Intra-Communal Conflict and the Politics of Oil

Compensation Sharing among Indigenes of Ilaje

Community, Ondo State, Nigeria
Rasidi Akanji Okunola¹*
Emmanuel Oluniyi Ademola²

Department of Sociology¹
Faculty of the Social Sciences
University of Ibadan
Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies²
Peace and Conflict Programme
University of Ibadan, Ibadan

Corresponding Author: [email protected]

Vol. 13 Issue 1 2015

Abstract
Payment and distribution of oil compensation as a benefit for oil exploration impact
has often resulted in communal conflicts between and within oil producing
communities of Ilaje coastal area of Ondo State, Nigeria. This study examined local
politics and conflict inherent in oil compensation agitation and distribution in relevant
communities. It synthesized Joseph prebendalism theory and Mills’ elite theory as its
theoretical base with specific emphasis on the local politics on agitation, negotiation
and distribution of oil compensation. Thirteen communities were purposively selected
from the coastal communities. Qualitative data collection methods were mainly
employed for this research. These included In-depth interviews with traditional
leaders, Focus Group Discussions among community youth leaders and Key Informant
Interviews were done amongst community representatives. Data collection was
complemented with a community survey to capture the views of community members.
Increase in conflict and agitation for oil compensation in oil producing communities
arose from differentials in oil compensation categories in the study area which
deepened oil politics and conflicts arising from the prebendal roles of the elites and
traditional rulers. The work suggested more proactive measures for restructuring oil
compensation payment and distribution.

Keywords: Intra-communal conflict, oil compensation, politics and producing

communities

Introduction
Agitation for oil compensation and its distribution have always been a knotty
issue causing conflict and frictions amongst and between people in oil
producing communities in Nigeria. Such conflict and agitations often arose
from groups who felt they have been denied of what should have been given to
them as shares of the benefits from oil exploration and its impacts on their
 Intra-Communal Conflict and the Politics of Oil Compensation Sharing 113

environment. Thus, compensation payments, share and distribution have been

identified as main cause of intra and inter communal conflicts (Alao, 2007).
While oil compensations are sometimes processed, delayed and finally
paid; the sharing formula often generates conflict and fierce politics between
and within communities especially, the identified oil producing communities.
However, while most of the money has been spent as “compensatory funds” in
some communities, it has been largely misspent and at times appropriated by
the acclaimed community representatives who formed group of agitators and
negotiators for oil compensation in coastal communities of Ilaje, Ondo State,
Nigeria (Ololajulo 2006).
Oil among other natural resources has given rise to vertical conflicts
among different communities/kingdoms and groups across geographical
boundaries in the Niger Delta region, Nigeria. Horsfall (1999) opines that crisis
that arose from oil production were not limited to revenue sharing. According
to him, exploration had left in its trail a complex mix of problems that included
environmental pollution, reduction in value of aquatic resources among others.
For example, inter and intra community conflicts between groups, within
kingdoms or communities are common with oil companies and government
over compensation (NDDC, 2001).
While the oil companies have held the belief persistently that what they
pay as compensation is adequate, the communities on the other hand have
maintained that compensation is anything but adequate. The politics of oil
exploration called “oil dichotomy,” for example, in the studied local
communities and among subgroups in the oil producing communities of Ilaje,
Ondo state has brought in dysfunctional changes that ramify “oil producing
communities, non- producing communities, core producing communities, semi
core, major communities, affected or impacted communities”- these splinter
groups as well as community with identities are the politics that defined the
dynamics of oil compensation payment, negotiation and distribution.
Albert (2003) opined that oil compensation conflicts either between
Arogbo-Ijaw vis-a-vis Mahin/Ugbo Ilaje and other groups is as a result of
benefits that come from exploration activities and not exploration itself. Oil
production started in Nigeria in 1958 and since then up to date, petroleum
industry has remained the biggest source of environmental pollution in Nigeria
industrial sector. In all stages- exploration, production, processing,
transportation and utilization, the activities of oil industry pollute the
environment. Exploration of oil in Nigeria interfaces and further disrupts both
natural and social life. The disruption causes conflict which needed to be
addressed; and one of the ways to address it is through the payment of
compensation to the host communities.
However, disputes over oil compensation agitation and distribution are
arising from gross disparities in wealth among different communities and
between groups in the coastal area of Ilaje, Ondo State, Nigeria. Thus as
regards “oil politics,” between Mahin Ilaje and Ugbo Ilaje communities and in
recent times within Ugbo Ilaje communities hitherto identified as “oil
114 The Nigerian Journal of Sociology and Anthropology Vol. 13 no. 2

