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OIL AND VIOLENCE: EXAMINING THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS AND ITS
IMPLICATION TO NIGERIA'S DEMOCRATIC STABILITY

Article · May 2018

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 International Journal of Advanced Academic Research | Social & Management Sciences | ISSN: 2488-9849
Vol. 4, Issue 5 (May 2018)

OIL AND VIOLENCE: EXAMINING THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS AND

ITS IMPLICATION TO NIGERIA’S DEMOCRATIC STABILITY

Iwediba, Innocent Odinaka

Department of Political Science,
Faculty of Social Sciences,
University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos State, Nigeria.
+2348069119178
iwedibai@[Link]

Abstract

At the start of oil exploration in the Niger Delta in 1956, the oil bearing communities had
anticipated some measure of industrialization and economic empowerment. Unfortunately,
this was not the case as oil exploration orchestrated systemic contradictions in the region
evidenced in marginalization, social exclusion and environmental degradation. The situation
was further complicated by the unholy alliance between the Nigerian state and the oil
multinationals which consequently engendered militancy in the region, thus constituting a
grave threat to Nigeria’s democratic stability. As a panacea to the crisis, this paper calls for
reforms in the country’s land use act, restructuring of the Nigerian federation, stringent
measures against the oil firms and continued dialogue between the warring parties amongst
others. The qualitative research method of secondary data collection was adopted while the
frustration-aggression theory was utilized as a framework of analysis.

Keywords: Resource curse, crisis, oil exploration, militia groups, democracy

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Introduction

Conflict is as old as human history and an inevitable outcome of human diversity and social
interactions. It is a feature of everyday life and subsists in multiple forms and dimensions
across the globe (Ajodo, 2011). Nigeria not being an exemption to this, has witnessed many
political crisis and upheavals from independence such as the; Census Crisis of 1962, Action
Group Crisis of 1962/63, Federal Election Crisis of 1964, Coups and Counter Coups, the
Civil War of 1967-1970, the Kafanchan riots of the 1970s, the Oodua People Congress (OPC)
militancy, the Maitatsine Jihad of the early 1980’s, Jos Crisis of the 2000’s, Boko Haram
insurgency of the 2010’s, farmer/herdsmen clash in recent times and of course the oil
violence in the Niger Delta which is the focal point of this research.

The Niger Delta crisis predates the amalgamation of Nigerian state. As a matter of fact, it
dates back to the early 19th century when a complex interplay of factors produced volatile
responses owing to the pressures for the control and distribution of resources along with a
feeling of injustice and inequity (Adebanjoko and Asu, 2013). At this period, struggles were
exerted against British domination of oil palm trade as some of the resistances against foreign
domination were carried out by kings such as Jaja of Opobo and King William Koko of
Nembe. Later resistance against domination and social injustice followed the path of a
secessionist move by Isaac Adaka Boro which culminated in the declaration of Niger Delta
Republic in 1966 (Odisu, 2017). Rather than look into the grievances of the minority groups
in the Niger delta, it was suppressed by the military regime.

Three decades after Boro’s attempt to liberate the minority groups in the Niger delta, Ken
Saro Wiwa and his Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) continued with the
struggle and became the voice of the voiceless in the Niger delta, unfortunately, the Nigerian
state was all out ready to repress the civil society in exchange for exclusive control of oil
resource (Obi, 1999). The aftermath of this struggle was the hanging of Saro Wiwa and his
associates by the federal military government in 1998. Contrary to the assumption that the
crisis in the oil producing region would be abated as a result of a fierce clamp down on
MOSOP, new waves of civil disturbances and insurrection erupted in the Niger delta shortly
after the country’s transition to civil rule in 1999 thus producing series of contradictions in
the face of an unceasing proliferation of militant groups in the region (Amusan, 2009),
consequently posing a grave danger to the country’s democratic stability, given that the
country’s democracy is still nascent and on the path of consolidation.

1. Conceptual Clarification
It is highly pertinent at this point to undertake a clarification of the major concepts which are
critical to our understanding of the discourse.

