3 I have in mind, then, what took place in the early Church
during the Christological difficulties when theology, with conciliar
ratification, made the passage from Scripture to dogma, prescinding
here from the infra-scriptural issue of the development of dogma. 134 I
have in mind what took place in the medieval Church when theology,
without specific conciliar ratification at the time, 135 developed the
doctrine of the supernatural. I have in mind what took place in the
Tridentine Church when theology, with subsequent conciliar ratifica-
tion, developed the definition of sacramental efficacy. I am thinking of
what took place at the first Vatican Council in the reason-revelation
teaching of Dei Filius. I am thinking of what took place among the
medieval schoolmen when the master interpreter of Holy Scripture,
Magister in Sacra Pagina, became Magister in Theologia, that process, as
Chenu suggests, in which reason achieved a decisive success within the

1 3 3
Bernard Lonergan, S.J., "The Origins of Christian Realism, in Theology
Digest 20, No. 4 (Winter, 1972), 295. It might seem that the expression
"Christian philosophy" militates against my argument that the philosophical prin-
ciple is something distinctively Catholic. Then, too, it might seem that, whereas
the sacramental and the dogmatic principles are ecclesiological, the present prin-
ciple concerns what is Christian and hence Christological and not ecclesiological. I
would argue to the contrary on both scores. First of all, with Congar, I would
suggest that a monophysite Christology, for example, mis-shapes one's view on
the Church, and thus on the theological enterprise which is an ecclesial reality.
The argument runs as follows: basic to ecclesiology, because it is basic to Christol-
ogy, is the principle that safeguards the legitimate place of the human in the work
of redemption. This has important ramifications for the nature of the theological
enterprise. To paraphrase Chenu, already quoted in this regard, reason must
achieve within the realm of faith a decisive success. This is what is meant by the
philosophical principle, a principle of philosophical realism. It should be noted
that the expression "Christian philosophy" is a technical term and did not origi-
nate in any Catholic vs. non-Catholic context.
134
See Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 4, pp. 3-35, re doctrinal de-
velopment.
i 35
See Robert Richard, S.J., Rahner s Theory of Doctrinal Development,
CTSA Proceedings 18 (1963), 179-83.
 49 The Task of Theology

realm of faith. 1 3 6 Finally, I am thinking of contemporary theological

scholarship, in doctrine as well as in ethics, trying to work out intellec-
tually and bring to speech the nature-grace relationship in which nature,
as an inner moment within the order of grace, is the very condition for
the possibility of grace; in which reason as an inner moment within the
order of faith, is the very condition for the possibility of faith; in which
philosophy as an inner moment within the theological order is the very
condition for the possibility of theology; in which a natural law ethics,
as an inner moment within the order of evangelical moral doctrine, is
the very condition for the possibility of evangelical ethics. To be some-
what more detailed, I will comment on Nicaea, on Aquinas as exem-
plary of the medieval Scholastic, and on the Dei Filius of Vatican I. By
the philosophical principle, I am not merely asserting the obvious that
philosophy has a role to play in theology; and I am not merely asserting
that the Catholic theological tradition historically has been by and large
a philosophical tradition. I am asserting that the origins of Christian
realism mean the origins of Catholic realism. The philosophical princi-
ple is a theological necessity by virtue of the nature of Catholic faith.
The Nicaean experience taught the Church that there is a style of
epistemology and ontology resident in the scriptural word of God. The
homo-ousion, as a development of faith and not some Hellenistic defor-
mation, is proof that the Church came to grips with what we are calling
the philosophical principle. As Robert Richard said to the CTSA in
1963, "Nicaea activated a tendency that is in itself radically human and
bound to assert itself whenever mature human intelligence, individual
and communal, and especially when illumined by faith, is allowed its
proper scope and freedom. This is the tendency of authentic Christian
consciousness to transpose the revealed communication through sys-
tematic understanding from an experiential priority to the objective
priority." 137 Many theologians have inquired: does theology need phi-
losophy, and if so, why does theology need philosophy? The responses
of Rahner and Lonergan to such questions would reject the phrasing of
these questions as an unacceptable extrinsicist.13 8 Lonergan would say