producing communities”; the situation which has resulted in struggle for

reform of economic system to ensure equitable distribution of oil compensation
between and within communities.
Exploration of oil has been reported to be predominantly carried out in
Ugbo Ilaje kingdom, the eastern coastline of Ilaje local government, and
mostly in Ugbo ward four (4), five (5) and six (6); all in the Ugbo
communities. All of these automatically gave Ugbo identity of oil producing
community and Mahin Kingdom, western coastline, non oil producing
community (Ololajulo, 2006). However, since consequences of oil exploration
activities are extensive, payment and shares of compensation, compensatory
schemes, funds and projects have often caused total warfare as groups and
communities have always been at loggerhead over “who gets what, when and
how?”
However, while most studies on resource conflicts in the Niger Delta
region, Nigeria, have continued to look at issues such as: impacts of oil
exploration by the Multinational oil Companies (MNOCs) on the economic
activities of people and their environment as the major causes of conflict, little
attention has been paid to internal politics and the crisis that surround oil
compensation paid by MNOCs, the agitation and the distribution process
among the key players in the oil producing communities. This paper examines
local politics inherent in oil compensation agitation, negotiation, payment and
distribution among oil producing communities of Ilaje, Ondo State with a view
to promoting equity and sustainable development, peace and tranquillity
among the inhabitants of oil producing communities.
 Intra-Communal Conflict and the Politics of Oil Compensation Sharing 115

4 30"E 5 00" 5 3 0" 6 0 0"E

KOGI
A koko N orth
W est
EKIT I STATE A koko
A k oko East N orth

STATE
7 3 0"N A koko
Sou th
A ko ko
East
So uth
Ifedore Iju/
Itao gbolu W est

O SUN Ile O luji/ A kure A kure

O k e-Igbo Sou th N orth
STATE O wo O se
O ndo
East
7 0 0"
Ondo W est Idanre

O G UN
STATE
O digbo
E

N
AT
ST

6 3 0" O kitipupa Irele

O
ED

K ey
S tate Boundary

Ese-Odo L ocal Gov t Boundary

Ilaje
S tudy A rea

0 20 40K m
B IG HT O F BE NIN
6 0 0"N
DELTA STATE

Figure 1.1: Map of Ondo State showing Ilaje, Ilaje LG Area

Source: Ministry of Land and Housing, Ondo State (2013)

Theoretical Framework
After much search to examine theories suitable for this discourse, two theories;
Prebendalism and Elite theories are found relevant and are discussed in this
section. According to Wehmeier et al. (2005), a theory is seen as a formal set
of ideas that is intended to explain why something happens or exits. The
purpose of theory therefore, is to explain things that have occurred with a view
to dealing with problems which arose or may arise (Percy, 1968). To this end, a
number of factors have been given by scholars in their explanation of local
politics, communal conflicts and resource misappropriation by the local elites.

Prebendalism Theory
Joseph Richard (1987) is usually credited with the theory of Prebendalism. He
first used the term prebendalism to describe patron-client or neo-
patrimonialism in Nigeria. He analyses right or entitlement that people feel
they have to the revenues of the state. The elected officials, government
workers, and members of the ethnic and religious groups to which they belong
always feel they have right to a share of government revenues. According to
the theory of Prebendalism, state offices are regarded as prebends, manipulated
and appropriated by office holders, who use them to generate material benefits
for themselves and their constituents and kin groups (Joseph, 1996).
116 The Nigerian Journal of Sociology and Anthropology Vol. 13 no. 2

Prebendalism is primarily a function of the competition for, and

appropriation of the office of the state. In other words, prebendalism points
towards the material resources needed to cultivate or maintain such
relationship and the consequences of such pressures on the nature of the state.
Joseph argued further that prebendalism is not only a system in which the
offices of the state are allocated and then exploited as benefits by the office
holders, “but also one where such a practice is legitimated by a set of political
norms according to which the appropriation of such offices is not just an act of
individual greed or ambition, but concurrently the satisfaction of the short term
objectives of a subject of the general population (Corruption Perception Index,
2006). (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5387814.stm).

Elite Theory
Elite theory on the other hand, is concerned with the nature and distribution of
power. It was originally developed by Pareto and Mosca (1916). Both Mosca
and Pareto saw the rule by elite group as inevitable (even in supposedly
*democratic societies) and as such, considered this state of affairs to be
desirable effectively “right and proper,” that elite groups should dominate the
political decision-making process. While Pareto saw political power in terms of
a “continuous of elite groups” who rule because of their members’ superior
intelligence, education, cunning and so forth (that is, their superior personal
qualities). Mosca argued that elite groups ruled politically because of their
superior organisational ability. In this latter respect, elites come to power
because of their superior internal organisation; they take power in the face of
the disorganisation of other elites, the general masses of the population and so
forth. Both writers saw the general (politically disorganised) masses or the
population as being controlled through manipulation and propaganda to serve
A interest of the powerful elite.
the