Resource Control
This connotes the rights of a community to generate and utilize income through the taxation
of human and non-human elements within its jurisdiction with little or no interference from a
central authority.

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Conflict
This signifies the contestation over issues of values in which each opponent’s aim is to
neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals.

Violence
This is the spontaneous outburst of chaos resulting from an aggressive expression of opinion
leading to physical and psychological damages.

Democracy
The procedure through which governmental processes and decision making in a State are
largely conducted through a majoritarian principle while at the same time acknowledging
minority rights.

Resource Curse
This signifies the inability of some developing economies, particularly those endued with
natural resources to mobilize and deploy these resources for effective social transformation.

Democratic Stability
The institutionalization of civil norms and practices such that political institutions acquire
enduring values and are endued with the capacity to mediate among the competing social
formations constituting the state.

2. Statement of the Problem

The commencement of oil exploration in commercial quantities at Oloibiri, present day Niger
Delta in 1956 was greeted with great excitement and tall hopes for rapid development and
accelerated industrialization (Oluduro and Oluduro, 2012). Unfortunately, no one anticipated
the pains associated with oil explorations such as; oil spillage, environmental degradation,
pollution and other ecological effects that come with it. Today, Oil spillage and gas flaring
have devastated the Niger Delta and has resulted in impoverishment, conflict, human rights
abuses and despair to the majority of the people rather than development (Onwubiko, et al.
2013). Truly, the crisis in Nigeria’s Niger delta has a long history. In its historical trajectory
and unfolding dynamics, it has become one of the most critical threats to national security in
contemporary Nigeria (Chukwuma, 2013). From a somewhat negligible internal security
concern, it metamorphosed to a national emergency with far-reaching international
implications (Chukwuma, 2013). In its sociological development, it became deeply rooted
while at the same time engulfing several actors namely; the state, multinational oil
Corporations, civil society organizations and local petit bourgeoisie (Ejumudo, 2013) thus
constituting existential and environmental threats (Esikot and Akpan, 2013).

Oil exploration and exploitation changed the dynamics of state relations in Nigeria, since for
the most part; the state in collusion with oil multinationals assumed a repressive disposition
in an attempt to stifle and contain dissenting voices within her territorial domain with the
attendant result being that one of the biggest security challenges in contemporary Nigerian

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State is the activities of ethnic militias in the Niger Delta with a concomitant effect on
enduring peace, economic development and democratic stability in the country. Land
alienation, unfulfilled promises for compensation, political marginalization, socio-economic
inequalities, dishonest leadership, communication gap, inadequate research input and cultural
disorientation continue to be a feature of oil politics in the Niger Delta (Ibaba, 2005:24).
These disturbing indices have been exacerbated by the country’s lackluster attitude and
payment of lip-service to national unity occasioned by deliberate plastering of wounds
through cosmetologized approach to national issues which, on its own has engendered
dangerous deformities in Nigerian polity (Ojakorotu and Olawale, 2009). In view of the over
centralization of the state as a result of oil politics, one begins to reflect on what could have
happened to the resources, particularly the groundnut pyramids, cotton, plywood, rubber,
timber, cocoa and oil palm which used to be the mainstay of the nation’s economy and which
the governments of the defunct regions depended on to fund their respective economic and
infrastructural development programs before the commencement of Oil exploration. It is on
this basis, that this paper attempts to examine the Niger Delta crisis and its implication to
Nigeria’s democratic stability, this is all the more germane at this point because fifty eight
years after decolonization the country is yet to experience socio-political and economic
tranquility.

