After two years of war and a string of assassinations that eliminated most of its leaders, Hamas now looks like a group in survival mode, facing uncertainty.
Moreover, according to sources who deal directly with Hamas leaders, the militant group appears to be in disarray. The chain of command within its military wing is close to non-existent, and communication between its leaders in Gaza and fighters in the tunnels on the one hand and with negotiators in exile abroad on the other is difficult and infrequent.
Hamas has lost significant support among Gaza's estimated two million residents after the humanitarian crisis in the enclave bit, with hundreds of thousands going hungry and famine claiming scores of lives, the sources told The National.
“Hamas is at its weakest ever,” said one of the sources. “The only bargaining chip it now has is the hostages. Militarily, only a negligible number of active fighters are left in the field.”

Hamas has said it has no intention of surrendering its weapons as demanded by the plan put forward by US President Donald Trump to end the Gaza war, but its approval might point to a different approach.
On Friday, it said it welcomed the 20-point plan but it wanted clarifications on some of its points, like Israel's withdrawal, postwar governance and the mandate of a proposed international force to police the enclave.
“The alternative perspective is that Hamas couldn’t care less about further devastation and death in Gaza,” said former Israeli diplomat Alon Pinkas. “For them, giving up the hostages is surrendering the one asset they have. They don’t mind drawing Israel into a complete quagmire, call it Vietnam, south Lebanon or Afghanistan.”

Nimrod Novik, a former senior adviser to Israel's late prime minister Shimon Peres, says he believes Hamas's disarmament “is not impossible”.
Disarming Hamas
To Mr Novik, now a fellow at the New York-based Israel Policy Forum, the issue with Hamas's disarmament might seem semantic to outsiders but it is of great weight for the group. It does not want the plan framed as “disarming Hamas” but rather as the movement “laying down” its arms, he told The National.
“The distinction suggests that it is not imposed by third parties … but rather something Hamas volunteers to do for the betterment of the Palestinian population and in the service of its national interest.”
The pressure has been piling on Hamas since Arab nations gave Mr Trump's plan a cautious welcome, with many of them saying they see it as a road map that could be followed rather than a destination.
For example, Egypt, which together with Turkey and Qatar maintain close links to Hamas, said a great deal of discussion and negotiations are required before Mr Trump's road map can take effect. However, all three agree that Hamas has no place in postwar Gaza.

The group has already signalled its readiness to become a political faction, staying away from governance or reconstruction in postwar Gaza, and for its leaders to leave the enclave and live in exile on condition that they are not assassinated by Israel.
It's all a far cry from the Hamas that on the eve of the Gaza war was a powerful member of an Iranian-backed militant axis that included Lebanon's Hezbollah, Iraqi and Syrian militias and the Houthis in Yemen.
But Hamas's likely demise as an armed resistance group, according to the sources, may not be complete.
French President Emmanuel Macron told Mr Trump last month that Hamas has the same number of fighters it had when the war started. He did not elaborate or say where the information came from, but there have been reports of the group's energetic recruitment during the war.
Infrequent, ineffective
However, available evidence suggests that these figures may be correct on paper only, with many of them inactive or new recruits who are too inexperienced to be thrown into combat.

Hamas fighters continued to attack Israeli troops in Gaza and occasionally unleashed rockets on Israel, but both are infrequent, ineffective in the case of the rockets, and largely symbolic when viewed in the war's wider context.
The sources said small cells of three to four young though active members of Hamas's current fighting force have been quickly forming in Gaza. Many of them are preparing themselves for suicide missions that would not turn the tide of the war but constitute an irritant to Israel's military.
“The ones who are still in the fight are by far the most dangerous Hamas has seen in years,” said another source. “Each cell is electing its own leader and there's barely any contact between the cells.”
The sources, however, point out that Hamas's diminished combat capabilities are compounded by the group's poor communications, a problem that has steadily worsened with Israel killing so many of its leaders over the past two years.

They said the hierarchy of the group's military wing has all but collapsed. It takes days for leaders of the group inside Gaza to reach those living in exile in Qatar or in Turkey.
The group's concern with the safety of its leaders and worry that mobile phones could be tracked by Israel began when Hamas's political leader and chief negotiator, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated in Tehran. Last month, the group's leaders in Doha were bombed by Israel. They are believed to have survived the attack, but several of them were wounded.
The sources said none of Hamas's senior operatives in exile or inside Gaza are now carrying mobile phones or any electronic devices, preferring to use handwritten notes delivered by aides situated a safe distance away and using secure phone lines.
Additional reporting by Thomas Helm from Jerusalem