OIL COMPANIES

Modern elites

Prebendal EntireCommunity
activities Members

Traditional
elites/traditional rulers

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

 Intra-Communal Conflict and the Politics of Oil Compensation Sharing 117

NB: The ideas

1. Prebendalism theory
2. Elites Theory of power relations
3. There should be an interaction /or common ground between the two sets
of theory
4. The interaction will be the collaboration point between the modern
political elites and the traditional leaders.
5. The persons outside the two circles are the commoners/masses who are
suffering the double tragedy of the multi-level exploitations

Methodology
Study Area
The study was conducted in oil producing communities of Ilaje, Ondo state,
Nigeria with special focus on coastal locations of Ilaje Local Government Area
of the state. Ilaje Local Government is bounded by the Ijebus to the West, the
Ikale to the North, and the Itsekiri to the East, the Apoi and Arogbo Ijaw to the
North East, while Atlantic Ocean formed the Southern boundary. It is situated
at 133km south of Akure, the state capital. The area lies between Longitude
4028 and 501 East of the Greenwich Meridian and latitude 5051 and 6021
north of the equator. It boast s of both onshore and offshore fields, habouring
over fifty oil wells from West to East as: Omuro oil field, Ojumole Oilfield,
Opuekaba oil field and Meren oilfield. It co-inhabits by the Mahin Ilaje, Ugbo
Ilaje, Aheri and Etikan, sub-groups of Yoruba entity with dynamic and
enterprising skill in fishing and mat making.
The study was exploratory and adopted cross sectional survey research
design. Combination of both qualitative and quantitative data collection
methods were used in order to obtain indepth knowledge on oil compensation,
its agitation processes, payment, politics and conflicts that inherent in
compensation agitation and distribution. The quantitative data for this study
was based on survey approach with structured questionnaire. Using
Lemeshow’s model of 95% confidence interval sample size, a threshold of 380
respondents were randomly selected across the thirteen selected communities.
For the purpose of survey, the selected thirteen communities were purposively
selected based on their geographical location and their experiences on oil
exploration and extraction activities. Also considered were their classified
spatial differences on core, semi-core, and impacted communities.
The data obtained through the qualitative technique was presented and
analyzed using content analysis, and the Open Code software package for
qualitative data analysis. The closed-ended items were pre-coded in the
questionnaire while the open-ended items were coded after retrieval. Analysis
of quantitative data was done with Statistical Package for Social Science
(SPSS) in simple percentage distribution.
118 The Nigerian Journal of Sociology and Anthropology Vol. 13 no. 2

Findings and Discussion

(a) Communities understanding of oil compensation agitation,
negotiation and payment
The common contention was the effects of destruction done to the
environment, and oil companies are expected to pay compensation.
Compensation at uniform rate is paid by oil companies for spillages, where
they are not attributed to sabotage. Conflict on oil compensation as reaction
however, always erupts as justification by communities, and groups who felt
they have been denied of what should have been given. On the understanding
of oil compensation made payable to oil producing communities, majority of
respondents from study communities (96.7%) responded positively to their
awareness and understanding of oil compensation paid to oil communities in
the state. On the channels of oil compensation payment to the community,
more than half of respondents (55.8%) opined that oil compensation was often
through agitation with oil companies, agitation with government (6.7%),
argued it through pipeline vandalization (7.3%), through sabotage (7.1%),
through rallies and demonstration (5.2%) and through political affiliation
(4.2%). While these responses generally demonstrated the politics of
compensation, which on what compensation stood for was affected by geo-
location. Majority of the respondents from the core communities (80.4%) said
that compensation involved benefit, 80% from affected communities submitted
that compensation is an entitlement to the affected communities, sixty-six per
cent from semi-core said ‘it is money for the damage to the environment
caused by the oil processing companies’, and 47.7% assumed that oil
compensation is the money paid for the loss of their land through oil
degradation. Findings from FGDs revealed that oil compensation translates to
benefits as well as entitlements expected to be paid to all affected communities
in the process of oil exploration activities. This compensation is expected by all
communities which the oil companies’ activities have affected through oil
pollution or spillage regardless of its location according to the key informants
from the study communities. These positions affirmed the consequence of oil
exploration activities in the oil communities in Nigeria as argued by Aworawo
(2004), that devastation wrecked on the environment of oil producing
communities has remained the major grievance of the people whose livelihood
is threatened by oil exploration. In similar vein Human Right Watch (1999)
identified the impact of oil spillage on the ecosystem of rural economy such as;
damage to soil, crops and the mangrove forest in the host communities as the
heat and brightness associated with gas flaring are known to confuse the
breeding regime of fish which is not only the source of livelihood of host
communities but their food. According to a respondent from Abereke, he
explained that:
Oil exploration has done much damage on our water; that we can
now see why the coast is becoming difficult to stay. Before this
time, our fathers do not need to go far on the sea to get fish, even
when we are very young we harvest fish as a training at bay of
 Intra-Communal Conflict and the Politics of Oil Compensation Sharing 119

water and get enough crabs and fish for household consumption
on daily bases, but today the crab is no more there even the fish
has move far to the high sea; this is the effect of pollution on our
water. (KII/Abereke community/February 2, 2013)