3. Conceptualizing the Niger Delta

Located in the South-South region of Nigeria, the Niger Delta covers an area of about 70, 000
km2, thus constituting 7.5% of Nigeria’s land mass (Omotosho, 2010). Niger Delta is an
agglomeration of people with different cultures, languages and histories, united by their
historical status in Nigeria and share a common identity as southern minorities (Ojakorotu
and Olawale, 2009). It is composed of nine states namely; Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross
River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. The Niger Delta is one of the World’s ten most
important wetland and coastal marine ecosystems and home to some 31 million people who
live in about 13,400 aboriginal communities, mainly farmers and coastal fishermen, and
belong to over 40 ethnic groups. It is also the location of massive oil deposits, which have
been extracted for decades by the government of Nigeria and by Multinational Oil
Companies (MNOCs) all of which culminate in making the region more attractive, lucrative
and relevant to the country’s survival and by extension global economy (Adebanjoko and
Asu, 2013).

The region houses the country’s oil and gas industry and accounts for 80 percent of
government revenue, 95 percent of export receipts, and 90 percent of foreign exchange
earnings (Babatunde, Norafidah and Tapiwa, 2016). Oil related activities in the region have
generated over $600 billion to the country (Etekpe, 2013). Further research reveals that that
the region has 6,000 oil wells, 606 oil fields, 355 onshore gas facilities, 10 gas plants, 275
flow stations, 15 export terminals, 7000 kilometers of pipelines and two modern refineries
(Ajayi, 2013:35). It has an estimated 40 billion barrels of oil reserves in addition to its huge
wealth of forest and water resources (Sampson and Odia, 2009) in addition to a natural gas
reserve of 160 trillion cubic feet (Omotola, 2009).

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4. Literature Review/ Overview of the Niger Delta Conflict

Given the unfolding and dynamic nature of the Niger Delta conflict, many analyses and
prognostications have been offered by scholars of varying shades of political opinions. Each
analyst seems to have his own conceptualization of the problem while attempting to proffer
solutions (Ojakorotu and Asu, 2009), with Nigeria being at the receiving end of this eclectic
and infinite knowledge pursuit engendered and precipitated by fossil politics. The conflict in
the Niger Delta is triggered by a number of factors including but not limited to; cracks in the
revenue allocation formula, resource control, fiscal federalism, environmental degradation,
state predation, unfulfilled political promises to mention a few. In this section, a synthesis of
the existing literature regarding the conflict shall be undertaken.

Omotosho (2010) situated the crisis within the context of the structural asymmetry and
lopsidedness inherent in Nigeria’s federalism, the effect of which has been gross
discontentment, conflict and agitation by the two other tiers against the federal government
for self reliance. For federations to endure, a level of agreement guaranteeing fiscal
decentralization and some measure of financial autonomy has to be reached between the
central government and component units. Unfortunately, in the Nigerian state this has been
on a reverse gear as the country has witnessed fiscal centralization owing to long years of
militarism. Federal-State finance becomes extremely important and controversial because it
allocates administrative responsibility, assigns fiscal powers, dictates political balance and
defines scope of administration (Watts, 1970). Furthermore, the fiscal centralization of the
Nigerian federal state has alienated the oil producing minorities in the Niger Delta from the
oil wealth emanating from the region. This has in recent times been consolidated by slow
pace of systemic reforms due to over dependence on oil revenue (Usoro, Ekpenyong and
Effiong, 2014). This over-dependence on the oil revenues emanating from the Niger-Delta
have focused demands on the system and inevitably birthed and sharpened contradictions
among different communal groupings in the country. As a result, the politics of oil inevitably
locks into the politics of communalism (Olusola, 2013; Ibeanu 2005).

The politics of resource control further animated the conflict, it is on this basis that Shebbs
and Njoku (2016) opined that resource control, issues of politics and legality lie at the heart
of the conflict. Legality and use of laws for resource control was introduced by the colonial
regime-the colonial state, which, through the 1914 ‘Colonial Minerals Ordinance’ granted the
monopoly of oil concessions in Nigeria to British or British-allied capital (IDEA, 2010:144).
Consequently, the colonial era witnessed the gradual proliferation of resource control protests
and agitation. In a bid to stem the tide several committees were set up whose terms of
reference were never geared towards providing a lasting solution to the crisis. These
structural defects were later consolidated by the post colonial Nigerian state through the
enactment of draconian laws such as the Land Use Act of 1978, and the Petroleum Act of
1969 which transferred full ownership and control of both the land, sea and its constituents to
the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) (Ngerebo, 2013:4). With the implication being that
the FGN appropriates a large share of revenues from economic activities like oil exploration
and exploitation (Obi, 1999; Ibaba, 2005). Again, policy measures such as ‘Derivation Fund’