1 6
Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, p. 302.
1 3 7
Richard, "Rahner's Theory of Doctrinal Development," pp. 130-1.
140See Rahner, "Philosophy and Theology," Theological Investigations,
50 The Task of Theology

that the theologian needs philosophy if the theological works of the

masters are to be read in their diverse cultural contexts. More impor-
tantly, the theologian needs philosophy to know what is going on when
one is doing theology. To do theology is to know in a theological
manner, and to know in a theological manner is to come to grips with
the style of epistemology and ontology resident in God's scriptural
word. This is applicable to the many tasks of theology. It applies to the
task of interpreting a text and of reconstructing a mentality just as
much as it applies to the systematic task of developing understanding of
the mysteries of faith. 1 3 9
The Church at Nicaea seemed neither to ignore nor to succumb to
the culture of the Greco-Roman world. The homo-ousion represents the
transformation of the culture in the preaching of the truth of the faith.
The same can be said analogously of Aquinas. He was a man of his
culture. His times were times of change and renewal brought about in
great measure by the importation of Greek and Arabic ideas. The
Summa theologiae represents the philosophical principle at work in St.
Thomas, as he transformed a sacra historia into an ordo doctrinae for
the purposes of faith-understanding. Lonergan says of Thomas: "The
brilliance and magnitude of Aquinas' achievement permit us to single
him out as the example of what was going forward in his day, namely,
discovering, working out, thinking through a new mould for the Cath-
olic mind, a mould in which it could remain fully Catholic and yet at
home with all the good things that might be drawn from the cultural
heritage of the Greeks and Arabs." 140 Thomas studied his Scriptures
and his Aristotle. He tried to do justice to the Christian fact and to
human experience, science and scholarship. His logic, his science, his
metaphysics of the soul now need transposition in view of modern
concerns with method, contemporary science, and the philosophy of

vol. 6, trans, by Karl and Boniface Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), pp. 71-81;
"Philosophy and Philosophising in Theology," Theological Investigations, vol. 9,
trans, by Graham Harrison (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), pp. 46-63;
Lonergan, "Theology and Man's Future," Cross Currents 19, No. 4 (Fall, 1969),
453-4; Method in Theology, cf. index under "philosopher," "philosophies," "phi-
losophy."
139 Lonergan, "Theology and Man's Future," p. 454.
140Lonergan, "The Future of Thomism," an unpublished lecture.
 The Task of Theology 51

the self-transcending subject. Still Aquinas stands in a special way for

what I am suggesting as a peculiarly Catholic element in theology,
namely the philosophical principle.
My final observation will concern the first Vatican Council. The
peculiarly Catholic philosophical principle is operative in the Council's
reflections on God and his existence, and in the Council's observations
on the nature of theology. The question of God and the question of
theology are not separate questions. They represent two aspects of the
same question. The Council's approach is anthropological. It is telling
us something about the human potential: not so weak in the face of
transcendence that a reductionist capitulation to some form of fideism
is the solution; not so much in control in the face of transcendence that
a reductionist capitulation to some form of rationalism is the solution.
The bipolar origin of Catholic theology is maintained, human experi-
ence and the Christian fact harmonized under the rubric ratio fide
illustrata.141 The history of Catholic theology in recent centuries is not
a glorious account of fidelity to the philosophical principle. On the
contrary, there has occurred an unfortunate separation of theology and
philosophy. 142 The philosophical principle may call for a distinction.
It does not call for a separation. Vatican I, in its own intellectual con-
text, is a strong affirmation of this principle in Catholic theology. Two

141
DS 3016.
1 4 2
Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 336-7. "In contrast with medieval
procedure, Catholics in recent centuries have not merely distinguished but even
separated philosophy and theology. The result was two theologies; there was a
natural theology in the philosophy course; there was a further systematic or
speculative theology concerned with an orderly presentation of the mysteries of
the faith. I think the separation unfortunate. In the first place it was misleading.
Time and again students took it for granted that systematic theology was just
more philosophy and so of no religious significance. At the opposite pole there
were those who argued that a natural philosophy does not attain the Christian
God and, further, that what is not the Christian God is an intruder and an idol. In
the second place, the separation weakened both natural theology and systematic
theology. It weakened natural theology for abstruse philosophic concepts lose
nothing of their validity and can gain enormously in acceptability when they are
associated with their religious equivalents. It weakened systematic theology for
the separation prevents the presentation of systematics as the Christian prolonga-
tion of what man can begin to know by his native powers."
52 The Task of Theology