Operationally however, majority (71.2%) of the respondents stated that

they have never been involved in agitation for compensation, but that such
agitations were done through community representatives, while 28.8% agreed
to have participated in the agitation process of the oil politics. Such agitations,
the FGD showed, came through four different umbrella bodies of oil associates
from different oil blocs of the communities in the study area. They are
Association of Ilaje Chevron Concessional Communities (AICECUM),
Association of Ilaje Coastal Communities (ASCOPIC), Ilaje Regional
Development Committee (IRDC) and Obe-Confederation. These umbrella
bodies were formed in recognition of both the oil communities and the oil
companies operating in the state and the most popular and active ones as at the
time of this study were AICECUM and IRDC, both of which were established
and managed by Chevron Nigeria Limited, the major oil producing company in
the study area.
According to an informant at Igbokoda:
These bodies negotiate on behalf of their communities as
“community representatives”. The process begins when
individual community were informed to put forward the three
names of their representatives through the authority of the
community leaders in agreement with their traditional leaders’
which would be later ratified by the first class Oba of the
Kingdom/Communities. The Olugbo of Ugbo land is known as a
paramount traditional leader of all Ugbo Kingdom who will
finally forward the name to the State Governor at Akure. Among
the communities’ representatives, the palace representative is
said to be included. (KII/at Igbokoda; February 6, 2013)

Observation showed that, if you are not selected or nominated into these
bodies you may not have much to say about the issues on oil compensation
negotiation, sharing and distribution and it is at this level of nomination of
community representatives or their election that power play and local politics
came in. So the dominant response of 97.4% by the respondents on community
representatives’ selection or nomination could not have been found to be a
mistake, but as the major process through which oil compensation agitation
and negotiation is being addressed in the recent times within and between the
communities. According to a respondent from Igo community in an FGDs
session he said:
It is in the process of ratification of names of representatives that
power play comes in. At this stage, names are buggled in and
buggled out and only those that said to be loyal to the traditional
120 The Nigerian Journal of Sociology and Anthropology Vol. 13 no. 2

authority made the list of community representatives because

one cannot predict what happens within the palace or at Akure
over the ratification of lists of community representatives. (Igo
Community/FGDs/March 5, 2013)

The nomination and ratification of community representatives can be

related to Ololajulo’s findings (2006) that, process of electing or nominating a
community representative into council that made negotiation on behalf of oil
producing communities could rival any national election. Thus, most times
representatives who are not loyal to the king are removed, while those whose
tenure has expired in most times are retained as long as they remained loyal to
the King. This is related to Joseph’s “patron-clients” assertion in his
prebendalist theory that:
Individual ruler by dint of personal prestige and power treated
ordinary folk as extensions of the big man’s household, with no
rights or priviledges other than those bestowed by the ruler.
Authority is entirely personalized, shaped by the ruler’s
preferences rather than any codified system of laws. The rulers
ensures the political stability of the regime and personal political
survival by providing a zone of security in an uncertain
environment and by selectively distributing favours and
materials benefit to loyal followers who are not citizens of polity
so much as ruler clients. (Joseph, 1996)

ASCOPIC, AICECUM and IRDC according to the findings, are oil bodies
established by Chevron Nigeria Ltd, the major oil producing company in the
state, while Obe Confederation is jointly formed by Conoil and Cavendish Oil
with some communities as their host communities. AICECUM as an acronym
is made up of what is described as member of “Ilaje Coastal communities”
with different spatial identities to be identified as groups or blocs of
communities coming up as a nomacleasure as actual communities, indigenous,
concessional, eight united, core communities, ultimate and major communities
(Adunni, 2013). It was reported that AICECUM came as a replacement to the
failure of ASCOPIC earlier formed by the conglomerate of oil companies in
the study area which included oil companies as Chevron, Conoil and
Cavendish.
ASCOPIC as an acronym means “Association of Ilaje Central Oil
Producing Communities”. It handles issues on compensation especially on
offshore from Abetobo among other communities as Abetobo Zion, Idogun,
Ehinmore Zion, Ehinmore Idogun, Ayadi, Idogun Nla, Lepe, Ogboti,
Womiteren Ojabineni, Yaye, Olotu Niye, Olotu Zion, Olotu Yara, Olotu
Kuwo, Okunipin, Eruwa Ero, Eruwa Isale, Idiogba, Aiyetoro, Idiogba Oke,
Zion Alugba, Ugbo Oke, Alagbon, Alagbon Oke, Modibo, Omosehin, Oroto,
Asumaga, Bijimi, Ilowo Otumara, Otumara Okun, Ago Olori Alufa, Orioke
Harama, Ilowo Ogunsemore, Ilowo Aiyetoro, Ilowo Saheyi, Ilowo Ogunfemi,
 Intra-Communal Conflict and the Politics of Oil Compensation Sharing 121