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and ‘Revenue Sharing Formula’ have been constantly manipulated to the disadvantage of the
Niger Deltans. Even development programs such as the Oil Mineral Producing Area
Development Commission (OMPADEC), Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)
and the Niger Delta Ministry were or are either stifled of funds or are tailor-guided to award
over-inflated contracts to non-indigenes of the region. Sometimes these contracts are not
effectively executed, further throwing the people into endless hopelessness (Ngerebo, 2013).

Adebanjoko and Asu (2013) pegged the crisis around the concerns of gross exploitation,
environmental degradation and pollution which in turn have resulted in poverty,
unemployment, health hazards, conflicts and death in some cases, since for the most part,
70% of the Niger Deltans live below the poverty line. Some other scholars, (Odisu, 2017)
have faulted the federal government and the multinational oil firms for the underdevelopment
of the region given that the Nigerian state is weak in relation to the oil multinationals, and
consequently lacks the capacity to call the oil firms, who are the neo-colonial agents in Africa
to order and do the needful in areas of environmental remediation and corporate social
responsibility. Again, the politics of marginalization and social exclusion been perpetrated by
the Nigerian state has been a source of worry. The feelings of alienation and political
exclusion have been another driver to the conflict (Dialoke and Edeja, 2017).

Explaining the restiveness, Dialoke and Edeja (2017) opined that state sponsored violence
and continued suppression of peaceful agitations have been at the core of the conflict, this is
aggravated by high levels of poverty in the region coupled with social issues which further
animate the conflict. High rate of unemployment among the youths has also helped to drive
and sustain the incidence of violence and criminality throughout the Niger Delta region,
(Alabi, 2010). The continuous suppression of peaceful agitations leaves the inhabitants with
no other alternative other than to militarize the struggle so as reduce their vulnerability to
attack. Thus, resulting in the proliferation of many militant groups within the region such as;
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV),
Movement of the Niger Delta People (MONDP), Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force
(NDVF), Niger Delta People Salvation Front, and Niger Delta Avengers whose sole mandate
is to cripple the country’s economic activities.

Arguing along this direction, Eke (2004) observed that the main causes of the Niger Delta
crises include greed, selfishness, deprivation, poverty and social injustice. Aside from the
poverty of the people, another issue worth mentioning here is that of corporate complicity,
that is, the role of oil multinationals in pitting one group against the other in the host
communities. This is sometimes evident in the execution of ‘development’ projects that have
caused more social divisions and problems in the Niger Delta (Okojie, 2009). Related to this
is the role of the Nigerian state, its politics and mode of surplus extraction which make it
possible for the oil corporations to conduct their businesses in a veiled manner (Okojie,
2009:3). The response of the Nigerian state to the crisis in the region has been to militarize
the region by stationing an ‘army of occupation’ with the main objective of keeping militancy
at bay while trying to maintain peace. This state predation whether expressed or implied

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comes in the form of repression of legitimate agitations as well as military invasion and
occupation of host communities in the pretext of civil unrest (Okumagba, 2012; Chukwuma,
2013).

In line with socio-economic practices in oil bearing communities especially in developed

climes, oil discovery always brought hope and great excitement that civilized and modern
infrastructure would be the attendant consequences of its exploration, this was not to be the
case in the Niger delta as initial hopes and excitements were dashed due to unrestrained and
unhealthy exploration by oil multinationals. On the whole, the politics of failed expectation
alongside poor human capital development gave credence to the Niger delta struggle; it was
thought that as oil companies commenced their operations and implement the ideas embodied
in their corporate social responsibility, more people would have the opportunity to be
gainfully employed. However, in the context of prolonged denials and frustrations, neither
the oil companies nor government ever came to terms with these pervasive social
expectations (Afinotan and Ojakorotu, 2009). Recent clamours by the elite in the region for
distributive justice have compounded several attempts at mediation and peaceful resolution.
For the people of the Niger Delta, the struggle for a just revenue allocation formula is a
manifestation of a collective sense of deprivation on the part of a people who see themselves
as the producers of the entire Federation’s wealth (Babalola, 2014:2).