commentaries on this matter can serve to conclude these remarks and at

the same time illustrate a position on the God-question which I wish to
call peculiarly Catholic. This does not mean that these commentaries
are saying everything that ought to be said, or that they are saying
things the right way or the best way. What I am saying is that these
commentaries, in their own cultural context, are part of the on-going
tradition of the philosophical principle.14 Bernard Lonergan spoke to
the membership of the CTSA in 1968 on the natural knowledge of
God. He commented on the meaning of Vatican I: "The doctrine of
natural knowledge of God means that God lies within the horizon of
man's knowing and doing, that religion represents a fundamental di-
mension in human living."1 Karl Rahner comments on the decree of
Vatican I in his essay, "Theos in the New Testament."
The theological sense of this decision . . . is clearly this: that in this
conception of human nature alone is it possible for man to be a
potentially receptive subject of theology and of Revelation. It is
only if man stands before God always and of necessity . . . even,
then, as sinner . . . that he is the being who has to come to terms
1 3
In his significant volume, Naming the Whirlwind, L. Gilkey raises ques-
tions which, in my opinion, Catholic faith-become-reflective-in-theology has
always felt compelled to raise: how can it be established . . . that existence as a
whole is coherent enough so that speculative thought about its ultimate structure
is possible? How can we show that there are legitimate uses of cognitive thinking
found in ordinary experience which by their character carry our cognitive
thoughts beyond immediate experience? (See page 226.) In footnote 30 on
page 226 Gilkey cites the sort of writers and thinkers he has in mind who are
actively engaged in the task of answering these significant questions. The out-
standing examples are Rahner and Lonergan. It strikes me as being no accident
that all four writers cited in this footnote are considered Catholic writers of
theology and/or philosophy. I would maintain that Catholic theology is commit-
ted to the position, espoused by the Scholastics, that "being" and "true" are
convertible terms; that this becomes the principle of intelligibility, which affirms
that the real is intelligible; that this principle is analogously applicable to the
reality in which the act of faith terminates; and that in systematic theology we
find the prolongation of "what man can begin to know by his native powers. Thus,
a Catholic theology of act of faith would affirm, Per actum fidei affirmat homo
contentum divinae revelationis tamquam reale. See Alfaro, Fides, Spes, Caritas,
pp. 28-66.
144
Lonergan, "Natural Knowledge of God," CTSA Proceedings 23 (1968),
66.
 The Task of Theology 53

with Revelation . . . . Precisely in order to be able to experience

God's personal self-disclosure as grace ... man must be a subject
who in the very nature of things has to come to terms with God's
disclosure or withholding of himself. Only if it is in the nature of
things that he has something to dtf with God can he freely and
spontaneously experience God's self-disclosure as it is actually
promulgated in Revelation: in other words, precisely so that Revela-
tion might be grace, it is necessary at least in principle that man
should have something to do with God from a locus which is not
already grace.1 5

Is there a Catholic theology? This is the convention's question, not

just mine. It is up to the convention to make a response. I am eager to
hear the presentations on revelation, ethics and the papacy. As for my
contribution to the general discussion, I conclude with a resounding
Yes. There is a Catholic theology. My reasoning is threefold. There is
the sacramental principle; there is the dogmatic principle; there is the
philosophical principle.

TWO CONSEQUENCES

In introducing the remarkable first volume of his history of the

development of doctrine, Jaroslav Pelikan makes the following observa-
tion: "The Church is always more than a school; not even the Enlight-
enment managed to restrict or reduce it to its teaching function. But
the Church cannot be less than a school. Its faith, hope and love all
express themselves in teaching and confession." 146 We find the same
sort of sentiment in a remark of Rahner: "The Catholic Church cannot
and ought not be a 'Church of professors,' but it cannot be today a
Church without professors."1 The reason the Church cannot be any-
thing less than a school seems obvious. Theology is for the Church's
task of preaching. Preaching demands theological schooling. Such
schooling means seminaries and divinity schools, parish catechetical
1 4 5 /
Rahner, "Tneos in the New Testament," Theological Investigations,
vol. 1, trans, by Cornelius Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961), p. 83.
146
Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1971), p. 1.
1 4 7
Rahner, Theology, Sacramentum Mundi 6, p. 239.
54 The Task of Theology 54