Ilowo Zion, Ilowo Nla, Ilowo Akingboye, Ilowo Atomore, Ilepete, Ofedegbe,
and Ilepete Bamigbose.
The community representatives formed as agitators or team according to
the FGDs are said to be devious, charlatan and therefore, represent the system
that is a corrupt one, where the crooks take the best at the detriment of
communities. According to a respondent:
While the communities are living in anguish poverty, these
representatives cruse heavy Jeeps all around communities
whenever they come home at month end, and in festive period.
The idiots and charlatans are deriving joy in galvanizing on the
lives of others by promoting personal aggrandizement which has
led to their ill-gotten wealth. They are loyal to the cause of their
wealth and disloyal to their communities. (IDI/Obe-Rewoye
Community/September, 12, 2013)

Such committee nominees have equally remained loyal to the power that
created them, the- Paramount traditional leader of Ugbo Kingdom; and
therefore, Olugbo often use his authoritative power to favour them. The system
therefore was seen to be bad since the benefit of oil has not trickled-down to
the generality of the community members, especially at the grassroots.
Furthermore, it was revealed that these bodies and community representatives
signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), most times, on behalf of their
communities with oil companies, and the arrangement on MoU is in tripartite
form where Oil Company comes as party A, Ondo State Government as party
B; with individuals’ community acts as party C. The MoU as established in
AICECUM yearly stated inter-alia:
Company shall provide a negotiation package/signing fee of
Naira to community, within one month of the signing and
implementation of this MOU and that community executive shall
inform all community workers, elders, women, youths of the
details of this MOU so as to avoid confusion and
misinformation.

Specifically, Chevron Nigeria Limited has engaged its community

stakeholders in two main ways- Memorandum of Understanding drawn
between it and individual communities and through the Global Memorandum
of Understanding (GMoU) framework. It was introduced and developed in
2005 to guide its relationship with communities assembled within a cluster
system. This attempt was a desire to participate in community affairs by
making partnerlistic charitable contribution that benefits a targeted group, and
at the same time creates a positive impression in recipients and observers
critics alike. In a short note, engagements under the MoU framework
produced social investments in the form of philanthropic grants for cultural
projects where community groups are passive recipients. MoU usually have
like provision on job opportunities for the indigenes of communities, contracts
122 The Nigerian Journal of Sociology and Anthropology Vol. 13 no. 2

awards to community members, procedure for resolving grievances and the

like. It intended to ensure capacity building, community empowerment and
supports the use of local contractors in the execution of projects (localization
of local content) (Extract from IRDC, Annual report, 2012).
However, the GmoU nevertheless was found to have been the initiatives
of oil companies while the community and representatives who are signatories
to it at times signed what they know little about. In addition, we found from
the study that majority of inhabitants especially women are excluded from the
signing of MoU as well as in the communities’ representative team.

(b) Oil communities, conflicts and politics of compensatory schemes and

funds
Oil companies had been blamed for their dual identity in their attempt to pay
oil compensation as oil operation in host communities on the basis siting of
drilling activities. Aworawo (2004) in his discussion about onshore/offshore
stated that the dichotomy on onshore/offshore has greatly favoured the oil
companies and even yielded pulp results especially when it becomes
abundantly clear that there would be more dividends from the federal
government following the promulgation of the onshore/offshore oil resources
Decree in 1971. So while the communities with oil well try to claim more
benefits from oil compensation in physical cash or through allocation of
compensatory schemes, award of contact and other social projects; other
communities revolted. A respondent from Aiyetoro, who resided in Molutehin
community said:
We are under compensated because we have not been opportune
to have our indigene as Chairman of any juice position of any of
those bodies that decide on negotiation for oil compensation.
Most time, Chairmanship like other juice positions both in the
government agencies and oil associates like AICECUM, IRDC,
NDDC and ASCOPIC are held by indigenes of so-called core
communities. With this, accesses to most of these infrastructures
become so difficult and as a result most are appropriated by
these communities’ representatives. It is a matter of who dictate
the pipe taste the tune. (Molutehin community/September 22,
2013)