From the foregoing thus, the crisis in the Niger delta can be seen to revolve around some
fundamental issues which include but not limited to; colonial legacy, distortions in the
country’s legal system, state predation and kleptocracy, marginalization and social exclusion,
unbridled exploration by oil multinationals and cracks in the country’s revenue allocation
formula all of which have bred systemic contradictions in the centre’s relations with its
constituent units.

5. Theoretical Framework

The crisis in the Niger Delta becomes more evident if examined from the lens of the
frustration-aggression theory. This theory was propounded by John Dollard and his research
associates in 1939. It has been expended and modified by scholars like Leonard Berkowitz
(1962) and Aubrey Yates (1962). The frustration-aggression theory appears to be the most
common explanation for violent behaviour in that it perceives violence as a fall out of human’s
inability to meet its most basic needs. Theorists who rely on this explanation employ
psychological theories of motivation and behavior as well as frustration and aggression
(Anifowose, 1982). In a bid to explain aggression, scholars point to the difference between
what people feel they want or deserve to what they actually get- the ‘want-get ratio’
(Feierabends, 1969), as well as the difference between ‘expected need satisfaction’ and ‘actual
need satisfaction’ (Davies, 1962), where expectation does not meet attainment, the tendency is
for people to confront those they hold responsible for frustrating their ambitions (Ademola,
2012). This was the central argument contained in Ted Gurr’s Relative Deprivation thesis that
‘the greater the discrepancy however marginal, between what is sought and what seem
attainable, the greater will be the chances that anger and violence will result’ (Gurr, 1970).
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On the whole, the thrust of the frustration – aggression theory is that aggression is not
undertaken as a natural reaction or instinct, rather it is an outcome of frustration, thus in
situations where an individual’s or group (s) legitimate demands are denied whether by design
or construct by the indirect consequence of the way a society is structured, the feeling of
disappointment may compel such a person or group to express their anger through violence that
will be directed at those considered responsible or indirectly linked to them (Ademola, 2012).
It further presents the idea of relative deprivation as a perceived disparity between value
expectation and value capabilities, or the lack of a need satisfaction defined as a gap between
aspiration and achievement (Midlarsky, 1975). Thus, when there is a gap between the level of
value expectation and the level of value attainment, due to lack of capacity to synchronize both
levels, tension builds up due to the pressure of an unfulfilled aspiration or an unsatisfied urge or
need. Failure to arrest this on time, leads to frustration. Frustration, when it accumulates, leads
to the rising up of suppressed emotions of anger, which is oftentimes directed against the party
considered to be the source of deprivation of satisfaction. This finally finds an outlet through
aggressive and violent disposition towards the environment.

Again, when socio-political, economic and cultural processes are monopolized by a group, it
creates the condition that force people to adopt adversarial approaches to conflict. Going
further, Scarborough reveals that in situations where existing structures are tilted in favour of
one ethnic group while putting the other(s) at a disadvantage, where cultures are seen as
exclusive; where holders of certain power or privileges are unwilling to acknowledge the right
of others to be different or where people find it difficult to identify with the political and
economic ideas of a political regime, the chances are that conflict will emerge and escalate if
nothing is done to rectify such anomalies (Scarborough, 1999). In this regard, we may argue
that the tendency to aggress is most visible when groups are subjected to unjustified frustration
or sustained frustration. Again, a history of humiliation, oppression, victimization and injustice
could become triggers which may eventually cause an ethnic group to resort to vengeance,
thus, making ethnicity pathological. It is however important to note that the potential for
collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among
members of a collectivity. If there is a fundamental discrepancy between what is sought for and
what was eventually attained, there is a likelihood of rebellion. On the whole, just as frustration
produces aggressive behaviour on the part of an individual, so does relative deprivation give
rise to collective violence by social groups (Maire, 2004).