programs, college and university theology departments. A Church with-

out theology professors is a non-preaching Church. What ought to be
said about theology professors in the Church today? (From personal
experience many of us can think of all sorts of things that have been
said in a pejorative vein. These, however, ought to be excised from any
public document—after the fashion of a Watergate transcript. They only
serve to remind us in passing that no one ought to take up the ecclesial
ministry of theology if the goal is to elicit gratitude from the students
or widespread approbation from all the diverse elements in the Church.)
By way of a practical postscript, this paper will have two things to say
about theology professors. The first concerns their collectively indis-
pensable role in the life of the Church. The second concerns an indis-
pensable requisite for theology professors that must accompany their
professional competence, namely, holiness of life. These two observa-
tions flow from the two assertions this paper has been making: that
faith does not exist without theology; and that theology does not exist
without faith.
First of all, faith does not exist without theology. To assert the
opposite is to settle for a reduction that does not do justice to human
experience and culture. Reductionism breeds polarization, and this is
descriptive of the Catholic Church in the United States at this time.
This paper has been suggesting that polarization finds its deepest cause
in the faith-theology question. This takes many specific forms. Recent-
ly, Richard McCormick has concretized the polarization issue under the
specific rubric of Humanae vitae. He writes, "From the response to
Humanae vitae over the past five years, one thing is clear: the Catholic
community is polarized both on the issue of contraception and, even
more importantly, on the nature and function of the Church's magis-
terium and the appropriate Catholic response to authoritative
teaching." 148 The McCormick article made the suggestion that the
bishops establish a "blue ribbon committee" to study the underlying
issues of the controversy. This could be a possible point of entry for a
renewing of serious theological dialogue between the bishops and the
Catholic theological community. Recently, the general secretary of the
National Conference of Catholic Bishops made reference to the compel-
1 4 8
Richard McCormick, "The Silence since Humanae Vitae, America
(July 21,1973), p. 32.
 The Task of Theology 55

ling necessity of this sort of dialogue. Bishop James Rausch had this to
say in an address given at the Catholic University of America:

A second matter I would like to touch upon briefly this evening

. . . is the relationship between bishops and scholars in the Church.
If there is any single issue that requires attention in our time, this is
it! It holds particular importance because, as all of us know, third
parties exist in our country who are taking it upon themselves to
exegete and theologize and engage in analysis without possessing the
required tools of scholarship. In addition, these same third parties
are assuming a role reserved to the official magisterium by passing
judgments on the orthodoxy of scholars or granting something in
the nature of a nihil obstat or an imprimatur in their editorials or
their question and answer columns.1

Bishop Rausch, I presume, is not attacking freedom of speech or free-

dom of the press. Rather, he seems concerned with judgments being
made on delicate and complex matters by those without the requisite
competence of either scholastic credentials or properly designated
mission. The practical imperative is clear. There is urgent need for
bishops and scholars to sit down and work out their relationship and
discover their mutual need for one another. Efforts at collaboration
must begin to close the ominous gap which, if continued as is or even
widened, will prove catastrophic for the good estate of God's people in
our country.
The membership of the CTSA needs no further instruction on the
collectively indispensable role of good theology professors and other
scholars in the life of the Church. Richard McCormick spoke to us
about this matter several years ago. 150 Roderick MacKenzie dealt with
this issue at the Toronto Theological Congress of 1967. 151 Pope
Paul VI has stressed the role of theology in his well-publicized remarks
1 4 9
Most Reverend James S. Rausch, "Address at Honorary Dinner," The
Catholic University of America, March 5, 1974. I have received a copy of the
address, courtesy of the author. The italics and exclamation mark are his.
1
°Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "The Teaching of the Magisterium and The-
ologians," CTSA Proceedings 24 (1969), 239-54. See also John R. Quinn, "The
Magisterium and Theology," ibid., pp. 255-61.
1
Roderick A. MacKenzie, S.J., "The Function of Scholars in Forming the
Judgment of the Church," Theology of Renewal, vol. 2, pp. 118-32.
56 The Task of Theology 56