The problem associated with the appointment of board of management of

some of the government agencies including compensation oil umbrella bodies,
which manage compensation, was said to have something to do with Nigerian
government policy and which affected the allocation of compensatory schemes
and funds. The indigene and non-indigene policy dichotomy according to
Dibua (2005) surprisingly enjoyed constitutional backing. For example, the
Law and Act that established most of the developmental commissions such as
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), as well as Oil Mineral
Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) and the Ondo State
 Intra-Communal Conflict and the Politics of Oil Compensation Sharing 123

Oil Producing Areas Development Commission (OSOPADEC), as found in the

study area have it designed that the board members of the commission must be
indigenes of oil producing communities which operationally excludes some
groups and their communities within the coastal communities particularly the
impacted communities.
Thus, the Ugbo Ilaje communities having been named as “oil producing
communities” and have proceeded to appropriate the benefits of resources
found naturally and abundantly deposited in their communities to the neglect of
the affected communities. Similarly, is the demand by some communities
within Ugbo Ilaje today, who seem to have the larger numbers of oil wells
cited on their lands and therefore demand for larger share of compensation.
This has aggravated to rivalry, conflict and demands for the positions as
headship of these agencies and oil bodies, at the same time posture to get large
share of whatever that comes as schemes and funds from oil compensation
between and within the communities. This has aggravated to compensation and
compensatory rivalry as exemplified by Awoye and Molutehin who have
gotten more of compensatory schemes.
Furthermore, discussions, records and observations showed that there have
been inter-community invasions that often disrupted Chevron operations at
operation facilities with attendant counter-invasions often lasting several hours
before being brought under control (Guardian, April 15, 2013). Similarly,
contestations for standing committees’ leadership often become overtly violent
even where they are tagged ‘peaceful protest. For example a respondent and
one of community representative in IRDC from Mese community said:
There is arrogance in those who call themselves indigenes of
core producing communities, that claimed the ownership of
everything, even the oil platform in their communities; the
leadership of IRDC, and therefore arrogates everything to
themselves. Honestly, there is already politics within the so-
called oil producing communities as regards Ugbo communities.
We have not recognized Jackson as Chairman of IRDC though,
he has since been parading himself as Chairman, and his
chairmanship remains a kangaroo. (FGD/Mese/May 22, 2013)

Responses to the question on the fairness of oil compensatory schemes,

more than half of the respondents (63.3%) stated that there have been
occasions when their communities felt unfairly treated, while 36.7%
responded otherwise. Inspite of the recorded cases of open altercations,
respondents are wont to denials of invasions as they generally claimed: ‘an
average Ilaje man from either Ugbo communities or Mahin communities is a
peaceful man and can only be tempted to fight if he is pushed to the wall’ and
this historical peaceful nature before 1998 oil conflict was linked to their
authentic communal lifestyle; where some houses have no doors, and where
beds were shared. According to a key informant he said that:
124 The Nigerian Journal of Sociology and Anthropology Vol. 13 no. 2

We do not beg for oil compensation because our fishing

expedition makes us sufficient. We believe that ocean is not a
barren entity; even if it’s affected, there is no element of paucity
of fishing in ocean. No matter how the tide, after the tidal, come
calmness; the calmness now propels the fishermen for their
fishing expeditions either in the local or modern form.
(KII/Igbokoda/September 3, 2013)

But another respondent saw it in a different way, according to the respondent

at Ogogoro he said;
We have felt cheated, discouraged and marginalized times
without number when you want to rate the disparity on
compensatory schemes and funds, and that we do not fight
ourselves do not mean we are cowards. We are astonished with
what is happening most especially, the politics and oil dichotomy
that has favour our brother in Ugbo Kingdom, but we still
believe in our ancestral history as the blood that ties us together
therefore, we remain calm even when there have been cause for
conflict. (IDI/Ogogoro/May 22, 2013)

Another respondent from Araromi and Key informant from Mahin Kingdom
said:
We do not fight ourselves because we believe the issues on oil
dichotomy as oil producing communities, onshore; offshore
dichotomy has not come into being by the making of our
brothers, but policy and the tactics from government and oil
companies. The offshore favour them because their water is
shallow in Ugbo Kingdom and very easy to get oil before 200
nautical shore miles compare to muddy water we have in Mahin
Kingdom that with 30 kilometer miles we are already in ocean.
(KII/26 May, 2013)