One is not unmindful here of the shortcomings of the frustration aggression thesis, and this is
where political tolerance comes in. An aggressive response to frustration may be dependent
upon the individual’s level of tolerance, and frustration may not necessarily culminate in
aggression and even in cases where violent response is undertaken, it could be positive and
constructive. Nonetheless, it is an established fact that frustration sometimes produces a
temporary increase in motivation, and thus lead to more vigorous responses (Berkowitz, 1962),
and this is perceived to be of sufficient generality to serve as an anchor for the explanation of
virtually all forms of aggressive behavior including political violence. This is perhaps why men
who are disadvantaged and frustrated by society’s structural configuration have an innate

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tendency to engage in violence in proportion to the intensity of their frustration. This is of

course a most appropriate description of the situation in the Oil bearing and contiguous
communities of Nigeria’s Niger delta area.

From the foregoing thus, it is observable that the crisis in the Niger delta has psychological
drivers to it. For the most part, the Niger Deltans whether by accident or design have been
deliberately marginalized by the asymmetrical and lopsided configuration of the Nigerian
federation, thus the present conflict is a fall out of the sour relationship engendered by long of
marginalization and social exclusion. The politics of exclusion and the reduction of the political
space to the detriment of other minority ethnic groups in the Nigerian state further animated the
conflict by engendering the accumulation of frustration which now finds an outlet in the form
of expressed struggle, thus culminating in violence. The Niger Deltans had hoped for a better
political arrangement and an all-inclusive government in the face of oil discovery and
subsequent exploration, unfortunately what has been evident has been a perceived disparity
between value expectation and value capabilities by the ethnic groups in the Niger delta.
Feierabends (1969) calls this ‘the revolution of rising expectation’ and this aptly explains the
reason why the ‘frustrated’ have chosen to ‘rebel’ against a political arrangement perceived to
be tilted to their disadvantage.

6. Implications of the Conflict to Nigeria’s Democratic Stability

The crisis in Nigeria’s Niger Delta has metamorphosed from being localized to a monstrous
epidemic with severe global implications, thus, calling for urgent attention. Nigeria’s external
relations vis-a-vis developed democracies have been badly affected as the country is now
considered a threat to foreign direct investment (FDIs). It is seen as an unstable economy and
a sinkhole that could swallow FDIs in the twinkle of an eye because of past crises like ‘Isaac
Boro’s Rebellion’ and ‘Ogoni Eight Saga’ (Adebanjoko and Asu, 2013). The saying that
‘crude oil is the life blood of Nigeria’s economy’ is a truism given the country’s heavy
reliance on petro-dollar. Unfortunately in recent times, the country has witnessed a cut in
crude production as a result of the incessant attacks being perpetrated by ethnic militias in the
Niger delta whose mandate is to cripple the country’s economic activities. This has, by and
large affected the capacity of the Nigerian state to deliver the dividends of democracy to her
citizens. The consequence of this has been the gross alienation of the citizens from the state,
where for the most part the masses perceive state institutions as enemies to be cheated
whenever occasion permits. This, in the author’s opinion could stifle all attempts at
consolidating the country’s nascent democracy.

Again the ecological degradation and despoliation being experienced in the Niger delta has a
grave implication for human existence. Human life can only be sustained in an environment
with favourable climatic conditions. However, this has not been the case in the Niger delta.
The unbridled exploration and exploitation being perpetrated by oil multinationals in the
region have contributed to the existing global climatic issues such as; ozone layer depletion,
global warming and green house effect. Quite a few scientific findings have shown that
environmental degradation negatively impacts global security and prosperity (Adebanjoko

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and Asu, 2013:11). Little wonder America's foreign policy particularly in the last two
decades have revolved around environmental issues and its resultant effects in terms of social
dislocations, health challenges, terrorism and unrestrained migration all of which have the
potential to constrict its resources and make human life more miserable.

