Wikipedia

KN-25

KN-25 is a designation given to a North Korean tactical ballistic missile.

KN-25
TypeShort-range ballistic missile/Multiple rocket launcher
Service history
Used byNorth Korea
Production history
Designed2019
Specifications
Mass3,000 kg (6,600 lb)
Length8.2 m (27 ft)
Diameter600 mm KN24 450 mm KN25 MRL
Operational
range
380 km (240 mi)
Guidance
system
Possibly inertial with satellite
Accuracy80-90 m[2]
Launch
platform
Wheeled or tracked vehicle

Design

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The KN-25 is officially described as a "super-large calibre" multiple launch rocket system. The larger size and greater range of the missile compared to traditional rocket artillery led the United States Forces Korea (USFK) to categorize it as an SRBM. It flies on a controlled ballistic trajectory. Missiles are estimated to be 600 mm in diameter, 8.2 meters long, and weigh 3,000 kg. They have an unspecified guidance system and have six rotating rear fins, with four moving forward fins, which likely provide the attitude control of the rocket. They are mounted on either a four-tube Tatra 813 8×8 wheeled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL),[3] or a tracked chassis with 10 road wheels on each side, carrying six tubes.[4]

It is a battlefield weapon, suitable for deployment at battalion-level, to attack enemy rear-echelon targets out to 380 km, with a conventional blast-fragmentation warhead.[5][6] In October 2022, the KN-25 was included in a statement among other missiles that North Korea claimed were part of its capability to deliver tactical nuclear weapons.[7] At a parade in February 2023, the KN-25 was included among other missiles which the North Korean press collectively referred to these as "tactical nuclear weapons operation units."[8]

The six rotating rear fins are an unusual feature for rocket artillery, a considerable innovation of North Korea. Their purpose is to provide stabilisation of the rocket while in flight, compared to other rocket artillery rounds, which are usually spin stabilised by rotating the entire body. This method of stabilisation creates a more favourable environment for the guidance systems, as the rest of the missile does not rotate.[9] It is possible that the missile will be stabilised through rolling the missile when it enters the upper atmosphere, where the smaller control fins are unable to function optimally, and then stopping the spin as it re-enters into denser air.[3]

The missile possibly derives from the OTR-21 Tochka/KN-02 Toksa, which has a similarly sized motor, at 62 cm diameter. Connecting three such motor segments would result in a length similar to the KN-25 rocket.[10] It has a 300 kg heavy warhead and circular error probable accuracy of 80 to 90 meters.[11] The KN-25 is likely an indigenous project, as media coverage of this missile emphasises its research, using words such as 'Juche projectiles' to describe it, unlike the KN-23.[12]

On January 1, 2023, 30 TELs were presented as a gift to the plenary meeting of the Worker's Party of Korea, with Kim Jong-un attending and making a speech.[13] The system was described as 'unprecedented', in both the munitions industry as having no equal and its presentation, being on the lawn of the party central committee.[14] 30 6-tube tracked launchers plus at least nine 4-tube wheeled launchers publicly showcased in North Korea's possession, would give them the ability to fire up to 216 projectiles, requiring many fewer launch vehicles than would be needed to fire a similar number of traditional ballistic missiles, to saturate South Korean ballistic missile defenses.[4]

Cruise missile launcher

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On 13 September 2021, North Korea announced they had conducted successful flight tests of a land attack cruise missile (LACM) over the past two days. The mobile launcher appears to be the same vehicle used to carry KN-25 "oversized" rockets, both weapons likely being similar in diameter. The cruise missile could carry a conventional or nuclear warhead. It is claimed to have a range from 1,500 km (930 mi)[15] to 2,000 km (1,200 mi). It was later revealed to be named the Hwasal-1/2.[16]

Tests

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Date[5][3] Number fired Range Apogee Notes
31 July 2019 Two 21 minute firing interval, dubious projectile; thin warhead, but different shape to the smaller KN-09 (MRL)
2 August 2019 Two 24 minute firing interval, tracked chassis
24 August 2019 Two 380 km 97 km 17 minute firing interval
10 September 2019 Two 330 km (210 mi) 50-60 km 19 minute firing interval, another rocket possibly failed to properly launch.
31 October 2019 Two 370 km (230 mi) 90 km 3 minute firing interval
28 November 2019 Two 380 km 97 km 30 second firing interval
2 March 2020 Two 240 km (150 mi) 35 km 20 second firing interval, first time seen operated by artillery soldiers, potentially reached initial operating capacity.
29 March 2020[17] Two or three 230 kilometres (140 mi) 30 km unknown firing interval, possibly around 1 minute, another rocket possibly failed to properly launch.
31 December 2022 Three[18]
1 January 2023 One[18]
18 March 2024 Six[19]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf [bare URL PDF]
  2. ^ https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf [bare URL PDF]
  3. ^ a b c "Analysis of the KN-25 Multiple Rocket Launcher System after the 9 March 2020 DPRK Test". March 23, 2020. Archived from the original on 2021-10-12. Retrieved 2021-10-26.
  4. ^ a b Update on the DPRK's 600 mm Multiple Launch Rocket System. Open Nuclear Network. 13 February 2023.
  5. ^ a b KN-25. Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
  6. ^ North Korea's Recent KN-25 Launches. 38 North. 6 March 2020.
  7. ^ “A Strong Military Warning:” Four Key Implications of North Korea's October 10 Missile Statement. 38 North. 14 October 2022.
  8. ^ North Korea's Feb. 8 Parade Highlights ICBMs and Tactical Nukes. 38 North. 15 February 2023.
  9. ^ "Brief on the Defence Development Exhibition of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea". oneearthfuture.org. Archived from the original on 2022-03-29. Retrieved 2021-10-26.
  10. ^ "Pukguksong MLRS". www.b14643.de. Retrieved 2021-10-26.
  11. ^ https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf [bare URL PDF]
  12. ^ "a tale of two missiles: analysis of kcna reports on north koreas kn-23 and kn-24 short range ballistic missiles". Archived from the original on 2021-01-15.
  13. ^ "KCNA | Article | Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Reply Speech at Ceremony of Donating 600mm Super-large Multiple Launch Rocket System". kcna.kp. Retrieved 2023-01-03.
  14. ^ "KCNA | Article | Gift of Loyalty to Plenary Meeting of Great WPK from Munitions Industrial Workers". kcna.kp. Retrieved 2023-01-03.
  15. ^ Initial Analysis of North Korea's “New Type Long-Range Cruise Missile”. 38 North. 15 September 2021.
  16. ^ North Korea Launches Four “Hwasal-2” LACMs to Show Strong Deterrence and Rapid Response. 38 North. 1 March 2023.
  17. ^ "North Korea Fine Tunes its Precision Strike Capabilities Amidst Pandemic". Beyond Parallel. 2020-03-30. Retrieved 2021-03-12.
  18. ^ a b "KCNA | Article | Latest News | Test-fire of Super-large Multiple Rocket Launchers Held". kcna.kp. Retrieved 2023-01-03.
  19. ^ "North Korea: Kim Jong Un Supervised Tests of Artillery Systems Targeting Seoul". Voice of America. 2024-03-18. Retrieved 2024-03-19.
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