The people therefore saw the act of division within them as caused by the
government and Oil Companies. On the part of government, people referred to
oil dichotomy as onshore/offshore policy that favours part of communities at
the expense of others, and on the part of Oil Companies, reference were made
to dual identity as oil producing and non oil producing communities as a
divide and rule tactics used by oil companies to pay Paul and rob Peters of
which continue to put them apart.
Issue of transparency which is one of the objectives of oil bodies was
reported absent in the handling of scholarship and other compensatory funds.
According to a key informant from Odofado, he said that:
Most times scholarships as well as jobs allocation from Chevron
were sold to strangers like Ikale, Isoko and Itshekiri; people who
have nothing to do with oil exploration in the state. But
 Intra-Communal Conflict and the Politics of Oil Compensation Sharing 125

communities representative do all these to make their ill wealth

out of the commonwealth. (IDI/May 12, 2013)

Generally, respondents argued that the five key objectives of IRDC as

participatory partnership, transparency, accountability, sustainable
development, conflict resolution litigation, continual maturity evaluation which
are hallmark for the establishment were all absent in the performance of the
body that disbursed and allocate compensatory schemes. Submissions such as
this and other related conflict and violence experiences become reinforced, and
make relevant the framework that guided this study. Field experiences point to
further conflict in the nearest future because the blood ties as brotherhood of
oneness Ilaje solidarity either between Mahin communities or within Ugbo oil
producing communities had already dwindled. There is already weaken social
cohesion among the groups of communities as communities have become
balkanised into different identities and mostly this fragmentation as mid-wife
by the traditional leaders and political elites. For example, in most times, in
issue of nomination and ratification of community representative,
representatives who are not loyal to the king are removed, while those whose
tenures had expired were retained as long as they remained loyal to the King.
This is in congruence with Joseph’s “patron-clients” assertion in prebendalist
theory that:
Individual ruler by dint of personal prestige and power treated
ordinary folk as extensions of the big man’s household, with no
rights or privileges other than those bestowed by the ruler.
Authority is entirely personalised, shaped by the ruler’s
preferences rather than any codified system of laws. The rulers
ensure the political stability of the regime and personal political
survival by providing a zone of security in an uncertain
environment and by selectively distributing favours and
materials benefit to loyal followers who are not citizens of polity
so much as ruler clients. (Joseph, 1996)

Both the political elite and the traditional leaders are today in control of the
affairs of the communities. They decide what they want, what comes to the
communities, who is entitling to it and how to be shared. The negotiation for
oil compensation is like the destiny of the local communities is being placed in
the hands of the traditional rulers and the political elite through the signing of
MoU. What is discovered is no more considered as politics, but corruption
between the local political elite and the traditional leaders. The claim by some
communities as major oil producers, as major owners of oil wells, and
attempts to get more of what comes from oil compensation is not only seen as
disadvantage to others who suffer the consequences of oil activities, but a seed
of discord that is gathering momentum for conflict at large. The conflict as
observed is growing fast, however it is no more between the Ijaw and the
Mahin Ilaje, but within the UgboIlaje Ilaje communities themselves; as intra
126 The Nigerian Journal of Sociology and Anthropology Vol. 13 no. 2

conflict over the share and the distribution of the compensation and
compensatory projects.

Conclusion
The study examined the local politics and conflicts arising from oil
compensation agitation and distribution in the oil producing community of
Ilaje, Ondo State. Basically, it was shown that access to power and other
schemes and funds purported for the development of oil producing
communities under the subject matter were disbursed, allocated and
concentrated in the selected communities and few groups based on their
communities’ identity. This created a politics driven lopsided trickling down
effect driven by patron-client relationship and pathway with the end product of
greater poverty in the midst of plenty. It has in turn created a rat race where
very few persons use the opportunity to protect their interests and that of their
kinsmen as an answer to the patron- client assertion by Joseph in his
prebendalism theory. We call for an immediate solution from Nigerian
government and suggest a need for a restructuring of the process of oil
compensation payment and distribution in order to nip the imminent conflict in
the bud. There is a need for peace making structures in the region to avoid the
degeneration of the little of the brotherhood that is still in existence.
Stakeholders in Ondo State oil producing communities like other oil producing
communities in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, should see oil deposits in their area as
a joint depot for sustainability and equity; a natural blessing and a pool of
commonwealth that should be used for common benefit.