Furthermore, if the socio-economic and political underdevelopment continues unabated in the

Niger delta, the crisis may spiral and become difficult to resolve. The cost of oil exploration
and distribution could eventually sky rocket, with inflation being the corollary effect.
Already, kidnapping and political killings are now lucrative businesses in the region. This
new wave of crime further adds salt to injury and complexifies the situation. Studies (Banon
and Collier, 2003) have shown that poverty, hopelessness and cruelty lead people to violence
and terrorism. As a matter of fact, these are the sort of environmental factors that aid and
sustain the activities of international terrorist groups, and since these variables are apparent in
the region, disgruntled elements and dissenting voices could use it as launching pad for the
recruitment of terrorists. Continued crisis in the Niger delta poses an increasingly significant
threat to the peace and stability of the West African region. The country’s neighbours are at
risk should the conflict persist since they have economic and security interests at stake in the
country, particularly in ensuring a continuous flow and supply of crude products.

Conclusion and Recommendation

When oil exploration began in the Niger delta in 1956, the inhabitants of the region had
thought that oil exploration would accelerate rapid development in the region. Unfortunately,
time tested and proved their assumption wrong. Rather than facilitate development and
improve the well being of the host communities, it sank them into deplorable conditions
leaving them with; abject poverty, poor human capital development, human rights abuses,
and environmental degradation. The consequence of which has been the rise and proliferation
of ethnic militias in the region with a grave threat to Nigeria’s democratic stability. On the
whole, the crisis in the Niger delta owes its origin to; the lopsided nature of the Nigerian
federation, the politics of exclusion and alienation being perpetrated by the Nigerian state, the
predatory character of the Nigerian state, the unrestrained exploration of crude deposit by oil
multinationals without any recourse to adequate corporate social responsibility, fractures in
the country’s revenue allocation formula etc. To stem the tide, the following measures are
highly expedient and must be urgently undertaken if the country’s democracy is to be fully
consolidated.

Firstly, the country’s land use act has to be reformed. The decree as enshrined in the 1979
constitution ceded all lands to the government. The implication of this is that the government
has been appropriating lands in the Niger Delta for mineral purposes without genuine
intentions to remediate the environmental degradation that follows. Unfortunately, the Niger
Deltans have been at the receiving end. The suggestion here, is that a comprehensive
agreement should always be reached by the government, oil multinationals and stakeholders
before the commencement of any exploratory activity, this agreement will help; define the
modus operandi of such operations, impose limits on the multinationals and guarantee some

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adequate compensation to the host communities. Secondly, a constitutional conference should

be called for where ethnic groups and major stakeholders would ventilate their angst against
the state. Issue such as resource control, fiscal federalism and reparations would have to be
looked into since they have generated a lot of grievances which have over heated the polity,
whatever outcomes and decisions reached at this conference must be binding on all parties.

In addition, effective restructuring of the Nigerian federation should be carried out. The
situation where political power is seen as the exclusive preserve of some ethnic groups to the
detriment of other constituent units does not augur well. Federalism demands that some
measure of autonomy and self rule be granted to the component units; this has not been the
case in the Nigerian federation, the consequence of this has been a ‘disunited unity’ or unity
by ‘gun powder’ as some have chosen to call it, this, on its own constitutes an obstacle to
effective democratization.

Furthermore, fierce measures must be taken against the oil companies operating in the region.
The situation where they are allowed to operate unfettered must be looked into, since for the
most part they operate without due considerations to the sustenance of human lives and the
preservation of the ecosystem for subsequent generations. Laws should be enacted that will
ensure that these oil firms undertake remediation in the case of oil spillage while paying
adequate compensation to host communities in line with international best practices. Lastly,
dialogue should continue unabated. No nation achieves economic development on violence,
an appeal must continue to be made to the aggrieved parties on the need to sheath their
swords and embrace peace which is the only panacea to ensuring peace and democratic
stability in the Nigerian federation.

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