on the relation between theology and the bishops' magisterium.152

Theology, like the magisterium, originates in God's Word entrusted to
the Church. Theology, like the magisterium, presses towards the same
goal of expressing, defending, illuminating God's Word so that all may
see it as the message of salvation (Acts 13:26). Still, theology and the
bishops' magisterium enjoy different gifts because they are responsible
for different functions. As Latourelle reminds us, in relating these func-
tions, it is not a question of relating a charismatic understanding of
revelation, as proper to the magisterium, and a purely rational reflec-
tion, proper to theology. Rather, the relationship is one of two activi-
ties each animated by a different charism. 153 The task of the magis-
terium is to preach the deposit of faith in its integrity, to guard it from
error, to promote its intelligibility. At times the magisterium is called
upon to pass judgment on certain theological formulations. Theology
functions differently in the Church. No summary expression of its
many functions could possibly be satisfying. In general, however, it can
be said that theology must reflect upon God's Word in the context of
the present culture and bring to the knowledge of the Christian com-
munity, and in particular to the bishops' magisterium, the results of its
reflection so that through the doctrine taught by the bishops these
results may give light to all God's people. 154 The theological charism
does not dispense with the theologian's obedience to the dogmatic
principle. The bishops' charism hardly grounds the claim to exclusive
theological initiative. The theologian operates in obedience to his char-
ism as a responsible servant of God's Word. He may at times be avant-
garde. He should eschew the role of franc-tireur.15 5 The theology
professor knows well that his discipline is not a source of divine revela-
tion nor an addition to the Scriptures nor the authority that promul-
gates Church doctrines. 156 He strives to develop theological doctrines

152
The Papal address can be found in L'Osservatore Romano, October 2,
1966.
153
See Latourelle, Theology: Science of Salvation, p. 47.
154
Pope Paul to the International Theology Congress, Rome, September,
1966. This is cited by Latourelle, Theology: Science of Salvation, p. 47.
155
Ibid., p. 49. The distinction is from Hans Kiing as cited by Latourelle.
1
Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 331.
 58 The Task of Theology 57

in order to render intelligible today, for purposes of preaching and

celebration, the Church doctrines formulated yesterday. As he does so,
he works to develop the theological doctrines that will provide the
background and some part of the content of the Church doctrines that
will be promulgated tomorrow.
If there is no faith without theology, it follows that there is no
effective preaching of the faith without theology. This demands serious
theological dialogue between bishops and theology professors. The pres-
ent gulf that presently separates them must be bridged. On the other
hand, theology does not exist without faith. To assert the opposite is to
settle for a reduction that does not do justice to the Christian fact. To
do injustice to the Christian fact is to deny that theology is a salvific
activity personal to the theological practitioner. Thus, it seems to fol-
low, granting of course a high level of theological expertise, that he or
she is the better theologian to the extent that he or she works at the
faith and matures in the faith, formed by charity and strengthened by
the gifts of the indwelling Holy Spirit. The theologian must be credible
as a person, a Christian, a Catholic. The biologist can be a very fine
biologist without necessarily being a good person. The theologian en-
joys no such luxury. The theologian's God-talk is not unrelated to his
being in love with God. In our theological pluralism today, it is good to
recognize that there is a type of pluralism existing in our time that
results from the presence or absence of intellectual, moral and religious
conversion. "It is this type of pluralism that is perilous to unity in the
faith especially when a lack of conversion exists in those that govern
the Church or teach in the Church." 157 The emphasis at the moment is
on religious conversion. We return, then, to a question already asked in
the first section of this paper: what sort of person ought the theology
professor to be if he or she is to do the work at hand without doing
more harm than good, without projecting into the Catholic community
any inauthenticity one has imbibed from others or created on one's
own? 15 8 The suggestion is simply this: falling in love with God hardly
seems irrelevant to the successful doing of the task of theology.
It has been noted that theology today is locked in an encounter

1 5 7
Lonergan, Doctrinal Pluralism, p. 65.
158
See footnote 18.
58 The Task of Theology 58

with its age. Will it grow and triumph as it did in the thirteenth century
when it followed its age by assimilating Aristotle? Or will it wither to
insignificance as it did in the seventeenth century when it resisted its
age? 1S9 This depends on the clarity and the accuracy of theology's
grasp of the external cultural factors that undermine its past achieve-
ments and challenge it to new endeavors. 160 In other words, it depends
on how well the theology professor talks about faith and theology, how
well he makes reference to his own scientific foundations. Such is the
present task of theology.

JOHN J. CONNELLY
St. John Seminary
Brighton, Mass.

159
160 Lonergan, "Theology in its New Context," p. 37.
Ibid.