References
Adunbi, O. (2013) Mythic oil: Resources belonging and the politics of claim
among the Ilaje Yoruba of Nigeria. Africa. 83(02).
Ajigbade, I. (2010) “Ugbo-Mahin Conflict in Ilaje, Ondo State” In Biodun
Adeniran (ed.), History of social Conflict and Conflict Management in
Nigeria. Nigeria: Archers Press.
Alao, A. (2007) Resources Conflict in African Countries: The Tragedy of
Natural Endowment. Woodbridge Suffolk University: Rochester Press.
Albert, I.O. (2001) Introduction to Third Party Intervention and Community
Conflicts. Ibadan: PETRAF John Archers.
Albert, I.O. (2003) Mainstreaming positive leadership in conflict
transformation, Nigeria. Lagos: Centre for Social Science Research and
Development.
Aworawo, D. (2004) Fiscal allocation and development at the third tier in the
constitution. Journal of Consttutional Development. Centre for
Constitutionalism and demilitarisation (CENCOD). Lagos: Panaf press.
Babatolu and B. Olawuyi (2001) “Environmental Impact of Ethnic nationalities
crisis in the Niger Delta Area of Nigeria” being the text of a paper
presented at the 3rd National Conference of Social Studies Association of
Nigeria held at Adeyemi college of Education. Pp 4.
 Intra-Communal Conflict and the Politics of Oil Compensation Sharing 127

Babatunde, A.R. (2010) Impact of oil Exploration on the Socio- Economic life
of Ilaje-Ugbo People of Ondo State, Nigeria. Unpublished PhD Thesis,
Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan.
Barret, S.R. (1976) The Use of Models in Anthropological Fieldwork. Journal
of Anthropological Research, 32(2): 161-81.
Bajowa, O. (1993) Ikale. Lagos: New Watch Book Limited. Also see W.A.
Moore (1970) History of Itsekiri F.L & Co. Ltd. Pp 13.
David, A. and Rothchild, D. (1996) Containing fear: the origins and
management of ethnic conflict, Journal of International Security, 21(2).
Dibua, J.I. (2005) Citizenship and resource Control in Nigeria: The case of
minority communities in the Niger Delta. Africa Spectrum, 40(1): 5-28.
Ebiseni (2012) Oral interview with Honourable Ebisen, a three-time
Commissioner for environment in Ondo State.
Gilbert, J. (1985) Rural Theory: The Grounding of Rural Sociology. Rural
Sociology, 47: 609-633.
Guardian Newspaper (1997) “Rival Groups clash over Shell Contracts”.
Guardian Newspaper (1998) Chevron Parable Crisis in Ilaje-Ugbo, Ondo
State, Nigeria, 6, June.
Guardian Newspaper (2013) “Crisis Brews in Oil producing Communities, as
Rivals clash over headship of body in Ondo State. Available online. April
27.
Horsfall, A.K. (1999) The OMPADEC Dream. West Sussex, UK: Imprint
Publication.
Human Rights Watch (1999) The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and
Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil producing communities.
London: HRW.
Isumonah, V.A. (1998) “Oil and Minority Ethnic Nationalism in Nigeria: The
case of the Ogoni, An Unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Political
Science, University of Ibadan.
Ikporukpo, C.O. (1983) Petroleum exploration and the socio-economic
environment in Nigeria. International Journal of Environmental Studies,
21: 193-203.
Joseph, R.A. (1987) Democracy and Prebendal politics in Nigeria: The rise and
fall of second republic. Cambridge University press.
Lemeshow, S.; Hosmer, D.W.; Klar, J. & Lwanga, S.K. (1990) Adequacy of
sample size in health studies. Geneva: World health Organisation.
NDDC (2007) Niger Delta regional Development Master Plan. Port Harcourt.
Obi, C. (1997) “The impact of oil on Nigeria’s revenue allocation system,
problems and prospects for national reconstruction” In Amuwo, K. et al.
(eds.). (1998) Federalism and political restructuring in Nigeria. Ibadan:
Spectrum Books.
Obi, C.; Soremekun, K. (1995) Oil and the Nigeria State: An overview
Soremekun, K. (ed.). Perspective on the Oil Industry. Lagos: Amkra
Books.
128 The Nigerian Journal of Sociology and Anthropology Vol. 13 no. 2

Obi, C. and Okwechime, I. (2004) Globalization and Identity Politics: The

Emerging Pattern of Inter-ethnic Relations in Nigeria’s Niger Delta.
Nigeria and Globalization: Discourses on Identity Politics and Social
Conflict, Duro Oni, S. Gupta, T. Omoniyi, E. Adfegbija, S. Awonusi (eds.).
Lagos: Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilization (CBAAC).
Omotola J.A. (1978) “The Quantum of Compensation for Oil pollution: An
Overview” Environmental laws in Nigeria including Compensation, In
J.A. Omotola (ed.). Department of Law, University of Lagos.
Omotola, J.A. (1980) Essay on the Nigerian land Use Act 1978. Lagos
University Press.
Ololajulo, B.O. (2013) Clinging to the inheritance of their fathers: resource
identity and patrimonialisation of oil in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,
Journal of Environment and Culture, 10(1&2): 18-38.
Ololajulo, B.O. (2006) “Rural Change and Impact of Development
Intervention on Ilaje people in Ondo State Nigeria”, Unpublished PhD
thesis, University of Ibadan.